SUMMARY ORDER
Petitioner Wei Huang, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, *62seeks review of an August 11, 2009, order of the BIA affirming the October 31, 2007, decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Philip L. Morace denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Wei Huang, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Aug. 11, 2009), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Oct. 31, 2007). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
Under the circumstances of this case, we review the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA’s decision. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir.2005). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 157-58 (2d Cir.2008); Salimatou Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 110 (2d Cir.2008).
I. Claim Based on Huang’s Wife’s Abortion
In concluding that Huang failed to establish either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution based on his wife’s forced abortion, the BIA found that Huang did not establish that he: (1) resisted China’s family planning policy; or (2) was harmed as a result. See Shi Liang Lin v. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 301 (2d Cir.2007). Although Huang argues that he endured emotional pain rising to the level of persecution as a result of his wife’s abortion, he does not challenge with any specificity the agency’s dispositive findings that he failed to demonstrate that he resisted China’s family planning policy or that any harm he endured resulted from any such resistance. See id. at 309-10. Thus, the agency reasonably denied his application for asylum on the basis of his family planning claim.
II. Claim Based on Huang’s Practice of Falun Gong
Huang also argues that he established a well-founded fear of persecution based on his practice of Falun Gong in this country. To establish asylum eligibility based on a fear of future persecution, an applicant must show that he or she subjectively fears persecution and that this fear is objectively reasonable. Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir.2004). When the applicant’s fear of persecution is based on activities undertaken in the United States, he must demonstrate a reasonable possibility that “authorities in his country of nationality are either aware of his activities or likely to become aware of his activities.” Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir.2008).
Huang argues that the agency imposed an incorrect burden on him by looking only at whether the Chinese government was currently aware of his practice of Falun Gong, without addressing whether the government was likely to become aware of that practice. To the contrary, the IJ noted that Huang’s involvement in the Fa-lun Gong movement consisted of attending a single protest and occasionally distributing flyers. Given the minimal extent of Huang’s activities, the IJ reasonably found that Huang’s claim was “speculative and mere conjecture,” requiring a chain of inferences unsupported by the record. Thus, we find no error in the IJ’s determination that Huang failed to meet his burden of proof. See id.
Because Huang was unable to meet his burden for asylum, he necessarily failed to meet the higher burden required for withholding of removal and CAT relief. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this peti*63tion is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).