Phillip Davis, a Missouri inmate, was charged with several rule violations, in-*453eluding assault, arson, and possessing an intoxicating substance. He was found guilty on each of these charges and received time in administrative segregation. He grieved the decisions but did not receive rulings on all of his grievances. He also was placed in a strip cell on two occasions. Based on these allegations, Davis brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against various prison officials, alleging violations of his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court1 dismissed Davis’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and Davis appeals. Upon careful de novo review of the record, we affirm.
Davis’s allegations do not establish (1) that his transfer to administrative segregation “imposefd] atypical and significant hardship on [Davis] in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life” as is required to trigger due process protection, see Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995); (2) that prison officials knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to Davis’s health and safety from his stays in the strip cell, see Williams v. Delo, 49 F.3d 442, 445 (8th Cir.1995); or (3) that any failure to process his grievances actually prejudiced him, see Farver v. Vilches, 155 F.3d 978, 979-80 (8th Cir.1998).
Accordingly, we affirm. We deny Davis’s motion for appointment of counsel.