Opinion
The plaintiff, Minnesota Methane, LLC, appeals1 from the judgment of the trial court dismissing its administrative appeal pursuant to General Statutes §§ 4-1832 and 16-353 from the decision of the named *703defendant, the department of public utility control (department), that the defendant Connecticut Light and Power Company (utility) is entitled to renewable energy certificates associated with the plaintiffs electrical output and to proceeds from all prior sales of such certificates by the plaintiff. The plaintiff, joined by the defendants Southeastern Connecticut Regional Resources Recovery Authority, Bristol Resource Recovery Facility Operating Committee and Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority,4 claims on appeal that the trial court incorrectly concluded that the department had subject matter jurisdiction over this matter. The plaintiff further claims that, if we conclude that the department had jurisdiction, the trial court incorrectly concluded that the department’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and did not constitute an unconstitutional taking under article first, § 11, of the Connecticut constitution.5 The department, the utility and the defendant office of consumer counsel6 con*704tend to the contrary. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
As context for our review of the factual and procedural history of this case, we first provide an overview of the relevant regulatory landscape. In 1978, Congress passed the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (federal act), Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117. Section 210 of the federal act, codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3, required the federal Energy Regulatory Commission (federal commission) to prescribe rules requiring electric utilities to purchase electric energy from qualifying small power production facilities. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (a) (2000); see also 18 C.F.R. § 292.303 (a) (2006). “Small power production facility” is defined in relevant part as “a facility which . . . produces electric energy solely by the use ... of biomass waste [or] renewable resources . . . .” 16 U.S.C. § 796 (17) (A) (i) (2000). The federal act also provides that the rates for the purchase of energy from a small power production facility “shall be just and reasonable to the electric consumers of the electric utility and in the public interest, and . . . shall not discriminate against qualifying cogenerators or small power producers.” 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (b) (1) and (2) (2000); see also 18 C.F.R. § 292.304 (a) (1) (i) and (ii) (2006). These rates may not exceed “the incremental cost to the electric utility of alternative electric energy”; 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (b) (2000); see also 18 C.F.R. § 292.304 (a) (2) (2006); which is defined as “the cost to the electric utility of the electric energy which, but for the purchase from such cogenerator or small power producer, such utility would generate or purchase from another source.” 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (d) (2000). This incremental cost also *705is known as the utility’s avoided cost. See 18 C.F.R. § 292.101 (b) (6) (2006).
In adopting the avoided cost regulations, the federal commission assumed that the cost to small power production facilities of generating electricity would be lower than the avoided cost that they would be paid for the energy. See American Paper Institute, Inc. v. American Electric Power Service Corp., 461 U.S. 402, 406-407, 103 S. Ct. 1921, 76 L. Ed. 2d 22 (1983). The federal commission explained that it had “set the rate [for purchasing electric energy] at full avoided cost rather than at a level that would result in direct rate savings for utility customers” in order “to provide incentives for the development of cogeneration and small power production . . . .” Id., 406. The federal commission also had determined that the rate was “just and reasonable to the electric consumers of the electric utility”; (internal quotation marks omitted) id., 413; even though it was not the “lowest possible reasonable rate consistent with the maintenance of adequate service . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 413-14.
The federal act required each state’s regulatory authority to implement the rules adopted by the federal commission for each electric utility over which it had ratemaking authority. See 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (f) (1) (2000). The Connecticut General Assembly responded by enacting General Statutes § 16-243a et seq., which substantially incorporated the federal definitions and mandates, including the avoided cost pricing provisions. See General Statutes § 16-243a (a) and (c).7
*706In response to the enactment of § 16-243a et seq., the department initiated an investigation into cogeneration and small power production. See Decision and Order, Dept. of Public Utility Control, “Investigation into Co-generation and Small Power Production: ‘Going Back to the Future’ ” (December 11, 1985) (1985 decision and order). In the 1985 decision and order, the department indicated that, in determining pricing methods for such facilities, its goal was “to encourage [small power production facility] development to the maximum feasible extent and to protect utility ratepayers by assuring that over the term of power purchase agreements, there will be net benefits to the state and to ratepayers.” Id., p. 30. To meet these objectives, the department indicated that “contracts should achieve payments of 100 [percent] of utility avoided costs over the term of the power purchase agreement” and that “[contracts for [qualified facilities] using renewable fuels should receive more favorable terms than for [qualified facilities] using fossil fuels . . . .’’Id. The department also recognized that “proceedings to review cogenerator contracts have often taken longer than the cogenerator, utility or [department may have wished.” Id., p. 47. To address this problem, the department determined that, when “a complete contract is being submitted for review that has the agreement of both [the] utility and [the] cogenerator the [department] will follow expedited procedures . . . .’’Id.
Thereafter, the department adopted regulations to implement these policies. The regulations established a competitive bidding process for obtaining a long-term purchase contract that would be triggered only when an electric utility has a demonstrated need for additional *707electric generating capacity. See Regs., Conn. State Agencies §§ 16-243a-4 (a) and 16-243a-5. Section 16-243a-7 of the regulations exempts “[projects of five megawatts or less fueled by a renewable resource other than wood” from these standard bidding procedures. Id., § 16-243a-7 (a) (3).
