This is a proceeding in error to reverse the judgment of the United States District Court, Western District of Kentucky, in the case of Paul Jones & Co., successor of the firm of Paul Jones & Co., rectifiers and wholesale liquor dealers, to recover rectified spirits taxes assessed against that firm under the provisions of section 304 of the Act of October 3, 1917 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 5986c), and paid under protest. By the agreement of counsel the cause was submitted to the court, without the intervention of a jury, upon an agreed statement of facts supplemented by oral evidence taken at the trial. The trial court-found on the issues joined for the plaintiff, and entered judgment in its favor for the sum of $2,095.76, with interest thereon and cost of action.
It is insisted upon the part of the defendant in error that, as there were no requests on the part of either party for special findings of fact or rulings of law, and that the only objection in the entire course of the trial was made by plaintiff in error to the judgment, which objection was incorporated in the entry of judgment, that there is nothing for this court to review except errors in the exclusion or admission of evidence, and that, as no such error is claimed, the judgment should be affirmed without further consideration. In addition to the facts agreed upon by stipulation, there was but one witness testified. His testimony is entirely consistent with the agreed statement of facts, so that there is no conflict in the evidence and no dispute as to the facts. The question presented to the trial court was purely a question of law.
[1, 2] The court, however, did make four separate findings of fact, including the admission in the pleadings, and the facts agreed upon by stipulation. While these findings of fact appear under the title “Opinion and Findings of Fact,” nevertheless they are not mere narrations *124of facts in the opinion, but findings separately stated and numbered, and the entry of judgment expressly states that this “opinion and findings of fact” are filed and made a part of this record. The objection that they are found in connection with the opinion, and not upon a separate paper, is merely technical, and while parties are held to a reasonable strict conformity to the provision of the statute, a mere technical objection will not avail. It is further insisted, however,, that even though the findings of fact are separately stated and numbered, and therefore easily distinguishable from and separate from the opinion itself, that nevertheless such findings do not meet the requirements of section 649, Revised Statutes, for the reason that they are mere recitals of the testimony. In support of this contention, counsel have cited Lehnen v. Dickson, 148 U. S. 71, 13 Sup. Ct. 481, 37 L. Ed. 373; Norris v. Jackson, 76 U. S. (9 Wall.) 125, 19 L. Ed. 608.
This objection, however, cannot possibly apply to the first, second, or third findings of fact. The first finding is certainly a definite finding of an ultimate fact, deduced from the evidence. The second incorporates the facts admitted by the pleadings. The third finding incorporates the facts agreed upon by stipulation of counsel. At first glance, it might appear that this objection is well taken as to that part of the fourth finding based upon the undisputed testimony of the only witness that testified in this case. Upon careful reading, however, it is apparent that this finding is not a mere recital of the testimony of' the witness, Miller, but, on the contrary, a finding of specific facts established by his testimony, and which the court found to have been detailed by him “with admitted accuracy.”
[3] While it is true that this fourth finding of fact is elaborate in detail, and that each paragraph thereof might have- been separately numbered as a separate finding, yet the failure to do this cannot possibly prejudice the rights of the defendant in error, and is therefore of no importance. It also further appears that each and all of these, facts so found by the court to be established by the testimony of Miller are essential to a full and complete understanding of the issues joined by the pleading in this case, and particularly the conduct and management of the business to which these issues relate. Eor the reasons above stated, this finding is not subject to the same objection and criticism as the finding in Rehnen v. Dickson and Norris v. Jackson, supra.
[4] It is of no importance whether the court made these findings sua sponte or upon request of counsel, nor is it important that these findings of fact appear in the opinion, for, notwithstanding that, they are separately stated and numbered, and ordered filed and made part of the record. O’Reilly v. Campbell, 116 U. S. 418-421, 6 Sup. Ct. 421, 29 L. Ed. 669; Philadelphia Casualty Co. v. Fechheimer, 220 Fed. 401-408, 136 C. C. A. 25, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 64.
[5] While the exceptions taken to the judgment, as appears in the entry of judgment, do not specifically state the grounds of objection, yet a reviewing court will assume the exceptions intended to and do sufficiently challenge this judgment on the statutory ground that the facts found were not sufficient to support it. Felker v. Bank, 196 *125Fed. 200-202, 116 C. C. A. 32; Casually Co. v. Fechheimer, supra, 220 Fed. 410. This assumption is not only justified, but required by the five separate assignments of error, in which assignments it is averred that the judgment “is against the law of the case” upon the several undisputed facts which are recited in the separate assignments of error.
