Following a jury trial involving the testimony of law enforcement officers about what the alleged victim and another individual told them, Leonardo Argueta Cuyuch was convicted of aggravated battery. Cuyuch contends that the trial court erred (1) in admitting the alleged double hearsay of a translator, who was translating a witness’s statements, in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights and (2) in failing to grant a directed verdict of acquittal at the close of the *630State’s case because the evidence was insufficient to submit the case to the jury, given the State’s reliance on allegedly inadmissible hearsay testimony. Because there was evidence identifying Cuyuch as the perpetrator of the crime, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting such evidence, we must affirm.
The standard of review for the denial of a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal is the same as for determining the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction. Thus, the evidence must be construed in the light most favorable to the verdict, and the appellant no longer enjoys a presumption of innocence. We determine only the legal sufficiency of the evidence adduced below and do not weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. Our inquiry is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Citations omitted.) Souder v. State.1
So viewed, the evidence shows that at approximately 1:30 a.m., a 16-year-old male who was crying and bleeding heavily from a cut on his left arm approached a City of Canton police officer in a restaurant parking lot. The victim told the officer that his roommate had cut him, and he pointed at the road across the street. Apolice sergeant who had arrived to back up the first officer left the scene to find the roommate at the address given by the victim. The sergeant drove down the road indicated by the victim and was flagged down by a man on the side of the road, later identified as Francisco Lorenzo, who was yelling that his friend needed help. Because there was a “minor language barrier” between the sergeant and the Spanish-speaking Francisco, the sergeant put him in his patrol car and “had him physically show me where he wanted to go to help his friend.” Francisco directed the sergeant to the victim’s address. When they got inside the house, the sergeant found two people watching television. The officer asked if the person sitting on the couch needed assistance, and Francisco responded, “No. My friend needs help.”
The sergeant called what he described as a “language line” to enlist the help of an interpreter who could translate Spanish to English. The sergeant asked Francisco who needed help, and Francisco explained through the interpreter that his friend, the victim, had been badly cut and needed help, and that the person sitting on the couch, Cuyuch, was the person who had cut his friend. After the translator told the sergeant that the weapon had been thrown, the *631sergeant asked Francisco to show him in which direction the weapon had been thrown, and the sergeant retrieved the weapon from the yard. The sergeant described the weapon as a carpenter knife.
After confirming with the medic that it was safe to do so, the officer, who had remained with the victim, told the victim that he was going to take him back to his home to identify the suspect. As the officer was transporting the victim back to his home, the victim began saying, “him” repeatedly, but the officer did not know what he meant. The officer parked the vehicle and the victim got out, and the officer asked, “Is that him?” The victim pointed at Cuyuch and said, “Yes. He’s the one who cut me.” On the way to the police station, Cuyuch told the sergeant he “knew what had happened” and threatened that he would “remember” him when he got out of jail.
Cuyuch subsequently was indicted for aggravated battery. The indictment averred that Cuyuch committed the charged offense by cutting the victim, seriously disfiguring his arm. See OCGA § 16-5-24 (a). At trial, the State established that the victim had suffered a serious, disfiguring injury through the testimony of the officers who observed the victim. But, the State never called the victim or Francisco to testify about the alleged cutting incident. Rather, the State relied entirely on the testimony of law enforcement officers about what Francisco and the victim had told them. Additionally, while the State also presented similar transaction evidence through the testimony of two police officers that Cuyuch had previously stabbed one of his roommates in the arm, no witnesses to the similar transaction testified.
From the outset, it is important to understand what Cuyuch has enumerated as error. He enumerates first that the trial court erred in allowing the double hearsay of the translator (who was translating Francisco’s statements) in violation of Cuyuch’s Sixth Amendment rights. Second, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict, as there was insufficient admissible evidence to submit the case to the jury. Thus, if the translator’s translation to police of Francisco’s statements was properly admitted as res gestae (as was expressly determined by the trial court), then Francisco’s identification of Cuyuch as the person who had cut the victim and his showing the officer where the knife used by Cuyuch was thrown into the yard would alone suffice to defeat the motion for directed verdict. Accordingly, we would not need to address whether the victim’s statements to police (also identifying Cuyuch as the attacker) were also admissible as res gestae, since Francisco’s statements alone would have sufficed to justify the denial of the motion for directed verdict.
1. The trial court correctly ruled that Francisco’s statements through the translator were admissible. Cuyuch’s first enumeration *632of error argues that the translator’s rendering of Francisco’s statements to police was double hearsay, and that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the police testimony about those statements. He attacks this evidence on two fronts: (i) he claims that the statements came from a translator, who was translating the statements from Francisco, and that this was double hearsay; and (ii) he then claims that even if the translator’s translation was a proper conduit of Francisco’s statements, those statements to police were themselves hearsay and did not fit the criteria for the res gestae exception.
