Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge BRYSON, in which Chief Judge MICHEL and Circuit Judges NEWMAN, MAYER, LOURIE, RADER, SCHALL, LINN, DYK, PROST, and MOORE join. Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge DYK, in which Circuit Judge LINN joins. Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge GAJARSA.
This case requires us to address a difficult question involving the allocation of jurisdiction between regional circuit courts and the Court of Federal Claims. The dispute in this case centers on the interaction between a provision of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (“NWPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101-10270, and a government contract with a utility company that operates a nuclear power facility.
The NWPA authorizes the United States Department of Energy (“DOE”) to enter into contracts with nuclear power producers to dispose of the high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel produced by nuclear power plants. The statute requires the contracts to provide that in return for the payment of fees by the nuclear power producers, DOE would begin disposing of the spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste no later than January 31, 1998. 42 U.S.C. § 10222(a)(5)(B).
DOE did not begin accepting nuclear waste in 1998. Several years later, Nebraska Public Power District (“NPPD”), which had entered a nuclear waste disposal contract with DOE, filed a breach of contract action in the Court of Federal Claims. A central issue in the breach of contract action was whether prior decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit interpreting DOE’s obligations under the NWPA were binding on the parties in the action before the Court of Federal Claims. The Court of Federal Claims held that the D.C. Circuit’s rulings were void because the D.C. Circuit lacked jurisdiction in the prior statutory review proceedings. Neb. Pub. Power Dist. v. United States, 73 Fed.Cl. 650 (2006). That issue is now before us on interlocutory review. We hold that the D.C. Circuit had jurisdiction to review DOE’s compliance with the NWPA, and that the mandamus order issued by the D.C. Circuit in that proceeding is not void. *1360We therefore reverse the order of the Court of Federal Claims and remand to that court for further proceedings.
I
A
Spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste are by-products of the operation of nuclear power plants. Because those substances remain dangerously radioactive for many years, disposing of them requires a safe, secure, and permanent disposal facility. In 1983, Congress sought to fashion a comprehensive solution to the challenge of nuclear waste disposal by enacting the NWPA, which authorized DOE to construct a suitable permanent storage facility for the nuclear material and made further provision for the construction of interim storage facilities.
While Congress assigned DOE the task of constructing the permanent storage facility, it provided that the costs of disposal “should be the responsibility of the generators and owners of such waste and spent fuel.” 42 U.S.C. § 10131(a)(4). Accordingly, Congress authorized DOE to enter into contracts with nuclear power providers to dispose of their nuclear waste in return for the payment of fees. 42 U.S.C. § 10222(a)(1). With respect to the contents of the contracts, section 302(a)(5) of the statute required the following:
(5) Contracts entered into under this section shall provide that—
(A) following commencement of operation of a repository, the Secretary shall take title to the high-level radioactive waste or spent nuclear fuel involved as expeditiously as practicable upon the request of the generator or owner of such waste or spent fuel; and
(B) in return for the payment of fees established by this section, the Secretary, beginning not later than January 31, 1998, will dispose of the high-level radioactive waste or spent nuclear fuel involved as provided in this subchapter.
42 U.S.C. § 10222(a)(5). The NWPA further provided that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission “shall not issue or renew a license” to any utility using a nuclear power facility unless the utility has entered into a contract under section 302 or is negotiating with the Secretary to enter into such a contract. Id. § 10222(b)(1)(A).
B
Pursuant to its statutory rulemaking authority, DOE promulgated a regulation in 1983 containing what it termed the “Standard Contract for Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and/or High-Level Radioactive Waste.” 48 Fed.Reg. 16,590 (Apr. 18, 1983) (codified at 10 C.F.R. § 961.11). In accordance with section 302(a)(5)(B) of the NWPA, the Standard Contract contained a provision setting January 31, 1998, as the deadline for DOE’s acceptance of nuclear waste. 48 Fed.Reg. at 16,600 (codified at 10 C.F.R. § 961.11, Art. II). In response to questions about the remedies that would be available to ensure that DOE would perform its contractual obligations in a timely fashion, and in particular that it would meet the 1998 deadline, DOE stated, “The 1998 date is called for in the Act, and we believe it to be a realistic date. Our performance will be judged by meeting this date.” 48 Fed.Reg. at 16,598.
Under the mandatory nuclear waste contracts, the utilities began making payments to DOE, and they have continued to do so since that time. At present, the licensed nuclear power utilities make a total of $750 million in payments under the *1361contracts each year. To date, however, DOE has not accepted any nuclear waste from any of the utilities.
By 1994, it had become clear that DOE was not going to have a permanent repository ready to accept nuclear waste by the statutory deadline of January 31, 1998. In recognition of that reality, DOE conducted a notice-and-comment proceeding to address the extent of DOE’s obligations under the NWPA. At the outset of that proceeding, DOE announced its “preliminary view” that, although it “may have created an expectation that it would begin accepting such spent nuclear fuel in 1998,” it had no statutory or contractual obligation to accept nuclear waste beginning in 1998 if it did not have an operational repository or other facility constructed in accordance with the NWPA by that time. 59 Fed.Reg. 27,007, 27,008 (May 25,1994).
After inviting and receiving comments on that issue of statutory construction, DOE issued what it termed its “Final Interpretation of Nuclear Waste Acceptance Issues,” 60 Fed.Reg. 21,793 (May 3, 1995) (“Final Interpretation”). In the Final Interpretation, DOE acknowledged that it would not be able to begin accepting nuclear waste by the January 31, 1998, deadline and in fact projected that “the earliest possible date for acceptance of waste for disposal at a repository is 2010.” Id. at 21,794. The agency took the position, however, that it did not have an unconditional obligation under the statute or the Standard Contract to accept nuclear waste by 1998. DOE explained that it interpreted the NWPA to mean that the statutory deadline did not apply if DOE did not have a facility available to accept nuclear waste by that date. Id. at 21,794-95.
