We enter a new battleground in this case, guided by the solemn expression of Congressional will to preserve parklands and the environment from harm or destruction at the hands of federal aid projects. This appeal challenges the construction of a six-to-eight lane federal-aid expressway through the Bracken-ridge-Olmos Parklands located in the City of San Antonio, Texas. It comes to us from the district court’s order granting the federal and state defendants’ joint motion for summary judgment and denying the appellants’ motion for preliminary injunction. Since it is an appeal from a summary judgment, we have given the appellants the benefit of all favorable inferences that reasonably may be drawn from the evidence. See Pogue v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 5th Cir. 1957, 242 F.2d 575; 6 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.15 [3]. So viewing the Record, we find supported therein the following long and tortuous tale of bitter controversy, which we relate along with the history of the proceedings to date in this action.
I. Background
The controversy over this highway began in 1955 or 1956 when certain officials in the City of San Antonio first suggested to the Texas Highway Department the building of a highway from what is now the San Antonio International Airport into downtown San Antonio. The highway was to be funded on a 50-50 basis between the City of San Antonio and the State of Texas for right-of-way acquisition costs, and on a *101550-50 basis between the State of Texas and the federal government for construction costs.
A period of four or five years elapsed before the first steps were taken to implement the 1955 suggestion. Then, in 1960, the Texas Highway Department prepared a report for the construction of the highway, recommending two alternate routes, one of which was the proposed present route through the Brack-enridge-Olmos Parklands. In 1961, a bond issue election was held in San An-tomo on the proposed acquisition of right-of-way for the new highway, which was to be called “the North Expressway.” The bond issue passed by a vote of 40,799 to 23,775.1
In 1963, the State actually settled upon the present proposed route through the Park, and at that time for the purpose of obtaining federal aid in the construction of the highway, the State conducted a Public Hearing on the “North Expressway,” as required by 23 U.S.C.A. § 128.2 In 1964, the Bureau of Public *1016Roads, a federal agency then in charge of supervising federally-funded highways, notified the State Highway Engineer that “insofar as public hearings are concerned, [we] will approve the successive steps in the development of this section of the highway.” 3 Another three years elapsed during which the City of San Antonio litigated and negotiated for the acquisition of certain portions of the proposed right of way owned or abutted by private persons.4 Then, in 1967, the San Antonio Conservation Society requested the City Council to seek rerouting of the North Expressway in order to save the Park. The City Council denied their request. Thereafter, in December 1967, the San Antonio Conservation Society filed this action and also sought through administrative appeals in the Department of Transportation and in other federal agencies, to persuade the Secretary of Transportation to withhold federal approval of the project. In January 1968, the Secretary of Transportation stated to the district court, in an affidavit filed by an official of the Bureau of Public Roads, that, as of that time, no federal approval had been given to this highway project referred to as the North Expressway.5 In April 1968, the then Secretary Boyd asked that an analysis of the highway be prepared and, by telegram, requested that the district court take no action in the case until he had acted on the Conservation Society’s appeals.
On September 23, 1968, the Department of Transportation issued a press release stating that Secretary Boyd “today announced conditional approval” of the State’s request but the release stated specifically that “no part of the project will be approved until after [certain] design changes have been submitted to and approved by the Federal Highway Administration’s Bureau of Public Roads.”6 - This “conditional approval” never became final, however, because in February 1969 the State rejected the design changes requested by Secretary Boyd.
Following the State’s refusal to accept Secretary Boyd’s conditional approval, there were further meetings and discussions between those opposing the route and the Department of Transportation. On December 23, 1969, the Department of Transportation issued a press release which stated that the new Secretary Volpe “could not justify approval for construction of the North Expressway between Mulberry and Tuxedo Avenue [Mulberry being the southern border of Brackenridge Park, and Tuxedo being a northern boundary of the Olmos Basin Parklands].” He called for a further study of this “middle segment.” With *1017respect to the two “end segments,” however, the press release stated:
Authorization will be given to the Texas Highway Department to construct those segments north of Tuxedo Avenue and south of Mulberry Avenue as soon as an agreement is reached to study an alternative route for the remaining segment.