[8] For these reasons the record in this case docs present the question of law as to the sufficiency of the facts found to support the judgment, but the court’s findings upon questions of fact, a jury having been waived, are not subject to revision by a reviewing court, if there was anv evidence upon which such findings could be made. Dooley v. Pease, 180 U. S. 126, 131, 132, 21 Sup. Ct. 329, 45 L. Ed. 457; Stanley v. Supervisors, 121 U. S. 547, 7 Sup. Ct. 1234, 30 L. Ed. 1000; Hathaway v. National Bank, 134 U. S. 498, 10 Sup. Ct. 608, 33 L. Ed. 1004; St. Rouis v. Rutz, 138 U. S. 241, 11 Sup. Ct. 337, 34 L. Ed. 941; Runkle v. Burnham, 153 U. S. 225, 14 Sup. Ct. 837, 38 L. Ed. 694; Chautauqua Institution v. Zimmerman, 233 Fed. 371-375, 147 C. C. A. 307 (C. C. A. 6).
[7] The plaintiff in error, of course, cannot challenge the sufficiency of these special findings to meet the requirements of section 649, R. S. (Comp. St. § 1587), for without these findings there would be no question presented that this court would have authority to review.
An examination of the bill of exceptions, which is substantially the same as the finding of facts of the court, discloses that not only was there “evidence upon which such findings could be made,” but also that there is no conflict in the evidence upon which these findings are based. The facts found by the court are as follows:
“(1) That prior to date in the year 3919 the ruling of the revenue officers had been that the use of the Karl Kiefer fitter, as plaintiff used it, was not rectification, and that said ruling was acted upon by plaintiff and other distillers and dealers up to the promulgation in 1919 of the new ruling herein-befdre copied.” 1
“(2) What we have shown to have been admitted by the pleadings.” 2
“(3) What we have shown to have been agreed upon by the stipulation filed.” 3
*126“(4) The statement of the witness Samuel O. Miller, who detailed the facts with admitted accuracy as follows: 4
“Furthermore, it is a matter of common knowledge, and therefore judicially known, that when whisky (all the spirits involved herein being whisky) is distilled it.is put into barrels to be kept in warehouses. There it may re*127main for eight years, largely in order to complete the process of manufacture, but also in order to secure the taxation thereon due to the United States. It may be removed from the warehouse in less time, if the owner elects to remove it, upon payment of the taxes thereon. The barrels used and into which tne whisky is put after distillation are charred on the inside by fire applied to the staves. Particles of the charcoal resulting from this process may, during the long period of warehousing, be separated from the staves, and may drop from them into the spirits. The presence of this charcoal in the whisky in no appreciable way adds to the volume of the spirits, and in no way changes the nature or property of the whisky. Equally its presence there adds noihing to the value of the merchandise, and only abnormal quantities would depreciate their value. Nevertheless, without any abnormality, it is desirable that particles of charcoal, if coming into the spirits, should be removed by the filter used by nearly all wholesale dealers for that purpose. The filtering removes this foreign substance, but in no way changes the nature of the spirits or imparts to them any other quality whatever. These facts being perfectly well known to the government and its officers, it became under their supervision and with their knowledge and consent the custom of many years’ standing to construe the process of filtering as in no way rectification, if the purpose of it was solely that of removing extraneous substances like charcoal. This contemporaneous construction of the statute, as evidenced by the almost universal custom thereunder, was continued in force until in 1919, when the new ruling hereinbefore referred to was announced by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.”
[8] Section 304 of the Revenue Act of October 3, 1917, imposes a tax of 15 cents on each proof gallon of distilled spirits or wines hereafter rectified, purified, or refined in such manner, and on all mixtures hereafter produced in such manner that the person so rectifying, puri*128fying, refining, or mixing the same is a rectifier within the meaning of section 3244, Revised Statutes (Comp. St. § 5971). It therefore becomes necessary to examine the provisions of section 3244, R. S., in order to determine the exact scope and effect of this section to the Revenue Act of October 3, 1917. The third subsection of that act provides that: ,
“Every person wlio rectifies, purifies, or refines distilled spirits or wines by any process other than by original and continuous distillation from mash, wort, or wash, through continuous closed vessels and pipes, until the manufacture thereof is complete, and every wholesale or retail liquor dealer who has in his possession any still or leach tub, or who keeps any other apparatus for the purpose of refining in any manner distilled spirits, and every person who, without rectifying, purifying, or refining distilled spirts, shall, by mixing such spirits, wine, or other liquor with any materials, manufactures any spurious, imitation, or compound liquors for sale, under the name of whisky, brandy, gin, rum, wine, spirits, cordials,, or wine bitters, or any other name, shall be regarded as a rectifier, and as being engaged in the business of rectifying: * * * Provided, that nothing in this section shall be held to prohibit the purifying or refining of spirits in the course of original and continuous distillation through any material which will not remain incorporated with such spirits when the manufacture thereof is complete.”