C
A number of utilities, states, and state agencies filed a petition in the D.C. Circuit for review of the Final Interpretation. Invoking section 119 of the NWPA, 42 U.S.C. § 10139, which provides for court of appeals review of certain claims arising under the Act, the petitioners challenged the portion of the Final Interpretation in which DOE took the position that it did not have an unconditional statutory obligation to begin accepting nuclear waste by January 31, 1998. They argued that DOE’s legal position was contrary to the provision in section 302 of the NWPA that in return for the payment of fees, “the Secretary, beginning not later than January 31, 1998, will dispose of the high-level radioactive waste or spent nuclear fuel involved as provided in this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 10222(a)(5)(B).
The D.C. Circuit reviewed the Final Interpretation to determine whether it constituted a permissible interpretation of the statute by DOE. After analyzing the statute and the Final Interpretation, the court concluded that DOE’s interpretation was contrary to the statutory mandate, and the court therefore rejected DOE’s interpretation. Ind. Mich. Power Co. v. Dep’t of Energy, 88 F.3d 1272 (D.C.Cir.1996).
The court interpreted section 302 of the NWPA as imposing on DOE an unconditional obligation to accept nuclear waste upon the payment of fees by the utilities. In particular, the court explained that nothing in the statute suggested that the obligation to accept nuclear waste was conditioned on the commencement of repository operations. Under the “plain language of the statute,” the court held, the utilities undertook to pay fees “‘in return for [which] the Secretary’ had a commensurate duty” to begin disposing of the spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste by a date certain. 88 F.3d at 1276. While acknowledging that Congress had *1362expected that a permanent facility would be available by 1998, the court ruled that even though Congress anticipated that a facility would be available, that “does not mean that Congress conditioned DOE’s obligation to begin acceptance of [nuclear waste] on the availability of a facility.” Id. at 1277. The court thus concluded that section 302(a)(5)(B) “creates an obligation in DOE, reciprocal to the utilities’ obligation to pay, to start disposing of [nuclear waste] no later than January 31, 1998.” Id.
Notwithstanding the court’s ruling, DOE subsequently advised the utilities with which it had section 302 contracts that it would not begin accepting nuclear waste by the 1998 statutory deadline. The utilities then returned to the court of appeals seeking a writ of mandamus to force DOE to comply with its statutory obligations as previously announced by the court. While that action was pending in the court of appeals, DOE asserted that under the “Unavoidable Delays” clause in the Standard Contract, 10 C.F.R. § 961.11, Art. IX(A), it was not obligated to provide a financial remedy for the delay in accepting the nuclear waste.
The court of appeals denied the utilities’ request for a writ of mandamus requiring DOE to begin accepting nuclear waste as of the statutory deadline. N. States Power Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 128 F.3d 754 (D.C.Cir.1997). The court acknowledged that “DOE’s current approach toward contractual remedies is inconsistent with the NWPA” and with the court’s prior decision on the matter. Id. at 756. Nonetheless, the court held that ordering DOE to comply with its statutory obligations was unnecessary because the Standard Contract “provides a potentially adequate remedy if DOE fails to fulfill its obligations by the deadline.” Id. at 756. The court explained that the unconditional statutory duty to begin accepting nuclear waste as of January 31, 1998, left “no room for DOE to argue that it does not have a clear duty to take the [nuclear waste] from the owners and generators by the deadline imposed by Congress.” Id. at 758-59. Moreover, the court held that there was no reason to believe that the expenses the utilities incurred in dealing with the nuclear waste that DOE failed to remove would not be taken into account “if the contractual processes operate as Congress intended.” Id. at 759.
Although the court of appeals declined to order DOE to begin accepting nuclear waste as of 1998, it entered a more limited mandamus order. Holding that the NWPA “imposes an unconditional obligation” to begin accepting nuclear waste by January 31, 1998, the court issued a writ of mandamus “precluding DOE from excusing its own delay on the grounds that it has not yet prepared a permanent repository or interim storage facility.” Northern States, 128 F.3d at 761. The court held that in light of DOE’s unconditional duty under the statute, the petitioners’ ability to enforce the contract “would be frustrated if DOE were allowed to operate under a construction of the contract inconsistent with our prior conclusion that the NWPA imposes an obligation on DOE ‘without qualification or condition.’ ” Id. at 759.
In particular, the court of appeals rejected DOE’s argument that it was not obligated to accept nuclear waste because its failure to do so was “unavoidable” -within the meaning of the “Unavoidable Delays” clause in Article IX of the Standard Contract. 128 F.3d at 757. The court held that DOE’s contention that its delayed *1363performance was excusable because it did not have a permanent repository, or congressional authority to provide storage in an interim facility, was “simply recycling the arguments rejected by this court in Indiana Michigan.” Id. at 759-60. The court therefore ordered DOE “to proceed with contractual remedies in a manner consistent with NWPA’s command that it undertake an unconditional obligation to begin disposal of the [nuclear waste] by January 31,1998.” Id. at 760.
DOE petitioned for rehearing, arguing that the court’s mandamus order had improperly intruded upon the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims with regard to claims arising under government contracts. In response to the rehearing petition, the court issued a supplemental opinion in which it clarified the scope of its order. N. States Power Co. v. Dep’t of Energy, No. 97-1064, 1998 WL 276581 (D.C.Cir. May 5, 1998). The court explained that it had barred DOE from interpreting the Standard Contract “as imposing only a contingent disposal obligation; such an interpretation, we ruled, would place the DOE in violation of its statutory duties ... which required it to undertake an unconditional obligation.” Id. at *1. Beyond that clarification of the statute’s requirements, the court “remitted the utilities to their remedies under the Standard Contract.” Id. at *2. The statutory duty to include such an unconditional obligation in the contract, the court added, “is independent of any rights under the contract.” Id. DOE petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which was denied. Dep’t of Energy v. N. States Power Co., 525 U.S. 1016, 119 S.Ct. 540, 142 L.Ed.2d 449 (1998).