(a) The translator did not create another level of hearsay.
[Ajbsent a motive to mislead, distort or some other indication of inaccuracy, when persons speaking different languages rely upon a translator as a conduit for their communication, the statements of the translator should be regarded as the statements of the persons themselves without creating an additional layer of hearsay.
(Punctuation omitted.) Lopez v. State.2 Cuyuch has not demonstrated that the translator had any motive to mislead the officer or that the translation was inaccurate in any way. Thus, this argument is without merit.
(b) Evidence supported the trial court’s ruling that Francisco’s statements met the res gestae exception. We now consider whether the trial court erred in finding that the statements met the res gestae exception. OCGA § 24-3-3 provides that “[declarations accompanying an act, or so nearly connected therewith in time as to be free from all suspicion of device or afterthought, shall be admissible in evidence as part of the res gestae.” In Andrews v. State,3 our Supreme Court held that “a trial judge’s determination that evidence offered as part of the res gestae is sufficiently informative and reliable as to warrant being considered by the jury will not be disturbed on appeal unless that determination is clearly erroneous.” See Mize v. State.4 In addition, this Court has held that
[w]hat the law altogether distrusts is not after-speech but after thought. In cases when a statement is narrative rather than exclamatory, the circumstances must be closely scrutinized, because narrative is generally the result of afterthought. If the declarations appear to spring out of the *633transaction—if they elucidate it — if they are voluntary and spontaneous, and if they are made at a time so near to it, as reasonably to preclude the idea of deliberate design, then they are to be regarded as contemporaneous. However, no precise time can be fixed a priori when the res gestae ends, but each case must turn on its own circumstances, the inquiry being rather into events than to the precise time which has elapsed. The admissibility of such declarations does not depend upon any arbitrary time or general rule for all cases, but is left to the sound discretion of the court in determining from the time, circumstances and statements in question, whether declarations meet the requirements of being free from all suspicion of device or afterthought. It is also a well established rule of law that if the admissibility of evidence is doubtful, the rules of evidence require that the evidence be admitted and its weight and effect left to the jury.
(Punctuation omitted.) Park v. State.5 In addition, “[ejvidence showing the statements were made while the parties were still laboring under the excitement and strain of the circumstances and in such proximity in time as to preclude the idea of deliberation or fabrication will support a judicial finding that the statements were sufficiently informative and reliable.” (Punctuation omitted.) Id. at 280 (5).
Here, shortly after the violent encounter, Francisco flagged down a police officer a short distance from Cuyuch’s house and, through a translator, made statements identifying Cuyuch as the person who cut the victim. In addition, Francisco informed the officer that Cuyuch had thrown the knife used in the attack into the yard outside of his home, and based on this information, the officer was able to recover the weapon. Given these circumstances, the trial court’s finding that Francisco’s statements were not premeditated but made while still laboring under the excitement and strain of the recent violent attack against his friend was neither clearly erroneous nor an abuse of discretion. See Mize, supra, 262 Ga. App. at 488 (1); Park, supra, 230 Ga. App. at 280 (5); Morris v. State.6
Furthermore, contrary to the conclusion in the dissent’s opinion, evidence inferentially showed that Francisco’s detailed statements were based on personal knowledge. His frantic flagging down of police shortly after the attack, his immediate taking of police to the scene of the crime, his immediate and definitive identification of Cuyuch as *634the man who cut his friend, and his accurate description of the place where Cuyuch had disposed of the knife, all show detailed and accurate knowledge shortly after the attack. Such thorough and detailed knowledge within a short time of the attack support the inference that Francisco’s statements came from his personal observations of the attack, rather than from the distressed and bleeding victim who was trying to escape and find help. See Freeman v. Lambert7 (“circumstances [may show] at least inferentially that the . . . declarant was present and that his declaration arose from personal observation”). See also Bush v. Wyche.8 Thus, at least some evidence supported the trial court’s determination that these statements met the criteria for the res gestae exception, including the criterion that such came from personal observation.
For these reasons, we hold that some evidence supported the trial court’s ruling admitting Francisco’s statements to police (through the translator).
2. Francisco’s statements supported a conviction. Based on Francisco’s statements, as well as the officers’ observations and testimony specifically regarding the victim’s injury, there was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find Cuyuch guilty of aggravated battery beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia.9 See Souder, supra, 281 Ga. App. at 341 (1); Mize, supra, 262 Ga. App. at 488 (2). Thus, we need not address whether the identifying statements made to police officers by the victim were also admissible. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s overruling of Cuyuch’s objection to the admission of Francisco’s statements and also affirm the trial court’s denial of Cuyuch’s motion for directed verdict of acquittal.
Judgment affirmed.
Andrews, P. J., Smith, P. J., Ruffin and Miller, JJ., concur. Barnes, C. J., and Bernes, J., dissent.