This is the only part of' section 3244 applicable to the finding of. facts in this case. It appears from the findings of fact that—
“Prior to date in the year 1919, the ruling of the revenue officers had been that the use of the Karl Kiefer filter, as plaintiff used it, was not rectifica-*129tíon, and that said ruling was acted upon by plaintiff and other distillers and dealers up to the promulgation in 1919 of the new ruling.”
It has been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court of the United States that, where the meaning of a statute is doubtful, the construction given by the department charged with its execution should be given great weight. Robertson v. Downing, 127 U. S. 607, 8 Sup. Ct. 328, 32 L. Ed. 269; U. S. v. Healey, 160 U. S. 136, 16 Sup. Ct. 247, 40 L. Ed. 369. It has also been held by the Supreme Court that —
“The re-enactment by Congress, without change, of a statute which had previously received long-continued executive construction, is an adoption by Congress of such construction.” U. S. v. Hermanos, 209 U. S. 337-339, 28 Sup. Ct. 532, 533 (52 L. Ed. 821); U. S. v. Falk, 204 U. S. 143-152, 27 Sup.Ct. 191, 51 L. Ed. 411.
This rule of interpretation applies with full force to this case, for the reason that section 304 of the Revenue Act of October 3, 1917, provides that the tax shall be levied only upon distilled spirits and mixtures produced in such manner that the person so rectifying, purifying, refining, or mixing the same is a rectifier within the meaning of section 3244, R. S.-
Congress is presumed to have known the long-continued executive construction given to paragraph 3 of section 3244, R. S., when it enacted this Revenue Act of October 3, 1917. It is also presumed to have known the rule of construction announced by the Supreme Court in U. S. v. Hermanos and U. S. v. Falk, supra. Buekley v. Stephens, 29 Ohio St. 620-622. The conclusion follows that it intended to adopt this construction as fully and completely as if it had written it into the act itself.
[9] It is contended, however, on the part of the United States government, that it is not precluded from a change in construction by reason of a prior erroneous construction of a statute, although that erroneous construction has long been followed by the executive officers charged with the administration of the law. Undoubtedly that contention is correct as an abstract proposition. If there had been no later legislation upon this subject than the third subsection of section 3244, R. S., the Treasury Department, in the absence of judicial interpretation, would be at liberty to make such change in prior construction from time to time as would seem to it necessary to carry into effect the purpose and intent of the law; but if by the Revenue Act of October 3, 1917, Congress has adopted a long-continued executive construction given to paragraph 3 of section 3244, R. S., the Treasury Department is no longer at liberty to change that construction.
[19] In the construction of a statute it is the duty of the court to give full force and effect to the intent and purpose of the law-making power responsible for its enactment. If this, intent and purpose can be ascertained from the language of the statute itself, then that language must control. U. S. v. Alamogordo Lumber Co., 202 Fed. 700, 121 C. C. A. 162; Scheu v. State, 83 Ohio St. 146, 93 N. E. 969; Slingluff v. Weaver, 66 Ohio St. 621, 64 N. E. 574.
[11] But where the meaning of a statute is doubtful, the construction given it by the department charged with its execution should *130be given great weight, for the reason, among others, that if such construction does not properly interpret the meaning and intent of Congress, Congress, by amendment or re-enactment of the statute, can readily correct the same. This presumption that the department charged with the execution of the law has properly interpreted it is strengthened in proportion to the length of time such construction has obtained without challenge by the law-making power, so that, where such executive construction has been long continued, a court has a right to presume that Congress is content therewith. This exhausts the full force and effect of such construction, and, while not binding upon a court, nevertheless a court will be slow to depart therefrom, unless the language of the statute itself absolutely requires it to do so.
But, when a court has adopted such construction, it is not in the power or authority of the executive department to change or alter that construction. Congress alone has the power to change that construction by amendment of the statute itself. It follows, therefore, when Congress has adopted an executive construction of a statute, that neither the department charged with its execution nor the courts are at liberty to depart from that construction.
In this case Congress, by the Revenue Act of October 3, 1917, has, by reference thereto, specifically adopted the long-continued executive construction given to paragraph 3 of section 3244, R. S., by the Treasury Department, so that neither that department, nor this court, or any other court, has authority to change or ignore that construction, or to substitute its own purpose and intent for the purpose and intent of the law-making power.
While it does not appear in the finding of fact nor in the bill of exceptions, counsel for both plaintiff and defendant in error discuss in their printed briefs the effect of Treasury Decision 19060, in reference to the Doew filter, and it is contended on the part of plaintiff in error that this decision applies to any mechanical form of filter, including the Karl Kiefer filter.
