We are asked here to decide whether RCW 9.95.210 limits the length of time for which a sentence may be suspended in justice court. We conclude it does not.
Spyrodon Nicholas Avlonitis pleaded guilty to a charge of simple assault, a gross misdemeanor, in Seattle District Court on February 22, 1979. Judge John Ritchie entered a guilty judgment on that date and imposed a sentence of 30 days in jail, suspended on the conditions that Avlonitis (1) be on active probation for 1 year and (2) pay a fine, restitution, and attorney and witness fees.
Avlonitis apparently feared he had violated these conditions in some respect because on August 13, 1979, he filed in King County Superior Court an application for writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Ritchie "from issuing a Bench Warrant against Mr. Avlonitis or to take any other steps calculated to bring the petitioner into court for a revocation of his probation, ...11
Avlonitis' argument in support of his application for a writ of prohibition rests on State v. Monday, 85 Wn.2d 906, 540 P.2d 416 (1975). The trial judge in Monday had sentenced the defendant to 1 year in jail but suspended that sentence for 2 years. More than a year later, the judge revoked the suspended sentence and imposed the original jail sentence. The Supreme Court found this revocation impermissible under RCW 9.95.210, which provides that a suspended sentence may "continue for such period of time, *608not exceeding the maximum term of sentence".1 The court held "that the maximum period of time for which a sentence may be suspended under RCW 9.95.210 is the term of sentence pronounced by the trial judge. Thereafter, the trial court loses jurisdiction to revoke probation and reimpose the sentence." Monday, at 910. Avlonitis argued on the basis of Monday that his probation could be revoked only during the term of his suspended sentence, i.e., within 30 days from the time Judge Ritchie's judgment of guilty was entered.
A Superior Court judge entered a judgment denying the application for a writ of prohibition. Avlonitis appeals from that judgment.
Avlonitis argues principally that the time limit imposed by RCW 9.95.210, as interpreted by Monday, should apply here, because the statutes governing the justice courts, RCW 3.30, do not specifically mention the length of time for which a judge may suspend the sentence of a convicted defendant. Avlonitis points out that RCW 3.66.010 provides in part: " [Wjhere no special provision is otherwise made by law, such [justice] court shall be vested with all the necessary powers which are possessed by courts of record in this state ..."
*609 Our reading of the justice court statutes, however, leads us to a different conclusion. We note initially that RCW 3.66.068, applying specifically to justice courts, provides for a 1-year period of continuing jurisdiction after sentencing during which a sentence may be suspended.2 RCW 3.66.067 provides that a justice court may defer sentencing a defendant and place him on probation for up to a year.3 RCW 3.66.069 provides deferral and suspension of sentence may be revoked by the court if the defendant violates or fails to carry out any of the conditions of the deferral or suspension.4
Our duty in construing legislation is to make that legislation purposeful and effective. State v. Hull, 86 Wn.2d 527, 546 P.2d 912 (1976). For that reason, we construe these statutes as contemplating that the sentence of a defendant convicted in justice court may be suspended, and the defendant placed on probation, for a 1-year period. Such a construction makes the maximum duration of suspended sentences identical with that of deferred sentences as provided in RCW 3.66.067. No rational reason exists to believe the legislature intended to differentiate between the maximum duration of these two types of sentences. A 1-year *610maximum period for suspended sentences is also consistent with the 1-year period of "continuing jurisdiction" provided for in RCW 3.66.068.
Application to justice courts of RCW 9.95.210, as interpreted by State v. Monday, supra, would limit the length of probation for a defendant receiving a suspended sentence to an unreasonably short time. Sentences in justice courts Eire frequently no longer than 30 days.5 Limitation of probation to the duration of the actual sentence imposed would often leave insufficient time for a defendant to pay fines or complete other conditions of his or her probation. Limitation of the court's authority to revoke suspended sentences to the length of the sentence imposed would likewise hinder the court's ability to supervise the conditions of those suspended sentences. This problem is not so severe in the superior courts, especially in felony cases where sentences are imposed for a matter of years rather than days.6 The defendant in State v. Monday, supra, for example, was convicted in Superior Court of negligent homicide.
Therefore, we conclude that the district court judge was empowered to revoke Avlonitis' suspended sentence at any time during his 1-year probation. The application for writ of prohibition was properly denied.
*611The judgment is affirmed.
Williams and Andersen, JJ., concur.
Reconsideration denied January 19, 1981.
Review granted by Supreme Court April 23, 1981.