Plaintiff appeals a decision of the Worker’s Compensation Appellate Commission that ordered plaintiff to authorize his employer to obtain information from the Social Security Administration regarding social security benefits plaintiff receives. This Court previously denied plaintiff’s application for leave to appeal in an unpublished order, entered December 15, 1995 (Docket No. 188531). However, our Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, remanded this matter for consideration as on leave granted “of the issue whether the magistrate properly ordered that an authorization for social security records be given.” Vernon v Controlled Temperature, Inc, 453 Mich 925; 554 NW2d 915 (1996). We affirm.
Plaintiff last worked for defendant Controlled Temperature, Inc., on July 12, 1984. On March 23, 1987, a hearing referee entered an open award of benefits on the basis of a January 6, 1984, injury. Benefits were paid to plaintiff. The appeal process continued until our Supreme Court denied a defense motion for reconsideration on July 31, 1992.
Plaintiff turned sixty-two years of age on May 31, 1992. In anticipation of plaintiff’s becoming eligible for early old-age social security benefits, defense *34counsel asked plaintiff’s counsel for a release in order to obtain information from the Social Security Administration regarding the benefits, if any, plaintiff received. It was known that plaintiff had been receiving social security disability benefits. Defense counsel relied on MCL 418.354(3)(b)(iii); MSA 17.237(354)(3)(b)(iii)1 for authority. The request was denied.
*35Defense counsel filed a request for a hearing, which was held on August 12, 1992. In the interim, defense counsel sent plaintiffs attorney a written request on June 22, 1992, which provided formal notification that plaintiff was entitled to early old-age social security benefits and which asked for a release in order to verify the type and amount of social security benefits plaintiff received. The written request went unanswered. The magistrate concluded that § 354(3) (a) contemplates the situation when an employee might be eligible for old-age benefits on reaching the age of sixty-two and ordered plaintiff to provide a release. The WCAC affirmed. It concluded that a plain reading of the statute logically led to the conclusion reached by the magistrate.
In this appeal, plaintiff argues that § 354(3) does not apply to him until he reaches sixty-five years of age. Plaintiff reasons that because he cannot be com*36pelled to apply for early old-age benefits, MCL 418.354(12); MSA 17.237(354)(12), the statute does not require him to provide a release to defendants. Plaintiff additionally argues that the release provision in § 354(3) (b) cannot be enforced because other portions of § 354(3) have not been implemented.
The coordination provisions in § 354 were added in 1981 (1981 PA 203) to address the perceived problem of a retired worker’s receiving both worker’s compensation payments and other payments also funded by the employer. Corbett v Plymouth Twp, 453 Mich 522, 531; 556 NW2d 478 (1996). At issue in this case is the coordination provision for old-age insurance benefits received under the Social Security Act, 42 USC 301 et seq. Employers are entitled to reduce weekly worker’s compensation payments by fifty percent of the amount of such old-age insurance benefits. MCL 418.354(1)(a); MSA 17.237(354)(1)(a).
In § 354(3) our Legislature established a method for determining whether there are benefits to coordinate and the amount of such benefits. Section 354(3) (a) requires the bureau to promulgate rules regarding notification by an employer to an employee of “possible” eligibility and the requirements for establishing proof of application for those benefits. This provision further requires notification to be mailed to the employee after the date the employee may be entitled to social security benefits. Plaintiff points out that no such rules have been promulgated.
Subsections 354(3) (b) (i)-(iii) pose certain requirements on an employee who receives notification of “possible” eligibility for social security benefits. The subsections require an employee to apply for benefits, to provide the employer with proof of the application, *37and to provide the employer with “an authority for release of information . . . The subsections state:
(b) Within 30 days after receipt of the notification of possible employee eligibility the employee shall:
(i) Make application for social security benefits.
(ü) Provide the employer or carrier with proof of that application.
(iii) Provide the employer or carrier with an authority for release of information which shall be utilized by the employer or carrier to obtain necessary benefit entitlement and amount information from the social security administration. The authority for release of information shall be effective for 1 year.
This provision is enforced by § 354(4), which permits benefits to be discontinued until an employee provides proof of the application and provides the authority for release of information.
We find nothing in the statute that limits the release or authorization provided for in § 354(3)(b)(iii) to employees who are sixty-five years old or older. To the contrary, the statute contemplates the release of information whenever an employee is possibly eligible for old-age social security benefits. Plaintiff does not dispute that he was eligible for such benefits when he reached the age of sixty-two. Plaintiff emphasizes that he cannot be forced to apply for such benefits. We agree with this assertion. MCL 418.354(12); MSA 17.237(354)(12) specifically states that nothing in § 354 is to be considered to compel an employee to apply for early old-age benefits. However, plaintiffs employer did not seek to compel plaintiff to apply for early benefits and neither the magistrate nor the wcac ordered plaintiff to do so. The employer merely requested authorization to *38obtain information to verify that plaintiff was not receiving social security benefits that could be coordinated. Plaintiff insisted that he was receiving disability benefits that could not be coordinated, but § 354(3)(b)(iii) clearly provides that an employer does not have to accept an employee’s representation but can verify for itself the benefits an employee receives. An employer’s need for information is the same whether early or regular old-age benefits are at issue.
We reject plaintiff’s argument that the employee’s obligation to authorize the release of information, as set forth in § 354(3)(b), is dependent on the requirement that the bureau promulgate rules, as provided in § 354(3)(a). The two portions of § 354(3) are not dependent on one another. Moreover, plaintiff received notification of possible eligibility for benefits at least three times: by an informal request, by a formal written request, and by the request for a hearing. The purpose of § 354(3)(a), to provide notice to an affected employee, was satisfied in the present case.
Verification of social security benefits is important in the overall scheme for coordination of benefits. Acceptance of plaintiff’s argument would seriously undermine that scheme. We do not believe our Legislature intended such a result. We avoid construing statutes to yield “absurd or self-defeating consequences . . . .” Haas v Ionia, 214 Mich App 361, 364; 543 NW2d 21 (1995). Statutes should be construed so as to give them validity and a reasonable construction, while inconsistencies in various provisions of a statute should be reconciled, if possible, so as to give effect to all parts of the statute. Gross v General Motors Corp, 448 Mich 147, 164; 528 NW2d 707 (1995). We do not think it reasonable to excuse plain*39tiffs obligations under the coordination scheme of § 354 because of the bureau’s failure to promulgate rales. The purpose of the unpromulgated rules was satisfied in the present case when plaintiff repeatedly received notice from his employer.
Affirmed.