As it had done with Secretary Boyd’s conditional approval, the State also rejected Secretary Volpe’s conditional approval, and in January 1970 made a counteroffer containing some conditions of its own on the Secretary’s enforcement powers.7 The Secretary rejected the States’ proposal,8 and the Department of Transportation advised that unless the State agreed to the conditions originally proposed, the Secretary’s conditional approval of the two end segments “must be withdrawn.” In April 1970 the State of Texas responded that the Texas Highway Department “respectfully declines to make the study * * * ” It maintained that no further study was necessary because there were no alternatives. At this point, the appellants relaxed, thinking that, with the State refusing to meet the Secretary’s conditions, “the battle for the Park had been won.” 9 All was quiet10 for a period of months, until August 4, 1970, when the Texas Highway Department agreed to the proposed study of the “middle segment” on the condition that federal funds would be made available for the two “end segments.” On August 13, 1970, the Secretary, apparently without notice to the plaintiffs in the then pending suit challenging the North Expressway, authorized construction of the two “end segments” and an agreement was reached that an independent consultant would study alternatives to the “middle segment.” On August 24, 1970, the State Highway Engineer was notified that he was authorized to advertise for bids. On September 1,1970, the appellants revived their pending action in the court below, claiming that they had found out about the Secretary’s action only through the newspaper; that the Secretary’s action was in violation of the Department of Transportation Act of 1966, the Federal Aid to Highway Act of 1968, and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969; and that they needed immediate protection to preserve the status quo, since the state defendants had filed notices of contract letting proposing to an*1018nounce contract specifications on September 1 and September 8, 1970. No reply to this motion for interlocutory relief even was filed by the defendants until September 10, 1970, and the district court took no action on the appellants’ motion for interlocutory relief until after the bids on the southern segment of the project had been made public sometime around September 20.11 The matter was finally heard on the parties’ opposing motions for summary judgment on November 12,1970. On November 13, 1970, the district court denied appellants’ motion for preliminary injunction, granted the defendants’ joint motion for summary judgment insofar as the construction of the two “end segments” of the *1019freeway was concerned, and retained jurisdiction over the case to hear and consider the complaints of the plaintiffs concerning the “middle segment.” On November 16, the appellants filed a motion for stay pending appeal in this Court. This Court received the motion on November 17, 1970, and on November 18, 1970, denied the motion. On November 19 or 20, the State awarded the contracts to the low bidders and shortly thereafter construction on the southern segment commenced. On November 25, 1970, the President of the San Antonio Conservation Society wrote the Secretary of Transportation that the Society had, by Board action, dismissed all litigation on the North Expressway. Said the letter, “[I]t was a difficult decision to make but, in light of recent court action, it appeared to be the only reasonable choice at this time. Of course, we continue to deplore the possibility of desecration of public parklands by the route of this expressway.”
Nevertheless, some members of the Conservation Society, disgruntled with the Board’s action, decided to continue the suit, and thus came their present style, “Named Individual Members of the San Antonio Conservation Society.” 12 The “Named Individuals” then applied to Mr. Justice Black for a stay. The Justice referred the matter to the entire Supreme Court, and the Court on December 7 granted the motion for stay on condition that “a petition for a writ of certiorari, before j’udgment, is filed in this Court by December 14, 1970.” San Antonio Conservation Society v. Texas Highway Department, 400 U.S. 939, 91 S.Ct. 231, 27 L.Ed.2d 262 (1970). Accordingly, on December 14, 1970, the appellants filed a petition for certiorari, before judgment and on December 18, 1970, over the dissents of four Justices, the Supreme Court vacated its stay. Named Individual Members of San Antonio Conservation Society v. Texas Highway Department, 400 U.S. 961, 91 S.Ct. 361, 27 L.Ed.2d 381 (1970). Subsequently, on December 21, 1970, the Supreme Court denied certiorari, 400 U.S. 968, 91 S.Ct. 368, 27 L.Ed.2d 388 (1970). On March 2, 1971, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971), and soon thereafter, the persevering remnant of the otherwise *1020litigation-weary San Antonio Conservation Society returned to this Court seeking reconsideration of our original denial of their motion for stay on grounds that conditions had now changed, and that the Overton Park decision compelled reversal of the district court’s action in this case. Because the appellants were claiming that changed conditions warranted their reapplication for stay, we required them to reapply first to the district court for a stay, in compliance with F.R.A.P., Rule 8(a). The district court denied their motion on May 11, 1971, and they returned to this Court on May 18. After reviewing the file in the case, and studying the Overton Park decision, we concluded that this case is in all essential respects controlled by Overton Park, and we granted the appellants’ motion for stay on May 27.