D
In its complaint in the Court of Federal Claims, NPPD sought damages for breach of contract on account of DOE’s failure to accept nuclear waste as of January 31, 1998, and thereafter. The government proposed to defend in part on the ground that its failure to meet the 1998 deadline was excused under the “Unavoidable Delays” clause of the contract. NPPD sought to bar the government from asserting that defense on the ground that it conflicted with the D.C. Circuit’s mandamus order. The government responded that the D.C. Circuit lacked jurisdiction to enter the mandamus order and that the order was therefore void.
The Court of Federal Claims agreed with the government and held that the D.C. Circuit lacked jurisdiction to issue the mandamus order based on the absence of an applicable waiver of sovereign immunity. The court therefore ruled that the order was void and had no effect on the litigation over the contract. The court then certified that order for interlocutory review by this court, and this court granted interlocutory review. Following briefing and argument before a panel of this court, we granted rehearing en banc before judgment by the panel. We now reverse.
II
The issue in this case is whether the D.C. Circuit’s decisions in Indiana Michigan and Northern States are entitled to res judicata effect in the proceedings before the Court of Federal Claims. Normally, a final judgment in one court is binding on the same parties in a subsequent action before another court as a matter of res judicata; in such a setting the first judgment ordinarily cannot be collaterally challenged in the second proceeding, even on the ground that the first tribunal lacked subject matter jurisdiction. *1364 See Christopher Village, L.P. v. United States, 360 F.3d 1319, 1329-30 (Fed.Cir.2004). However, we have recognized an exception to that principle if the first court acted in derogation of principles of sovereign immunity and its judgment was void on that ground. Id. at 1333. The Court of Federal Claims ruled that the D.C. Circuit’s mandamus order was void because it was not supported by a waiver of sovereign immunity.
The trial court based its decision on three grounds. First, the court held that section 119 of the NWPA, 42 U.S.C. § 10139, did not give the D.C. Circuit jurisdiction to review DOE’s Final Interpretation for inconsistency with section 302 of the Act. In that respect, the court disagreed with a series of decisions of the D.C. Circuit beginning with that court’s decision in General Electric Uranium Management Corp. v. United States Department of Energy, 764 F.2d 896 (D.C.Cir.1985) (General Electric).
Second, the court held that there was no valid waiver of sovereign immunity for the review action undertaken and the mandamus order entered by the D.C. Circuit in the Indiana Michigan and Northern States cases, respectively. The court ruled that the only possible source of a waiver of sovereign immunity enabling the D.C. Circuit to act in those cases would be section 10(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 702. However, the court held that section 10(a) did not waive sovereign immunity for the review proceedings in the D.C. Circuit because the plaintiffs did not satisfy the requirement in section 10(c) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 704, that there be “no other adequate remedy in a court” before an APA judicial review action can be brought. The court held that an action before the Court of Federal Claims for contract breach would provide an adequate remedy for the injury asserted by the utilities in the litigation before the D.C. Circuit. For that reason, the court held that the “no adequate remedy” requirement of section 10(c) was not satisfied, and that section 10(a) therefore did not effect the required waiver of sovereign immunity. Absent a waiver of sovereign immunity, the court held, the D.C. Circuit did not have jurisdiction over the utilities’ action in the Indiana Michigan case, and it did not have jurisdiction to issue the mandamus order that it issued in the Northern States case.
Third, and relatedly, the trial court held that the D.C. Circuit had improperly addressed contract interpretation issues that were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims. The court viewed the dispute before the D.C. Circuit as “entirely contained within the terms of the contract” between DOE and the utilities. While acknowledging that the Standard Contract had to be construed in light of the NWPA, the court held that the effect of the NWPA on DOE’s obligations under the contract was a contract interpretation issue that fell outside the jurisdiction of the D.C. Circuit.
For the reasons set out in detail below, we disagree with each of the trial court’s reasons for concluding that the D.C. Circuit’s mandamus order is void. First, based on the analysis of the D.C. Circuit in General Electric and the decision of this court in PSEG Nuclear, L.L.C. v. United States, 465 F.3d 1343 (Fed.Cir.2006), we hold that section 119 of the NWPA authorized the D.C. Circuit to review the utilities’ statutory claim arising under section 302 of the Act. Second, we hold that the “no adequate remedy” requirement in section 10(c) of the APA does not apply to special *1365statutory review provisions such as section 119 of the NWPA. Section 10(c) of the APA therefore did not bar the D.C. Circuit from exercising its jurisdiction to determine the scope of the government’s obligations under section 302 of the NWPA and to order appropriate relief to enforce those obligations. Finally, we hold that the D.C. Circuit’s decision construing section 302 of the NWPA, and its order directing the government to act in accordance with the utilities’ rights under that provision, did not improperly intrude on the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims to address NPPD’s breach of contract claim. The D.C. Circuit’s order prohibited the government from using contract interpretation as a means of avoiding its statutory obligations under section 302, which the D.C. Circuit was authorized to do as a means of enforcing the statutory claim that was brought before it in the Indiana Michigan case. Beyond that implementation of its statutory ruling, the D.C. Circuit properly left all issues of contract breach, enforcement, and remedy to be determined in the litigation before the Court of Federal Claims.
