SUMMARY ORDER
Petitioner Hai Hua Qiu, a native of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”), seeks review of a June 9, 2009 order of the BIA reversing Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Robert D. Weisel’s decision to grant Qiu’s petition for asylum. See In re Hai Hua Qui, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] at 2 (B.I.A. June 9, 2009), rev’g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City June 28, 2007). Under the circumstances of this case, we review the BIA’s decision alone. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir.2005). We review the BIA’s findings of fact for “substantial evidence,” and review de novo legal issues and the application of law to fact. See Castro v. Holder, 597 F.3d 93, 99 (2d Cir.2010). In applying these standards, we assume familiarity with the facts and procedural history, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to deny the petition.
In seeking asylum, Qiu claimed that corrupt local government officials offered inadequate compensation for the demolition of her family’s home and arrested her for impeding her family’s eviction. She now asserts that the BIA erred as a matter of law in concluding that these circumstances failed to demonstrate (1) persecution (2) on account of political belief. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (requiring asylum applicant to demonstrate well-founded fear of persecution on account of “race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion”). We disagree.
As this court has ruled, a person’s “mere subjection” to an opposed policy or practice of general application “will not itself qualify as persecution ‘on account of political opinion.” Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 545 (2d Cir.2005). Nevertheless, “opposition to endemic corruption or extortion ... may have a political dimension when it transcends mere self-protection and represents a challenge to the legitimacy or authority of the ruling regime.” Id. at 547-48. In such cases, we query whether an applicant’s opposition was “directed toward a governing institution, or only against individuals whose cor*916ruption was aberrational, and whether the persecutor was attempting to suppress a challenge to the governing institution, as opposed to a challenge to isolated, aberrational acts of greed or malfeasance.” Id. at 548 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Applying these principles here, we identify nothing in the record indicating that Qiu’s opposition was grounded in anything beyond her personal circumstances or represented the kind of broader challenge to governing institutions that we have found could constitute a political opinion. See id. at 542-43.
Contrary to Qiu’s argument, the BIA did not exceed its authority in reversing the I J’s conclusion that Qiu’s treatment was on account of a political opinion. The BIA has authority to review an IJ’s conclusions of law de novo, including conclusions about whether harm was inflicted “on account of’ a protected ground. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii); see also Matter of A-S-B-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 493, 497 (B.I.A.2008). Because we conclude that the BIA did not err in deciding that Qiu’s treatment was not on account of a political opinion, we need not address her challenge to the BIA’s determination that her treatment did not amount to past persecution or that she did not possess a fear of future persecution.
We have considered Qiu’s other arguments on appeal and conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, Qiu’s petition for review is DENIED and her motion for a stay of removal is DISMISSED as moot.