It is found as a fact in this case that Bliss, who endorsed the note in question in the name of the Defendants as their agent, had frequently before endorsed their business paper in the same manner, and procured it to be discounted by the Plaintiff, which endorsements had been recognized by the Defendants. It is also found that this note was discounted for the Defendants, upon their application, through their secretary, and the avails paid over to him, which the Defendants had and used in their business as commission dealers, in buying grain for the market, and that the Plaintiff had no notice that the note was accommodation paper.
Now, whether Bliss, the agent, had authority from the Defendants to endorse accommodation paper in their name, or whether this note was in fact endorsed for the accommodation of the maker or not, is quite immaterial; for the Plaintiff had the right to presume from the facts found, as above stated, that it was business paper such as it had been in the habit of discounting for the Defendants; and the Defendants are precluded from denying that it was such business paper (Bank of Genesee v. Patchin Bank, 3 Kern. 314; S. C., 19 N. Y. R. 312; Farmers’ Bank v. Butchers’ and Drovers’ Bank, 16 N. Y. R. 125).
The notice of protest was sent to Bliss, the agent, and received by him. This, L think, was sufficient. In the first place, Bliss was the agent to endorse this paper for the Defendants. In Firth v. Thrush (8 Barn. & Cress. 387), Lord Tenterdon expressed the *323opinion, that authority to endorse negotiable paper carried with it authority to receive notice of its dishonor. But it is not now necessary to examine that question, for here the agent was authorized, not only to endorse this paper, but, as appears from the findings, we must conclude was the general agent of the Defendants to endorse and attend to such paper for them. There is a distinct finding of fact that lie was their agent for what is not stated, but manifestly not merely to endorse their paper.
There is no evidence from which we may infer that a general agency was meant. Now, if he was the general agent of this joint-stock company, in reference to the endorsing and taking care of their business paper, no doubt notice to him of the dishonor of this note was notice to the Defendants (sec. 1, Parsons on Notes and Bills, 499, and cases there cited; also id. 502-3).
But for another reason that must be deemed the law of this case. There is in the findings by the judge before whom the cause was tried the following conclusion of law:—“ The objection, that the notice of non-payment was not properly served on the Defendants, because sent to the agent Bliss, is not good. It was the proper way to serve the notice, especially if Bliss was agent of the company, and authorized to endorse.” To this there is no exception, and, consequently, it is not open to review (Code, § 268; Magic v. Baker, 14 N. Y. R. 435 ; Weed v. The New York and Harlem Railroad Company, 29 N. Y. R. 616).
The judgment should therefore be aifirmed.
All concur.
Aifirmed.