A
Section 119(a)(1)(A) of the NWPA, 42 U.S.C. § 10139(a)(1)(A), provides that the courts of appeals shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over any civil action “for review of any final decision or action of the Secretary, the President, or the [Nuclear Regulatory] Commission under this part.” The term “this part” refers to part A of subchapter I of the NWPA, which is entitled “Repositories for Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel.” Subchapter II of the Act deals with research and development relating to the disposal of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel. Sub-chapter III contains “Other Provisions Relating to Radioactive Waste,” including section 302(a)(5) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 10222(a)(5), which designates those provisions that must be included in nuclear waste disposal contracts entered into by DOE and nuclear power providers. The Court of Federal Claims held that the D.C. Circuit lacked jurisdiction to review the Final Interpretation because the challenge to the Final Interpretation arose under section 302(a)(5), which is found in Sub-chapter III of the Act, not in Part A of Subchapter I.
In General Electric, the D.C. Circuit rejected the argument that section 119 applies only to actions arising from Part A of Subchapter I of the NWPA. 764 F.2d at 901-04. The court first noted that section 119 provides for review of matters such as the choice, characterization, approval of, and authorization for construction of disposal sites, and that section 221 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 10201, applies the judicial review provisions of section 119 to Subchap-ter II of the Act. In light of the broad scope of the review provisions, the court concluded that it would be “inconceivable that Congress intended to have review of all actions concerning waste disposal in the court of appeals ... except for questions concerning the composition of the Nuclear Waste Fund and a few other matters located in Subchapter III.” 764 F.2d at 901-02.
The matters addressed in Subchapter III are closely related to those addressed in Part A of Subchapter I. Thus, section 111(b) of the NWPA, 42 U.S.C. § 10131(b), which is in Part A of Subchapter I, states that the purposes of Part A include establishing a schedule for the construction and operation of repositories, establishing federal responsibility for nuclear waste dis-*1366posai, and creating a Nuclear Waste Fund to ensure that the costs of disposal are borne by the persons responsible for creating the nuclear waste. Section 302 fills in the details for creating and operating the Nuclear Waste Fund established in section 111(b). Thus, while the civil action before the D.C. Circuit addressed DOE’s specific responsibilities under section 302, the action could also be regarded as arising under section 111(b). See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Abraham, 244 F.3d 742, 747 (9th Cir.2001) (section 119 grants jurisdiction to review decisions “under the [NWPA] when the decision is pursuant to a part of the Act and relates to the purposes of the part in which the judicial review provision is placed”).
In addition, as the D.C. Circuit observed in General Electric, “the evolution of the placement of section 302 in the [NWPA] strongly suggests that its physical separation from the judicial review provision in section 119 is pure happenstance and in no way indicates a congressional intent that review under the different subchapters be governed by different standards.” 764 F.2d at 903. A close examination of the legislative history of the NWPA provides strong support for that conclusion.
The principal bill on which the NWPA was based, H.R. 3809 (1982), contained a judicial review provision similar to the enacted version of section 119. See H.R.Rep. No. 97-491, pt. I, at 14, 56-57 (1982), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982, pp. 3792, 3822 (section 119). That bill also contained a substantive provision corresponding to section 302 of the enacted statute. See id. at 15-16, 58-59, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982, at pp. 3822-3824 (section 124(a)(4)(B)). A second House bill, H.R. 6598 (1982), produced by a different committee, also had a judicial review provision corresponding to section 119 and a substantive provision equivalent to section 302. See H.R.Rep. No. 97-785, pt. I, at 16-17, 18-19 (1982). Significantly, in both of those predecessor bills the section that became section 302 of the NWPA was located in subtitle A of Title I, thus clearly providing court of appeals review for issues arising under that section. When the House bills were reconciled on the floor of the House, the predecessor provision to section 302 was moved to Title III of the Act, but no change was made in section 119, the judicial review provision. See 128 Cong. Rec. 26,305, 26,306-42 (1982). While there was no explanation for moving section 302 out of Title I, there was no suggestion that Congress intended, as part of the process of reconciling the House bills, to withdraw court of appeals review with respect to matters arising under section 302 that had been covered in both of the predecessor bills.1 The Senate adopted the House bill in substance without material change to sections 119 and 302.
Even if the statute is regarded as ambiguous as to whether section 119 *1367places review of matters arising from section 302 in a court of appeals, or leaves such matters to district courts under the default judicial review provision of section 10(c) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 704, any such ambiguity must be resolved in favor of court of appeals review. When there is a question whether judicial review was meant to be in district courts or courts of appeals, that ambiguity is resolved in favor of court of appeals review. General Electric, 764 F.2d at 903; see generally Clark v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 170 F.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir.1999); Tennessee v. Herrington, 806 F.2d 642, 650 (6th Cir.1986); Suburban O’Hare Comm’n v. Dole, 787 F.2d 186, 192-93 (7th Cir.1986). Because review in a district court would be subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the court of appeals in any event, resolving jurisdictional ambiguity in favor of direct review in the court of appeals “avoids du-plicative review and the attendant delay and expense involved.” General Electric, 764 F.2d at 903; see also Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 593, 100 S.Ct. 1889, 64 L.Ed.2d 525 (1980); Natural Res. Def. Council v. Abraham, 355 F.3d 179, 193-94 (2d Cir.2004); Ind. & Mich. Elec. Co. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 733 F.2d 489, 491 (7th Cir.1984). That is particularly true in the case of a review proceeding involving a pure legal issue, such as the review of DOE’s Final Interpretation for consistency with section 302 of the NWPA. In that context, as the General Electric court concluded, “we cannot assume that Congress intended both the District Court and this court to perform the identical review function” of reviewing DOE’s interpretation of the NWPA. 764 F.2d at 904.