With this regulatory background in mind, we review the facts and procedural history of the present case. The plaintiff owns a landfill gas energy facility in Hartford. In 1996, the plaintiff, pursuant to General Statutes §§ 4-1768 and 16-243a, submitted to the department apetition for approval of an electricity purchase agreement and for a declaratory ruling that its facility was both a renewable resource proj ect smaller than five megawatts under § 16-243a-7 (a) (3) of the regulations and a “small renewable power project” as defined by General Statutes § 16-243b (a) (6),9 thereby rendering the plaintiff exempt from the bidding requirements for obtaining a long-term purchase contract with the utility for the sale of electricity. The proposed agreement was the standard form agreement approved by the department and provided that the utility would purchase the entire electrical output of the plaintiffs facility. The plaintiff also requested rulings that the utility’s “participation in the transactions specified in the [proposed] [agreement constitute [s] prudent and efficient management and [is] otherwise consistent with the provisions of [General Statutes] § 16-19e,10 and that [the utility] be allowed to *708recover payments under the [proposed] [agreement [in a manner] at least as favorable to [the utility] as the manner in which [the utility] recovers fossil fuel expenses.”
On October 30, 1996, the department issued a decision in which it found that the plaintiffs facility was a “small renewable power project” under § 16-243b (a) (6) and, therefore, was exempt from the department’s standard bidding procedures. This exemption allows small renewable power projects, such as the plaintiff, to obtain long-term purchase power contracts without a determination that the utility has a need for new capacity. The department noted that, without a determination that the plaintiffs facility was a small renewable power project, the plaintiff “would not [have been] eligi*709ble for a long-term purchase power contract at [that] time.” The department further concluded that the plaintiffs production of electricity would further the state’s policy of developing diversified energy resources. The department was concerned that the projected avoided costs that provided the basis for the proposed agreement’s pricing provision overestimated the actual avoided costs and “could add to . . . high electric rates and future strandable costs.” The department concluded, however, that it was constrained by § 16-243a, “which requires that the [department allow pricing in effect on the date [that] the private power producer submits its proposed contract to the [d]epartment.” Accordingly, the department approved the proposed agreement. In 1997, the utility and the plaintiff executed the approved agreement (1997 agreement).
The 1997 agreement contained a dispute resolution clause providing that “[a]ny and all disputes and differences pertaining to or arising out of this [agreement or the breach thereof, which cannot be settled by mutual consent of both parties and which are not subject to the jurisdiction of the [department], maybe submitted to arbitration at the request of either party.”
In 2002, the New England Power Pool (NEPOOL)11 created an accounting device known as generation information system certificates, or renewable energy certificates. NEPOOL created the certificates in part because many states, including Connecticut, had *710enacted statutes requiring certain retail sellers of electricity, including the utility, to purchase a specified amount of electricity from renewable energy sources. See, e.g., General Statutes § 16-245a (a).12 The certificates verify that specified units of electricity have been generated using renewable fuel or have been produced with low emissions and, pursuant to state law, can be purchased to satisfy the state renewable energy requirements. See General Statutes § 16-245a (b).13 Thus, the certificates effectively “unbundled” the renewable energy attribute of the electric product from the generic energy component for accounting purposes and allowed them to be traded separately. Since 2002, NEPOOL has assigned to the plaintiff, pursuant to NEPOOL’s standard rules of operation, the certificates associated with the generation of electricity at the plaintiffs facility, “without prejudice to which person or entity is the owner of such certificates.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
In 2003, the utility filed a petition with the department (2003 petition) in which it requested that the department reopen the 1996 proceeding and issue a declaratory ruling that the plaintiff was required to transfer the renewable energy certificates to the utility pursuant to the 1997 agreement. The plaintiff opposed the 2003 *711petition on the ground that the department lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter and that, if the department had jurisdiction, the utility was not entitled to the certificates. The department held a public hearing on the 2003 petition, issued a draft decision and provided all parties to the proceeding an opportunity to file written exceptions and present oral arguments. Thereafter, the department issued its final decision (2004 decision) in which it concluded, first, that it had jurisdiction over the matter under § 4-176 and other state statutes and, second, that the utility was entitled to ownership of the certificates. The department reasoned that the plaintiffs “renewable source of fuel was the necessary condition for [its] approval [of the 1997 agreement]. No other bases existed in [the federal act] or [state] statutes or regulations that [would have allowed the plaintiff] to qualify for the regulatory treatment [that] it [had] received. For [the plaintiff] ... to claim that the renewable attributes of its fuel are not part of the [department’s approval and therefore not specifically contemplated by the [1997] [agreement is disingenuous and cannot withstand the clear words of the [1996] [d]ecision or logical scrutiny.” The department further stated that, “[w]ere [it] to accept [the plaintiffs] argument that the value of the . . . [c]ertificates remains with them, it would imply that the [department failed to follow the law and ordered [the utility] to purchase generic electricity.”
The plaintiff appealed to the trial court from the 2004 decision pursuant to § § 4-183 and 16-35.14 The trial court *712concluded that the department had jurisdiction to hear the utility’s 2003 petition under § 4-176, among other statutes, that the 2004 decision did not constitute an unconstitutional taking and that there was substantial evidence to support the department’s determination that the utility owned the renewable energy certificates. Accordingly, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the plaintiffs administrative appeal.
This appeal followed. The plaintiff claims on appeal that the trial court incorrectly concluded that (1) the department had subject matter jurisdiction over the contract dispute that formed the basis of the 2003 petition, (2) there was substantial evidence to support the department’s 2004 decision, and (3) the 2004 decision did not constitute an unconstitutional taking.15
In the companion case of Wheelabrator Lisbon, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 283 Conn. 672, 931 A.2d 159 (2007), we addressed substantially identical claims and concluded that the department had jurisdiction over the dispute, that there was substantial evidence to support the department’s 2004 decision and that the 2004 decision did not constitute an unconstitutional taking. We adopt the reasoning and conclusions of that decision in the present case and, accordingly, reject the plaintiffs claims on appeal.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.