The entry of our stay order precipitated a virtual barrage of motions from the state and federal defendants seeking reconsideration of our stay order and a stay of the mandate on the order until they could seek relief in the Supreme Court. On Memorial Day, May 31, 1971, the state and federal defendants presented their motions to a single member of this Panel, Judge Clark, in Jackson, Mississippi. On that day, Judge Clark entered a single judge order modifying our stay order to permit the contractors to continue with construction for one week, and then to proceed with “an orderly deactivation of each of * * * [the construction] projects in such a manner as to preserve the work actually accomplished and as may be necessary to prevent soil erosion and maintain public safety.” On June 1, 1971, the full Panel considered the state and federal defendants’ motions, and on June 2, 1971 entered an order staying for a period of 15 days the mandate on our order of May 27, but only insofar as it applied to the State, in order that the State might seek relief in the Supreme Court. The State filed its motion for relief in the Supreme Court some 10 days later, and on June 21, 1971, it was unanimously denied by the Supreme Court. Texas Highway Department v. Named Individual Members of the San Antonio Conservation Society, 403 U.S. 932, 91 S.Ct. 2257, 29 L.Ed.2d 711. The state and federal defendants immediately filed motions to expedite the appeal. We granted their motions, and set the matter down for hearing in New Orleans at the earliest possible date.
After hearing oral argument and studying the case on its merits, we remain convinced that our stay order of May 27 was completely justified by the Overton Park decision, and for the reasons stated herein, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand the case for further proceedings in strict accordance with this opinion.
II. Preservation of Parklands
The Brackenridge-Olmos Basin Park-lands are unique park and recreation areas situated at the headwaters of the San Antonio River and surrounded by a densely populated urban area in San Antonio, Texas. The Parklands contain Sunken Gardens, an open air theatre, two golf courses, the San Antonio Zoo, picinic areas, nature trails, and many acres of green, open space. While there is a factual dispute concerning the exact number of acres threatened by this proposed expressway,13 it appears that the expressway will require the use of between 116 and 250 acres of parkland.
In recent years, the Congress of the United States has enacted several statutes designed to preserve just such parks as this from destruction by massive fed*1021eral projects.14 Specifically, we deal with three such statutes in this case: (1) Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act of 1966, 23 U.S.C.A. § 138 (Supp.1971), which provides as follows:
It is hereby declared to be the national policy that special effort should be made to preserve the natural beauty of the countryside and public park and recreation lands, wildlife and waterfowl refuges, and historic sites. The Secretary of Transportation shall cooperate and consult with the Secretaries of the Interior, Housing and Urban Development, and Agriculture, and with the. States in developing transportation plans and programs that include measures to maintain or enhance the natural beauty of the lands traversed. After the effective date of Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, the Secretary shall not approve any program or project which requires the use of any publicly owned land from a public park, recreation area, or wildlife and waterfowl refuge of national, State or local significance as determined by the Federal, State, or local officials having jurisdiction thereof, or any land from an historic site of national, State, or local significance as so determined by such officials unless (1) there is no feasible and prudent alternative to the use of such land, and (2) such program includes all possible planning to minimize harm to such park, recreational area, wildlife and waterfowl refuge, or historic site resulting from such use.
(2) Section 138 of the Federal Aid to Highway Act of 1968, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1653(f) (Supp.1971) which provides as follows :15
(f) It is hereby declared to be the national policy that special effort should be made to preserve the natural beauty of the countryside and public park and recreation lands, wildlife and waterfowl refuges, and historic sites. The Secretary of Transportation shall cooperate and consult with the Secretaries of the Interior, Housing and Urban Development, and Agriculture, and with the States in developing transportation plans and programs that include measures to maintain or enhance the natural beauty of the lands traversed. After August 23, 1968, the Secretary shall not approve any program or project which requires the use of any publicly owned land from a public park, recreation area, or wildlife and waterfowl refuge of national, State or local significance as determined by the Federal, State, or local officials having jurisdiction thereof, or any land from an historic site of national, State, or local significance as so determined by such officials unless (1) there is no feasible and prudent alternative to the use of such land, and (2) such program includes all possible planning to minimize harm to such park, recreational area, wildlife and waterfowl refuge, or historic site resulting from such use.