From this decision it appears that the essential feature of the Doew filter consists in forcing the liquid, under pressure, through a closely packed pulp, and that a wholesale or retail dealer using the same became a rectifier, within the contemplation of the third subsection of amended section 3244, R. S.; that if there is any inconsistency or conflict between this decision and the prior executive construction of the statute in reference to the hat filter, or .the Kiefer- filter, that this conflict hás been resolved by the department subsequent to the passage of the act of 1917, in Treasury Decision 2953, whereby it has treated hat filters in the same way as mechanical filters, and has therefore recognized that both are used in the process of rectifying under Revised Statutes, § 3244.
For the reasons heretofore stated, Treasury Decision 2953, in relation to the hat filter, promulgated subsequent to the passage of the act of 1917, can in no wise affect the construction and interpretation of that act, for if Congress adopted the long-continued executive construction in reference to the hat filter and the Karl Kiefer filter, the Treasury Department must accept that construction as final.
*131However, it further appears from the finding of facts that this Treasury Decision 19060 applied specifically to the Roew filter, and to other forms of mechanical filters in which the liquid is forced by pressure through a closely packed pulp.
[12] The trial court found as a fact that the Karl Kiefer filter uses no force -whatever, except the force of gravitation, the same as in a hat filter; that it performs precisely the same function as a hat filter, and that the only reason for using a Karl Kiefer filter, instead of a hat filter, is because the former is more convenient; that the Karl Kiefer filter has a cover over the top to prevent the whisky from overflowing, and will operate much more rapidly than a hat filter. It also appears from the finding of fact that, notwithstanding Treasury Decision 19060, the use of the Karl Kiefer filter, as plaintiffs used it, was not “rectification,” under the ruling of the Revenue Department prior to the year 1919, when the new ruling was promulgated in that year, so that, if Treasury Decision No. 19060 appeared in the bill of exceptions and findings of fact, it could not avoid the effect of long-continued executive ruling in reference to the hat filter and the Karl Kiefer filter prior to and subsequent to the promulgation of that decision and up until the new ruling of 1919.
[13] If, however, it were conceded that Congress, by the Revenue Act of October 3, 1917, had not under the settled rules of construction adopted the long-continued executive construction that obtained prior to that date, the findings of fact by the trial court would necessarily require this court to do so.
It appears from these findings that the use of the hat filter or the Karl Kiefer filler does not change the constituent elements of the whis-ky in any respect whatever. It is identically the same after the filtering process as before, except that the particles of charcoal and other extraneous substances, if any, have been removed therefrom. Tt is still “straight,” not “rectified,” whisky, and is bonded, labeled, and sold as such. In the case of Wampole v. U. S., 191 Fed. 573-678, 112 C. C. A. 633, 636 (C. C. A. 3), it was held'that—
“Rectifica tion of distilled , spirits, in the legal sense, means any process, exclusive of original and continuous distillation * * * by which the spirits are separated from the substance with which it is mixed or combined. The rectifier may lake the raw^ spirit of the distiller and, by repeated processes of distillation, separate the spirit from the oils and impurities left in it by the distiller; or he may take the refuse material of the manufacturer of ginger or vanilla extract, saturated with alcohol, and by distillation separate the spirit from that material.”
This definition taken in connection with the definition in the case of Michel v. Nunn (C. C.) 101 Fed. 423, in reference to mixed or blended whiskys, would seem to cover fully and completely the entire definition of “rectification” and “rectifier,” and it necessarily follows therefrom that the use of either a’ hat filter or Karl Kiefer filter for the sole and only purpose o'f removing particles of charcoal from straight whis-ky is not rectification within the meaning of this act.
It is insisted, however, that this revenue act is not directed solely to rectified or blended whisky, but also includes distilled spirits that have been refined or purified by any process other than original and *132continuous'distillation, and that the removal of this charcoal from the distilled spirits constitutes “purifying” and “refining” within the meaning of the act.
We are of the opinion, however, that the terms “purifying” and “refining,” as used in the Revenue Act of October 3, 1917, and in paragraph 3, section 3244, R. S., mean something more than the removal of nonsoluble particles of charcoal that perchance may become loosened and detached from the charred staves of the barrels in which the distilled spirits are aged. The .method of removing these particles is not important, provided that method has no further purpose or effect. The larger particles might readily be removed by hand, and perhaps with time and patience all of them, regardless of size, might be so removed. While that method would not be practical, yet the fact that it is possible demonstrates that the removal of these particles of charcoal does not affect the character or the quality of the liquor itself, and that they are no component part thereof.
[14] “Purifying” or “refining,” as used in these statutes, undoubtedly means the removal, chemical change, or modification of objectionable soluble matter, held in solution in the distilled spirits, united therewith and forming.a constituent and integral part thereof, so that its removal, chemical change, or modification will change or alter, in some degree, at least, the character or quality of the entire volume of the distilled spirits.
For the reasons above stated, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed.