1985 Mass. App. Div. 141

Janet L. Pratt1 vs. Rita L. Johnson and another2

Southern District

July 10, 1985.

Present: Welsh, P.J., Staff & Shubow, JJ.

Sumner Bauman for the plaintiff.

Mary M. McCallum for the defendants.

Shubow, J.

This appeal seeks review of the allowance by the trial judge of a motion for summaryjudgment in favor of the sellers who were being sued for a commission by a real estate broker. Because the pleadings and the affidavits filed in connection with the motion disclose a substantial factual dispute as to whether failure to consummate the transaction was due to the acts of the defendants, we reverse.3

The historical or subsidiary facts are clear.

The parties entered in September 1982 into an agreement (aso-called listing agreement) under which the plaintiff undertook to find a purchaser of the defendants’ real estate. The plaintiff was successful and the defendants entered into the conventional form of purchase and sale agreement with buyers produced by the plaintiff broker. That agreement, drawn by the defendants’ attorney, contained the language “A broker’s fee for professional services of 6% ... is due from the seller to J.L. Pratt Realtors [the plaintiff], if and when papers are passed and the deal is recorded.” The broker did not sign the agreement and contends she is not a party to it. The defendant in her affidavit asserts that the plaintiff entered into a further agreement extending the time for passing, thus ratifying the basic document. That agreement, if written, is not set out in terms in the record before us. There thus appears what maybe described as a secondary controversy over just what the parties agreed were the circumstances under which a commission would be payable.

The conveyance became endangered when it was discovered that the husband and father of the sellers had recorded a lis pendens. Thereafter, in connection with divorce and equity proceedings in the probate court, a resolution of the marital controversy eventuated which involved conveying the subject premises to the husband.

*142In her affidavit, the defendant asserts she was ordered ... “[to] convey all her right, title and interest” to her former husband and “consequently neither she nor her daughter “were able to convey a good and clear and marketable title ... in accordance with the Purchase and Sale agreement dated February 16,1983, as amended and extended on March 25,1983.” The factual claim, in short, is that the defendant did not voluntarily breach her undertaking but acted under the force majeure of a judicial command. The plaintiffs lawyer filed an affidavit asserting, based on an examination of the probate court records, “The judgment in the equity case was by agreement of the parties.”

It seems to us abundantly clear that two factual disputes exist. One has to do with the precise contours of the agreement between the broker and the defendant. The other has to do with whether the proposed conveyance fell through because of the voluntary act of the defendants. The factual determination will lead directly to the correct legal conclusion. Compare Tristram’s Landing, Inc. v. Wait, 367 Mass. 622, 625-627 (1975), with Creed v. Apog, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 365, 372 (1978), S.C. 377 Mass. 522 (1979). See, also, Leech v. Ebers, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 1004, 1005 (1981). In the face of what, to put the best appearance on it, was the equivocal role of the defendants in the probate court, this cannot be said to be a case where there “could be no inference of bad faith.” See the recently decided case of Capezzuto v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 394 Mass. 399, 404 (1985).See, also, Lewis v. Emerson, 391 Mass. 517, 524-525 (1984).

The action of the trial judge in ordering summary judgment for the defendant constituted an error of law. See Dist./Mun. Cts. R. Civ. P., Rule 56. See Community National Bank v. Dawes, 369 Mass. 550 (1976).

The case is remanded to the Dedham Division for trial or other disposition consistent with this decision.

Pratt v. Johnson
1985 Mass. App. Div. 141

Case Details

Name
Pratt v. Johnson
Decision Date
Jul 10, 1985
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1985 Mass. App. Div. 141

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Massachusetts

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