(3) Section 102(2) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, which provides in pertinent part, that16 all agencies of the Federal Government shall
******
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for leg*1022islation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on—
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,'
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man’s environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved. Copies of such statement and the comments and views of the appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies, which are authorized to develop and enforce environmental standards, shall be made available to the President, the Council on Environmental Quality and to the public as provided by section 552 of Title 5, and shall accompany the proposal through the existing agency review processes;
It is these statutes which, through our judgment, we enforce herein.
III. Noncomplianee with the Statutory Law
Our task is simplified greatly to begin with because it is undisputed that the Secretary of Transportation complied with none of the above-quoted statutes in his approval of the two “end segments” of this expressway. No environmental study under N.E.P.A. has been made with respect to these two “end segments,” and the Secretary has demonstrated no effort by anyone to examine the section 4(f) “feasible and prudent” alternatives to the route followed by these two “end segments,” which come right up to, if not in to, the Parklands from both the north and the south. Thus, it requires no discussion to establish that there has been no compliance with any of the above-quoted statutes.
Instead, we must devote our efforts to examining the numerous defenses17 raised by the federal and state defendants seeking to establish their positions that for various reasons these statutes do not apply to the North Expressway.
IV. Division of the North Expressway into Three Segments
Both the state and federal defendants argue that section 4(f) does not apply to this case because the construction of the two “end segments” involves no taking of parkland, and because there is nothing unlawful in the Secretary’s division of the project into three “segments” for purposes of section 4(f) approval.
In the first place, there is a factual dispute between the parties over whether any parkland is taken by the two “end segments.” If that issue were material therefore, the mere existence of a disputed fact manifestly would require us to reverse the district court’s summary judgment, since summary judgment is always improper when there are disputed issues of material fact. We have determined, however, that it is unnecessary to base our decision on the existence of a factual dispute over whether parklands are taken by the two “end segments,” because we have concluded that the Secretary’s division of the project into three “segments,” for purposes of giving his approval to the two “end segments,” was unauthorized by section 4(f). Section 4(f) provides that “the Secretary shall not approve any * * * *1023project which requires the use of any publicly owned land from a public park. * * * ” Section 4(f) does not authorize the Secretary to separate a “project” into “segments.” In short, the Secre- • tary acted beyond the scope of his authority and in violation of section 4(f) when he approved “segments” of a project before he had complied with his section 4 (f) responsibilities.18
We note that the word “project” becomes a key word in the statute on this point. While it is conceivable that in other cases the question of how broadly the Secretary must define “project” may be presented, that question is not, and never has been, presented in this case.19 There is nothing in this Record to support the conclusion that the North Expressway has ever been anything but one project for purposes of federal approval. It has consistently been denominated the “North Expressway.” It was presented as a single project at the Public Hearing in 1963. The state defendants presented it to the federal defendants as a single project for federal participation. And indeed the Secretary’s attempt to condition federal approval of the entire project on a section 4(f) study of the middle “segment” demonstrates that he has construed it as one “project” for purposes of section 4(f).
The question therefore, is whether the Secretary may take a single “project” and divide it into “segments” for purposes of section 4(f) approval. We have already stated that such fragmentation of a “project” is unauthorized by section 4(f). But there is another reason why we refuse to authorize such action: The frustrating effect such piecemeal administrative approvals would have on the vitality of section 4(f) is plain for any man to see. Patently, the construction of these two “end segments” to the very border, if not into, the Parklands, will make destruction of further parklands inevitable, or, at least, will severely limit the number of “feasible and prudent” alternatives to avoiding the Park. The Secretary’s approach to his section 4(f) responsibilities thus makes a joke of the “feasible and prudent alternatives” standard, and we not only decline to give such an approach our imprimatur, we specifically declare it unlawful.20
At this point, we would comment on one final argument made by the Secretary in defense of his piecemeal approval. He contends that the appellants’ argument against piecemeal approval depends for success “on innuendos, utter bad faith, and some conspiracy type of clandestine activity on the part of the Secretary * * * to build this highway, ‘come hell or high water.’ ” The appellants’ brief, however, makes no charges of conspiracy or clandestine activity on the part of the Secretary. And the Secretary is wrong if he is suggesting that a finding of “bad faith” is essential to support a holding that he violated the applicable law in this ease. By *1024the Secretary’s own admission,21 he adopted this piecemeal solution in order to defuse a controversial situation by attempting to strike a compromise between those who were determined to build the highway and those who were determined to save the Park. The problem with the Secretary’s solution to the controversy is that he misconceived his role. The conflict between Parklands and Highways has already been resolved in the Halls of Congress, which is the proper place in our system of Government for priority decisions to be made. And, as the statutes here in question make clear, parklands and environmental values are considered paramount. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. at 411-412, 91 S.Ct. at 821-822, 28 L.Ed.2d at 150-151 (1971).
V. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
Both the federal and state defendants argue that NEPA has no application to this Project. The federal defendants’ position, however, is predicated on their argument that the division of the Project into segments was permissible, and that since the two end segments involved no taking of parklands, NEPA did not apply. We have already dealt with, and rejected, this argument. We proceed, therefore, to the State's arguments.
Section 102(2) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332 (Supp.1971), requires “all agencies of the federal government * * [to] include in every recommendation or report on proposals for * * * major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man’s environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
It is undisputed that no section 102(2) statement has been prepared or filed by anyone in this case. The State argues none was required because (a) federal authorization of a federal-aid highway is not a “recommendation” within the meaning of section 102(2); (b) there is no one for the Secretary to make his report or recommendation to; and (c) “approval of a section of a roadway in Texas” is not a major federal action within the meaning of the statute.
The legislative history of NEPA and the language of the statute itself refute each of these arguments. That federal-aid highways were among the federal actions affecting the human environment, and therefore covered by the Act, can be seen from the hearings and debates over the Act. “Super-highways” were pointedly cited among the list of modern phenomena threatening the environment. See 115 Cong.Rec. 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 29068 (1970). And the Department of Transportation was asked to send, and did send, a representative to testify at the Senate hearings on the Act.22
To the State’s argument that there is no one for the Secretary to file a state*1025ment with, the language of section 102 (2) provides an answer: “[c]opies of * * * [the] statement * * * shall be made available to the President, the Council on Environmental Quality, and to the public * * * and shall accompany the proposal through the existing review processes. * * * ”
Finally, the State’s argument that this is not a major federal action seems doubtful. It has been estimated that the project ultimately will cost a total of $18,000,000.00. Total initial costs, according to the defendants’ pleadings, were projected in 1960 at $12,600,000.00, of which half was to be funded by the federal government. Without belaboring the point, we conclude that we have no difficulty in characterizing a project of this size as “major.”
The State also argues that NEPA does not apply to this Project because NEPA cannot be applied retroactively. The simple answer to this contention is that no retroactivity would be involved in the application of NEPA to this case. NEPA was the law at the time the Secretary authorized federal funding of the two “end segments” of the North Expressway on August 13, 1970, and it had been the law since January 1, 1970.23
We move next to two defenses presented by the State in which the federal defendants do not participate.
VI. Are the Braekenridge-Olmos Park-lands of Local Significance?
Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act protects from federal-aid highway parks “of local significance as determined by the Federal, State or local officials having jurisdiction thereof. * * * ”
After section 4(f) was passed and became effective, the City Council of San Antonio passed the following resolution:
The portions of public lands owned by the City of San Antonio and required by present plans for the construction of this expressway facility *1026are of primary local significance as part of the right of way for the North Expressway and of secondary local significance as parts of park and recreation areas.24 (Emphasis in original).
The State argues that this resolution is a determination by local officials that Brackenridge Park is of “no local significance.” The Resolution, however, does not say that Bracken-ridge Park is of no local significance. Indeed, it says that Brackenridge Park is of local significance as a Park, but that the City Council would prefer to see it used for a highway. The question, therefore, is whether Congress intended to leave the choice between parks of local significance and federal-aid highways to local authorities; or whether Congress, in passing section 4(f), has already made the choice between the two uses. Only one construction fairly can be given to section 4(f), and that is that Congress itself has made the choice between the two uses. Clearly, Congress did not intend to leave the decision whether federal funds would be used to build highways through parks of local significance up to the city councils across the nation. If there was any doubt about this question before Overton Park, there most assuredly is no longer any doubt. The following appears in the district court’s opinion in Overton Park:
With respect to the reference to “ * * * local preference,” * * * it should here be pointed out that the Mayor and Council of the City of Memphis have heretofore approved this corridor and design and have approved the sale of this strip through Overton Park to the State of Tennessee. * * Since [section 4(f)] by its terms is invoked only if park “is of local significance as determined by Federal, State or local officials having jurisdiction thereof” in view of the approval by the Mayor and Council, it may well be that [section 4(f)] has no application here.