In the aftermath of the General Electric decision, other circuits likewise rejected the argument that section 119 applies only to matters arising under Part A of Sub-chapter I of the NWPA. See Ala. Power Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 307 F.3d 1300, 1312-13 (11th Cir.2002); County of Esmeralda v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 925 F.2d 1216, 1218-19 (9th Cir.1991); Tennessee v. Herrington, 806 F.2d at 647-51. No circuit court has taken the opposite position.2
More recently, in the PSEG case, this court agreed with General Electric and the other circuit decisions holding that the reviewing authority conferred by section 119 of the NWPA is not limited to matters arising under Part A of Subchapter I of the Act. See 465 F.3d at 1349 (“We agree with ... the D.C. Circuit that agency actions mandated under [Subchapter] III which relate to the creation of repositories for spent nuclear fuel fall within the class *1368of actions subject to review by the courts of appeals under section 119.”). The court further held that the January 31, 1998, deadline for beginning nuclear waste collection “was clearly statutorily mandated” by section 302 of the NWPA, and it recognized that judicial review under section 119 of the NWPA “as to whether the DOE properly incorporated these obligations within its contracts may fall within the jurisdiction conferred to the courts of appeals in section 119.” Id. at 1350.
The court in PSEG held that section 119 does not have the effect of transferring all contract breach issues to the courts of appeals. As the court explained, “issues of whether the DOE breached its contractual obligations, and if so, to what damages, if any, PSEG is entitled for the breach” did not arise under the NWPA, but were for the Court of Federal Claims to address. PSEG, 465 F.3d at 1350. That was because those issues are “not within the DOE’s statutory obligations under the NWPA.” Id. However, with respect to claims arising from the statutory mandates in section 302, PSEG supports NPPD’s position that courts of appeals have jurisdiction to review such claims pursuant to section 119 of the Act.
The government makes the further argument that even if, as PSEG held, section 119 applies to at least some issues arising under section 302, section 119 review is limited to actions relating to the creation of nuclear waste repositories. Because the government characterizes this case as involving the date for accepting nuclear waste, but not “the development of or date for opening a repository,” the government argues that section 119 does not vest judicial review jurisdiction in the courts of appeals. The government notes that sub-paragraph (A) of section 302(a)(5) refers to the commencement of repository operations and DOE’s responsibility to take title to nuclear waste, but does not refer to the date the repository operations are to begin, while subparagraph (B) of section 302(a)(5) identifies the date by which disposal must begin, but does not mention a repository. Accordingly, the government contends that even if issues arising under section 302(a)(5)(A) of the NWPA are subject to review in a court of appeals, issues arising under section 302(a)(5)(B) are subject to review, if at all, only in a district court under the default review provisions of the APA.
The government’s argument is not based on the statutory text, the legislative history, or any discernible policy, but instead appears tailored simply to accommodate the specific holding of PSEG while still maintaining that section 119 did not provide the D.C. Circuit with jurisdiction to review DOE’s Final Interpretation in the Indiana Michigan case. The divided review regime contemplated by the government’s argument would be exceptionally cumbersome, and it is difficult to think of any reason why Congress would have wanted to create such a scheme. We reject the government’s proffered distinction of PSEG and hold that the D.C. Circuit did not lack jurisdiction to review the consistency of DOE’s Final Interpretation with section 302 of the NWPA based on the purported inapplicability of section 119 of the Act.3
B
Apart from ruling that section 119 of the NWPA did not authorize court of *1369appeals review of a claim arising under section 302, the trial court held that the D.C. Circuit lacked jurisdiction to review the Final Interpretation because there was no statutory waiver of sovereign immunity for that review proceeding. Accordingly, the trial court concluded that the D.C. Circuit’s mandamus order was void on that ground as well.
Section 10(a) of the APA is the source typically invoked for waiver of sovereign immunity in a case involving judicial review of administrative action by federal agencies or officials. It provides, in pertinent part, that an action seeking relief other than money damages and stating a claim challenging an action by an agency or officer of the United States “shall not be dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the ground that it is against the United States.” 5 U.S.C. § 702. The Court of Federal Claims held that section 10(a) did not waive sovereign immunity with respect to the review conducted by the D.C. Circuit in the Indiana Michigan and Northern States cases because section 10(c) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 704, requires that there be “no other adequate remedy in a court.” The court explained that an adequate remedy was available through an action for breach of contract in the Court of Federal Claims, and it was therefore improper for the D.C. Circuit to conduct judicial review of DOE’s Final Interpretation. See 73 Fed.Cl. at 672-73 (“[B]ecause an adequate remedy was and is available in this court, section 704 precluded the D.C. Circuit in Indiana Michigan from relying on the section 702 waiver in issuing the judgment that, in turn, led it to issue in Northern States the mandamus at issue.”).
We disagree with the trial court’s interpretation of section 10(c) of the APA. That statute provides, in pertinent part: “Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. The most natural reading of that sentence is that it relates to two categories of agency action: agency action that is made reviewable by a specific review-authorizing statute, such as section 119 of the NWPA (referred to as “special statutory review”), and final agency action for which there is no adequate remedy at law (referred to as “nonstatutory review” or, sometimes, “general statutory review”). Under that reading, the “adequate remedy at law” proviso applies only to nonstatutory review and not to special statutory review, such as the review at issue in this case. For that reason, even if the plaintiffs would have been entitled, in a contract breach action in the Court of Federal Claims, to invoke section 302 of the NWPA to overcome DOE’s reliance on the “Unavoidable De*1370lays” clause, the fact that they could have invoked section 302 in the contract breach litigation would not bar them from seeking relief in a statutory APA review proceeding.
