Plaintiff-Appellant Jimmy M. Tompkins worked as a special agent with the United States Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General (“the Agency”) from 2000 to 2008. Following an investigation into a complaint filed against him, Tompkins was terminated from the Agency on March 7, 2008. The complaint alleged that, in May and June of 2007, Tompkins repeatedly contacted a female Special Assistant United States Attorney (SAUSA) regarding his personal life despite the female SAUSA’s insistence that he only contacted her concerning professional matters.
The investigating official found the allegations against Tompkins to be true and proposed that Tompkins be terminated for (1) unprofessional conduct toward a professional colleague (the SAUSA) and (2) unprofessional conduct toward co-workers and supervisors. Tompkins, believing his termination to be in retaliation for a complaint of race and gender discrimination he filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in November 2006, filed suit in the Northern District of Texas.1
The retaliation claim is governed by the familiar McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework. LeMaire v. La. Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 480 F.3d 383, 388 (5th Cir.2007) (Title VII claims). A retaliation claim requires proof that the plaintiff engaged in protected EEO activity and that he suffered an adverse employment action; it also requires proof of pretext, i.e. that the employer’s action was motivated by retaliation for the filing of the complaint. Id. at 388-389. The district court found that Tompkins did not present evidence sufficient to create genuine issues of material fact in support of his claim, and granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
On appeal, Tompkins raises the same arguments and evidence proffered in the court below, and raises no argument that casts doubt on the district court’s thorough opinion. Moreover, he fails to brief, and has therefore waived any challenge to the second charge identified above. Therefore, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court essentially for the reasons set out in its opinion dated May 23, 2012.
AFFIRMED.