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, W.D.Tenn.1970, 309 F.Supp. 1189, 1195.
The Record in this case reveals that the state defendants relied heavily on this district court opinion in opposing application of section 4(f) to the North Expressway.25 Now, of course, that argument is foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in reversing the district court in Overton Park. We must conclude from the Supreme Court’s action that the Court attached little if any significance to the local officials’ preference *1027to use Overton Park for highway right-of-way.26
VII. May the State Now Proceed with this Project Using its Own Funds ?
The State argues that it is “absolutely committed” to building the North Expressway regardless of what this Court decides about the validity of the Secretary’s action, and that this Court has no power to require the State to comply with the law in building the Project because the State is determined to build the highway with its own funds, “if necessary.” In connection with this argument, the State has presented this Court with a document which was not part of the Record on appeal, but which deserves reproduction in this opinion. The document is a Minute Order of the Texas Highway Department, passed on June 1, 1971, five days after this Court entered its stay order of May 27, 1971:
WHEREAS, there is presently pending on appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Cause No. 30915 styled, Named Individual Members of the San Antonio Conservation Society v. Texas Highway Department, et al, and The Department of Transportation, et al, and there is some apparent doubt concerning whether a stay of highway construction should be effected, in part because of apparent doubt concerning the nature of the State’s commitment to construct the highway involved; and, because such doubt should not exist;
THEREFORE, IT IT HEREBY AFFIRMED that the commitment of the State of Texas made by this Commission to build said highway, is absolute. The highway will be built with 100% state money if necessary. While this Commission continues to believe that this highway is eligible for federal funding, such eligibility is neither determinative of whether or not the highway will be built, nor of the schedule of its construction.
FURTHERMORE, the construction contracts authorized by this Commission in the Fall of 1970, under which construction is presently proceeding on the end segments of the highway, are in no way contingent upon federal funding. (Emphasis in original)
In addition to presenting us with the foregoing “Minute Order,” the State argued before the Supreme Court in its petition for relief from our stay order, and repeated before this Court, the following :
In all candor, it must be admitted that in the event the Secretary of Transportation or the Courts, should rule that federal law prohibits federal participation in the “North Expressway” construction project, other eligible projects will be submitted to take up available federal funding.
We are not impressed with this argument. If we were to accept it, we would be giving approval to the circumvention of an Act of Congress. The North Expressway is now a federal project, and it has been a federal project since the Secretary of Transportation authorized federal participation in the project on August 13, 1970. As such, the North Expressway is subject to the laws of Congress, and the State as a partner in the construction of the project is bound by those laws.27 The supremacy of federal law has been recognized as a fundamental principle of our Government since the birth of the Republic. United States Constitution, Art. VI, cl. 2. The State may not subvert that principle by a mere change in bookkeeping or by shifting funds from one project to another.
*1028The State seems to contend that the North Expressway is not yet a federal project because, at the time of oral argument, no federal funds had exchanged hands between the federal and state defendants.28 This argument misses the point. The point is that on August 13, 1970 the Secretary of Transportation, at the State’s request, authorized federal participation in the North Expressway. That áuthorization triggered the advertisement for contract bids, the letting of contracts, and the commencement of construction that has erected almost % of the southern “segment” of the North Expressway. No one forced the State to seek federal funding, to accept federal participation, or to commence construction of a federal aid highway. The State, by entering into this venture, voluntarily submitted itself to federal law. It entered with its eyes open, having more than adequate warning of the controversial nature of the project and of the applicable law. And while this marriage between the federal and state defendants seems to have been an unhappy one, it has produced an already huge concrete offspring whose existence it is impossible for us to ignore.29
In short, the state, as well as the federal defendants must comply with the law in the completion of the North Expressway.
VIII. Conclusion
The district court erred in granting a summary judgment in favor of the federal and state defendants before the Secretary of Transportation had complied with his statutory responsibilities under 23 U.S.C.A. § 138 (Supp.1971); 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332 (Supp.1971); and 49 U.S.C.A. § 1653(f) (Supp.1971). That judgment is now reversed, and the case is remanded with directions to hold the case until the Secretary has completed his administrative review of the North Expressway as one project under the law. Once the Secretary has completed his re*1029view, the district court shall conduct a full review of the case as soon as possible in accordance with the guidelines laid down here and in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971). Construction shall not proceed until there has been full compliance with the law.
Reversed and remanded with directions.