Although the statutory language can be interpreted, with some effort, to apply the “adequate remedy” proviso to both statutory and nonstatutory review, the courts have not interpreted section 10(c) in that manner. In Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967), the Supreme Court characterized section 10(c) of the APA as providing “specifically not only for review of ‘[algency action made reviewable by statute’ but also for review of ‘final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court.’ ” Id. at 140, 87 S.Ct. 1507; see also Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 904, 108 S.Ct. 2722, 101 L.Ed.2d 749 (1988) (quoting the pertinent language in Abbott Laboratories approvingly); id. at 926 & n. 4, 108 S.Ct. 2722 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (distinguishing between agency action specifically made reviewable by another statute and nonstatutory review in which review of final agency action is permitted under the APA if there is no “other adequate remedy”).4
This court and others have characterized section 10(c) in the same way. On several occasions, we have noted that the “no other adequate remedy in a court” formulation is associated with “nonstatutory review.” See Doe v. United States, 372 F.3d 1308, 1312 (Fed.Cir.2004) (stating that in a “nonstatutory review action” there must be “no other adequate remedy in a court”); Brazos Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v. United States, 144 F.3d 784, 786 (Fed.Cir.1998) (same); Nat’l Ctr. for Mfg. Scis. v. United States, 114 F.3d 196, 200 (Fed.Cir.1997) (same). Other circuits have uniformly characterized section 10(c) in the same fashion.5 We concur with those character*1371izations and accord section 10(c) its natural meaning, under which the “no adequate remedy” requirement does not apply to special statutory review provisions such as section 119.
Consideration of Congress’s objectives in enacting section 10(a) shows why this construction makes sense. Congress was, of course, aware of the pre-existing statutes that provided for special review of particular agency action, including review in the courts of appeals for actions of agencies such as the Interstate Commerce Commission, the National Labor Relations Board, and the Federal Trade Commission. See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 903, 108 S.Ct. 2722. It was to fill in the gaps in that patchwork of special review provisions that Congress created the right to general review of agency action in the district courts through section 10(a). Congress provided that the new default review created by section 10(a) would not be available if there were already an adequate remedy available in a court, because it “did not intend that general grant of jurisdiction to duplicate the previously established special statutory procedures relating to specific agencies.” Id. By the same token, however, Congress plainly did not intend section 10(a) to narrow the scope of the pre-existing special statutory review provisions, which would be the effect if the “no adequate remedy” requirement were deemed applicable to those provisions. Accordingly, we reject the rationale of the Court of Federal Claims to the extent that it relies on the “no other adequate remedy in a court” provision of section 10(c) to hold that the D.C. Circuit was foreclosed from conducting the review proceeding in this case.6
The Court of Federal Claims relied heavily on this court’s decision in Christopher Village, L.P. v. United States, 360 F.3d 1319 (Fed.Cir.2004), in support of its decision. In that case, the Fifth Circuit directed the issuance of a declaratory judgment in favor of government contractors that had filed a nonstatutory APA action in district court. We held that the Fifth Circuit’s order was void because the contractors had an adequate remedy in a court of law, namely, an action in the Court of Federal Claims for breach of contract. Significantly, the judicial review at issue in that case was nonstatutory review, not review pursuant to a special statutory review provision permitting review in a regional court of appeals, such as section 119 of the NWPA. The court’s analysis in Christopher Village with respect to the “no other adequate remedy” clause of section 10(c) of the APA is therefore inapplicable here. That is also true of another case the trial court cited, Consolidated Edison Co. v. United States, 247 F.3d 1378 (Fed.Cir.2001), which similarly relied on the “no other adequate remedy” clause in section 10(c) in a nonstatutory review case. Because the availability of review under section 119 of the NWPA obviates the need to inquire into the availability of other possible judicial remedies, section 10(c) of the APA is not an impediment to court of appeals review in this case. Accordingly, we hold that section 10(a) of the APA waived sovereign immunity for the judicial review of DOE’s Final Interpretation by the D.C. Circuit.7
*1372In addition to holding that Congress did not waive sovereign immunity for the D.C. Circuit’s review proceeding in Indiana Michigan, the Court of Federal Claims focused in particular on the mandamus order and held that the order “pretermits a key aspect of the contractual dispute before this court,” 73 Fed.Cl. at 662, and in so doing “plainly encroaches upon this court’s jurisdiction.” Id. at 663.
In assessing whether the D.C. Circuit’s mandamus order improperly invaded the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims over the adjudication of contract rights, it is important to focus on precisely what agency action was challenged in the D.C. Circuit and what relief the D.C. Circuit granted. The issue before the D.C. Circuit in Indiana Michigan was whether section 302(a)(5)(B) of the NWPA imposed an unconditional obligation on DOE to accept nuclear waste by the statutory deadline. The agency action challenged in that case was DOE’s announcement in the Final Interpretation that it had no statutory obligation to accept nuclear waste by 1998 if DOE did not have an appropriate storage facility at that time. The D.C. Circuit rejected that argument as clearly contrary to the NWPA.
The issue before the D.C. Circuit in Northern States was what relief was appropriate in light of what the court characterized as DOE’s effort to circumvent the court’s statutory ruling by arguing that the Standard Contract relieved it of the responsibility to accept nuclear waste if it lacked a facility for accepting the waste. The D.C. Circuit determined that DOE’s interpretation of the Standard Contract would allow DOE to treat its obligation to accept nuclear waste as a contingent obligation, in violation of the unconditional statutory obligation announced by the court in Indiana Michigan. Viewing DOE’s position as simply “recycling the arguments” that the court had rejected in Indiana Michigan, the court issued an order “precluding DOE from excusing its own delay on the grounds that it has not yet prepared a permanent repository or interim storage facility.” Northern States, 128 F.3d at 761.
The D.C. Circuit concluded that it was necessary to bar DOE from doing under the rubric of contract interpretation what section 302(a)(5)(B) prohibited as a matter of statutory compulsion. Beyond that, however, the court stated that the utilities would be required to seek relief for any asserted breach of contract in an action before the Court of Federal Claims. On rehearing, in response to DOE’s argument that the court had erroneously “designated itself as the proper forum for adjudication of disputes arising under the Standard Contract,” the D.C. Circuit stated, “[W]e *1373did not; we merely prohibited the DOE from implementing an interpretation that would place it in violation of its duty under the NWPA to assume an unconditional obligation to begin disposal by January 31, 1998. The statutory duty ... is independent of any rights under the contract.” N. States Power Co. v. Dep’t of Energy, No. 97-1064, 1998 WL 276581 at *2 (D.C.Cir. May 5, 1998). The court added that its initial decision in Northern States described “the nature of the DOE’s obligation, which was created by the NWPA and undertaken by the DOE under the Standard Contract. It does not place the question of contract remedies in this court, nor set up this court as a source of remedies outside the Standard Contract.” Id.
A later opinion by the D.C. Circuit in a different case sheds further light on what that court regarded as the proper scope of its reviewing authority with respect to the NWPA and the Standard Contract. In Wisconsin Electric Power Co. v. United States Department of Energy, 211 F.3d 646 (D.C.Cir.2000), a nuclear power producer petitioned for a writ of mandamus from the D.C. Circuit declaring that the Department of Energy must provide both monetary and non-monetary relief for having failed to begin disposing of the company’s nuclear waste by January 31, 1998. The court denied the petition. The court explained that it had held in Indiana Michigan that DOE had an unconditional statutory obligation to begin disposing of nuclear waste by January 31, 1998, but that DOE had “acted to frustrate that decision by holding that its failure to perform was ‘unavoidable’ and therefore, under the terms of the [Standard] Contract, did not render the Department liable for damages of any kind.” Id. at 647. For that reason, the court noted, it had issued a writ of mandamus “forbidding the DOE from claiming, in proceedings under its contracts, that its failure to perform was ‘unavoidable’ because a repository was not available.” Id. The court stated that it had “expressed no opinion about the relief the DOE would have to provide for breach of that obligation,” and that “[t]he Court of Federal Claims, not this court, is the proper forum for adjudicating contract disputes.” Id. at 648. Thus, in Wisconsin Electric, as in Northern States, the D.C. Circuit characterized its authority as limited to prohibiting the government from acting in derogation of its statutory obligations under the NWPA. The court disclaimed that its authority otherwise extended to any issue of contract interpretation, enforcement, or remedies.
The trial court in this case characterized the D.C. Circuit’s mandamus order as being at odds with the analysis in this court’s recent decision in PSEG Nuclear, L.L.C. v. United States, 465 F.3d 1343 (Fed.Cir.2006), but we disagree. Like this case, PSEG was a case brought by a nuclear power producer alleging a breach of contract because of DOE’s failure to begin accepting nuclear waste as of January 31, 1998. In PSEG, however, the Court of Federal Claims held that it lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiffs breach of contract claim because section 119 of the NWPA gave the courts of appeals exclusive jurisdiction over all actions relating to the contract term requiring performance by January 31, 1998. On appeal, this court rejected the Court of Federal Claims’ conclusion that section 119 divested it of jurisdiction over the underlying breach of contract action. We held that section 119 gave the regional courts of appeals jurisdiction to decide whether the Standard Contract complied with the requirements of section 302, but that it did not strip the Court of Federal Claims of *1374its Tucker Act jurisdiction over the breach of contract suit. 465 F.3d at 1349-50.
In the course of its analysis, the PSEG court distinguished between “judicial review as to whether the DOE properly incorporated [its statutory] obligations within its contracts,” an issue that the court said could fall within the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals under sections 119 and 302 of the NWPA, and “the performance of and any damages for failure to meet those obligations.” 465 F.3d at 1350. The latter issues, the court held, “are not within the DOE’s statutory obligations under the NWPA,” but fall within the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims. Id.
Because the issue in PSEG was whether the NWPA wholly stripped the Court of Federal Claims of its jurisdiction over PSEG’s breach of contract claim, the PSEG court did not find it necessary to decide “whether the courts of appeals continue to have jurisdiction to decide the propriety of agency actions under section 302 once the government includes the required language in the Standard Contract.” 465 F.3d at 1348. That unresolved question is presented in this case. Yet, while PSEG does not decide that question, it provides guidance as to the proper analytical approach for deciding it.
First, the PSEG court recognized that section 119 of the NWPA authorizes court of appeals review of DOE actions taken under section 302. Second, the court made clear that the breadth of the reviewing court’s mandate under that authority depends on whether the agency action in question “involve[s] the agency’s authority under that statutory mandate,” that is “whether the DOE properly incorporated [the statutory] obligations within its contracts.” PSEG, 465 F.3d at 1350. Finally, the court explained that answering that question does not involve the reviewing court in “issues of whether the DOE breached its contractual obligations, and if so, to what damages, if any, PSEG is entitled for the breach.” Id.
That is the same line the D.C. Circuit drew in the Indiana Michigan, Northern States, and Wisconsin Electric decisions, and we reaffirm that distinction here. It was within the authority of the D.C. Circuit to say what section 302(a)(5) of the NWPA means; and, except to the extent that the D.C. Circuit’s ruling on the statutory question controls as a matter of res judicata, it is within the authority of the Court of Federal Claims to interpret, apply, and enforce the provisions of the Standard Contract.
Notwithstanding the disclaimers by the D.C. Circuit, the Court of Federal Claims in this case concluded that the D.C. Circuit’s mandamus order was void because that court had exceeded its jurisdiction by “enforcing the terms of the Standard Contract,” a task that Congress committed to the Court of Federal Claims through the Tucker Act. 73 Fed.Cl. at 662. The trial court viewed the D.C. Circuit’s mandamus order as dictating the resolution of an important dispute over contract interpretation, a dispute that the court regarded as “squarely within this court’s Tucker Act jurisdiction.” Id. The court added that “the fact that a contract is underlain by a statute or regulation does not turn a contract interpretation question into one involving statutory or regulatory construction to be controlled by the administrative law decisions of other courts.” Id. at 664. We disagree with that analysis.
