Alvin Mingo appeals the 18-year (216 months) term of imprisonment imposed following his guilty-plea conviction of multiple counts of drug trafficking offenses, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), 924(c)(1)(A); 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 843(b), 846. Mingo argues that the sentence, which was an upward variance from the statutory minimum term and advisory guidelines range, was substantively unreasonable.
This court reviews a district court’s sentencing decision for reasonableness, under the abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50-51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007); United States v. Cisneros-Gutierrez, 517 F.3d 751, 764 (5th Cir.2008). “Appellate courts must first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error.” Cisneros-Gutierrez, 517 F.3d at 764. Min-go does not argue that the district court committed procedural error. Where the sentence is procedurally sound, this court considers the substantive reasonableness of the sentence under the abuse of discretion standard. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586. Reasonableness review requires this court to assess whether the sentence unreasonably fails to reflect the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Smith, 440 F.3d 704, 708 (5th Cir.2006).
The Government argues that Mingo did not adequately preserve this issue for appeal. If Mingo did not preserve his appellate challenge, plain error review would govern this appeal. See United States v. Peltier, 505 F.3d 389, 391-92 (5th Cir. 2007). Because the following analysis indicates that Mingo cannot prevail even under the less deferential, abuse-of-discretion standard, it is unnecessary for this court to determine the standard of review. See United States v. Rodriguez, 523 F.3d 519, 525 (5th Cir.2008).
The record reflects that the district court appropriately relied upon the § 3553(a) sentencing factors in determining that an above-guidelines sentence was warranted, including such considerations as Mingo’s history and characteristics, the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense and to promote respect for the law, the need to provide adequate deterrence to further criminal conduct, and the need to protect the public from further crimes. See § 3553(a)(1); § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(C). The sentencing decision also reflects consideration of the kinds of sentences available as well as the advisory guidelines range. See § 3553(a)(3), (4).
Mingo’s argument regarding the circumstances of his upbringing amounts to a mere disagreement with the weight the district court afforded to the various sentencing factors, and such an argument does not warrant reversal. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586. His assertion that he was previously punished while imprisoned for possession of a shank, a factor that the district court considered when imposing the variance, is not persuasive given the extensive reasons the district court provided to support its sentencing decision. See United States v. Scott, 654 F.3d 552, 555 (5th Cir.2011). Also, given the careful attention that the district court paid to Mingo’s particular facts and circumstances, his argument that his sentence was not commensurate with his co-defendants is not persuasive, as the record *434does not provide fact findings regarding whether his co-defendants were similarly-situated. See § 3553(a)(1); United States v. Guillermo Balleza, 613 F.3d 432, 435 (5th Cir.2010). Moreover, the magnitude of the variance is not unreasonable. See United States v. Jones, 444 F.3d 430, 433, 442 (5th Cir.2006); United States v. Smith, 417 F.3d 483, 492 (5th Cir.2005); United States v. Daughenbaugh, 49 F.3d 171, 174-75 (5th Cir.1995). Accordingly, Mingo has not shown that the district court abused its discretion in imposing an upward variance from the advisory guidelines range. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586.
AFFIRMED.