Section 302(a)(5)(B) of the NWPA directs that DOE’s contracts with nuclear power producers must provide that DOE will begin disposing of nuclear waste by *1375January 31, 1998. As a matter of statutory construction, the D.C. Circuit interpreted DOE’s obligation to begin accepting nuclear waste in 1998 as unconditional. If DOE had omitted the clause required by section 302(a)(5)(B) from its contracts, it is clear that a court order directing the inclusion of that clause in its contracts would constitute a straightforward enforcement of DOE’s statutory responsibilities and would not intrude on the Tucker Act jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims. See PSEG, 465 F.3d at 1348.
What the D.C. Circuit did in the Indiana Michigan and Northern States cases is not meaningfully different. As the D.C. Circuit viewed the matter, DOE included a provision in the Standard Contract pertaining to its obligation to begin accepting nuclear waste by 1998, but then nullified the statutory requirement by interpreting the “Unavoidable Delays” clause to make that obligation conditional. DOE’s conduct, as the D.C. Circuit viewed it, was equivalent to having omitted the clause required by section 302(a)(5)(B) from the Standard Contract in the first place. Once the D.C. Circuit construed the NWPA to require DOE to begin accepting nuclear waste by 1998, it was not a significant further step to conclude that Congress did not intend for DOE to avoid that statutory obligation by adopting a contrary interpretation of the Standard Contract. Thus, based on its interpretation of the NWPA, the D.C. Circuit held that the government’s failure to have a repository ready by January 31, 1998, could not be excused as unavoidable delay.
The government argues — with a passing endorsement from the trial court, 73 Fed.Cl. at 672 n. 30 — that the D.C. Circuit’s mandamus order fell outside the waiver of sovereign immunity in section 10(a) of the APA because it ran afoul of the proviso in that section barring review “if any other statute that grants consent to suit expressly or impliedly forbids the relief which is sought.” 5 U.S.C. § 702. Citing Sharp v. Weinberger, 798 F.2d 1521 (D.C.Cir.1986), the government contends that the D.C. Circuit’s order was impliedly forbidden by the Tucker Act.
Sharp and the other cases on which the government relies stand for the proposition that “[t]he sole remedy for an alleged breach of contract by the federal government is a claim for money damages, either in the United States Claims Court under the Tucker Act or, if damages of no more than $10,000 are sought, in the district court under the Little Tucker Act.” Sharp, 798 F.2d at 1523 (citations omitted). But the cases cited by the government involve actions for relief based on rights conferred by a contract. In Sharp, for example, the plaintiff sought “a declaration that he had a valid contract with appellees and an injunction requiring appellees to perform that contract.” Id.
The D.C. Circuit subsequently explained that a case is not a “contract case” that is subject to the “impliedly forbids” limitation in section 10(a) simply because it involves contractual issues. Instead, the question whether the Tucker Act impliedly forbids a district court from acting in a case depends on “whether, despite the presence of a contract, plaintiffs’ claims are founded only on a contract, or whether they stem from a statute or the Constitution.” Transohio Sav. Bank v. Dir., Office of Thrift Supervision, 967 F.2d 598, 609 (D.C.Cir.1992). The court drew the following lesson from Sharp: that under section 10(a) and the Tucker Act, “litigants may bring common-law contract claims only as actions for money damages in the Claims *1376Court, but they may bring statutory and constitutional claims for specific relief in federal district court even when the claims depend on the existence and terms of a contract with the government.” Id. at 610; see also Roberts v. United States, 242 F.3d 1065, 1068-69 (Fed.Cir.2001) (quoting with approval the standard articulated in Transohio); Katz v. Cisneros, 16 F.3d 1204, 1209 (Fed.Cir.1994) (same).
In Indiana Michigan, unlike in Sharp, the utilities sought relief based on a statute. Even though it was clear that the D.C. Circuit’s remedial order would affect later litigation over contract-based rights, it remains the case that the D.C. Circuit was interpreting statutory rights, not rights under a contract. For that reason, the D.C. Circuit’s action was not impliedly forbidden by the Tucker Act.
The government’s position in this case is fueled in large measure by its conviction that the D.C. Circuit was wrong when it interpreted section 302 as imposing an unconditional obligation to begin accepting nuclear waste in 1998, and its hope that the Court of Federal Claims or this court will interpret the statute differently. It is important to emphasize, however, that the merits of that issue of statutory construction are not before us. The D.C. Circuit resolved that issue, and its resolution became final when the government’s petition for certiorari in the Northern States case was denied. The question before us is whether the D.C. Circuit had jurisdiction to decide that issue of statutory construction, or whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred it from reviewing the government’s compliance with section 302 and enforcing its decision by prohibiting the government from taking actions inconsistent with the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of the government’s statutory obligations.
The mandamus order was issued pursuant to the D.C. Circuit’s authority to construe the NWPA and to direct DOE to comply with its obligations under the statute. The order did not address any issue of contract breach, direct the implementation of any remedy, or construe any contract defense, except to the extent that the proposed interpretation of the contract would conflict with the statutory directive in section 302(a)(5). Those issues are all left to the Court of Federal Claims to decide in the contract breach action before it. We are satisfied that the D.C. Circuit’s order was confined to the issue of statutory interpretation and did not impermissi-bly invade the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims to adjudicate the parties’ rights and remedies under the contract between them.
In sum, the D.C. Circuit’s decisions in the Indiana Michigan and Northern States cases were not barred by sovereign immunity and should not have been denied res judicata effect on that ground. We therefore reverse the order of the Court of Federal Claims under review and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.