The State of Missouri appeals from an order entered by the Circuit Court of Macon County sustaining Respondent Jonathan B. Abeln’s motion to suppress evidence sought to be introduced in the criminal case against him.1 For the following reasons, we affirm.
I.
On December 13, 2001, Missouri State Highway Patrol Trooper Steve Wilhoit stopped Respondent’s truck as he was traveling west on U.S. Highway 36 east of Bevier, Missouri. Based on evidence obtained after Abeln’s vehicle was stopped, Abeln was charged with attempting to produce a controlled substance, § 195.211,2 possession of a chemical with the intent to create a controlled substance, § 195.420, and possession of a controlled substance, § 195.202.
Prior to trial on those charges, Abeln filed a motion to suppress the evidence resulting from the traffic stop that led to his arrest, asserting the stop was improper and violated his Fourth Amendment right to protection against unreasonable seizure.
In opposing Abeln’s motion, the State relied entirely upon a written stipulation *807as to the testimony Trooper Wilhoit would offer. By way of the stipulation, Trooper Wilhoit offered the following testimony. Trooper Wilhoit stated that he was driving west on U.S. Highway 36 when he received a dispatch indicating that an individual wearing a tan colored Carhart coat had been seen picking up a case of starter fluid at the Macon, Missouri Orscheln store. The dispatch further indicated that the individual put the case down after noticing people watching him, that he purchased one can of starter fluid and that he drove away in a burgundy pickup truck. The dispatch also indicated that Orscheln employees had seen the individual purchasing funnels and hoses earlier in the week. Trooper Wilhoit claimed that moments later he saw a burgundy pickup truck driven by a man wearing a tan Carhart coat driving east on U.S. Highway 36. Trooper Wilhoit indicated that he then made a U-turn across the median in his patrol car and started after the truck. The trooper testified that he could not get directly behind the truck because the highway changed to two-lanes before he reached the truck and another vehicle was between his patrol car and the truck. Trooper Wilhoit testified that he saw the individual reach toward the glove box, an action the trooper described as “furtive.” The trooper claimed that, in correlation with the individuar s movements toward the glove box, he “observed on 2 occasions ... that the passenger side tires of the truck traveled over what is commonly referred to as the fog line.” He asserted that the individual’s movements toward the glove box caused him “to go over to the shoulder.” The trooper stated that he then passed the other vehicle, called the radio operator and ran a check on the license plate on the truck. The trooper indicated that the check revealed that the truck was registered to Abeln. Trooper Wilhoit further stated that he “had received information that Jonathon [sic] Abeln was involved in local methamphetamine trade and also had information that he was possibly carrying a pistol on his person.” The trooper testified that he then activated his lights and made a traffic stop.
After reviewing the motions and the stipulated testimony, the trial court sustained Abeln’s motion. The State appeals from that order.
II.
On appeal, the State contends that the trial court clearly erred in sustaining Abeln’s motion to suppress because the trooper had probable cause to believe that Abeln had committed a traffic violation. The State further claims that the totality of the circumstances established that the trooper had a reasonable suspicion to believe that Abeln was involved in criminal activity.
The first fundamental problem with the State’s argument on appeal is that, while properly setting out the proper standard of review for this court to follow on appeal, the State wholly disregards that standard of review in making its argument. The State treats all of the trooper’s stipulated testimony as though it had been found credible by the trial court. The State then views the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to itself and disregards all evidence and inferences to the contrary.
“ ‘At a suppression hearing, the State bears both the burden of producing evidence and the risk of nonpersuasion to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the motion to suppress should be overruled.’ ” State v. England, 92 S.W.3d 335, 339 (Mo.App. W.D.2002) (quoting State v. Weddle, 18 S.W.3d 389, 391 (Mo.App. E.D.2000)). In ruling on a motion to suppress, “[t]he trial court may choose to *808believe or disbelieve all or any part of the testimony presented by the State, even though it may be uncontradicted, and may find the State failed to meet its burden of proof.” State v. Talbert, 873 S.W.2d 321, 325 (MoApp. S.D.1994) (emphasis added).
In reviewing the trial court’s decision to grant a motion to suppress, we view the evidence presented and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the trial court’s order and disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary. State v. Hoyt, 75 S.W.3d 879, 882 (Mo.App. W.D.2002). Even where the trial court’s decision was based solely “ ‘on the records,’ we defer to the trial court as the finder of fact in determining whether there is substantial evidence to support the judgment and whether the judgment is against the weight of the evidence.” Reece v. Director of Revenue, 61 S.W.3d 288, 291 (Mo.App. E.D.2001). We defer to the trial court’s factual findings, and the only issue that we review de novo where the trial court has ruled on a motion to suppress is whether the Fourth Amendment was violated as a matter of law under the historical facts found by the trial court. State v, Schmutz, 100 S.W.3d 876, 878 (Mo.App. S.D.2003). “If the ruling is plausible, in light of the record viewed in its entirety, an appellate court will not reverse, even if convinced that it would have weighed the evidence differently.” State v. Haldiman, 106 S.W.3d 529, 533 (Mo.App. W.D.2003) (citing State v. Milliorn, 794 S.W.2d 181, 184 (Mo. banc 1990)).
Where, as here, “the parties have not requested findings of fact or conclusions of law and none are entered, the trial court is presumed to have made findings in accordance with the decree entered,” and “[t]he judgment will be affirmed under any reasonable theory supported by the evidence.” State v. Kampschroeder, 985 S.W.2d 396, 398 (Mo.App. E.D.1999). Thus, we must view the evidence submitted to determine whether it would support any set of factual findings under which the trial court could have found that the State failed to meet its burden of proving that the stop was proper.
III.
On the record in this case, the trial court could reasonably have found that Trooper Wilhoit did not observe any driving behavior that would warrant stopping Respondent’s vehicle to issue a citation or a warning. First, in light of Trooper Wilhoit’s overall testimony, it cannot be said that it would be unreasonable for the trial court to be skeptical about the witness’ credibility. The stipulation is succinct, cursory and without the explanation that trial testimony might provide. The trooper’s stipulation relates that he observed a gray over burgundy Ford pickup traveling west on U.S. Route 36 “east of Bevier” while he was traveling east and that he was able to observe that the driver was wearing a “tan colored Carhart style coat.” U.S. Route 36 west of Macon and east of Bevier is a four lane, divided highway, and the speed limit is 65 miles per hour.3 To find any justification for the stop, the trial court would have had to believe: (1) that Trooper Wilhoit, while traveling east at highway speed on a four lane, divided highway, was able to look out his window, across the median, and identify Abeln’s pickup truck traveling west at *809highway speed and also observe that Abeln was wearing a “tan colored Carhart style jacket”; (2) that later Trooper Wilhoit, while traveling west on a two lane undivided highway, with a vehicle between him and Abeln’s pickup, was able to see the passenger side tires of Abeln’s truck travel over the fog line4 twice; and (3) that Trooper Wilhoit, while traveling west on a two lane undivided highway, with a vehicle between him and Abeln’s pickup, was able to see Abeln making “several furtive motions for the passenger side of the truck,”5 and from that testimony infer that Abeln was being stealthy, doing something wrong, or that there was something sinister afoot. While all of this may have been possible, and may all be true, it would not be unreasonable for a fact finder to conclude that (1) it would be impossible to identify a “tan colored Carhart style jacket” on Abeln under the circumstances described by the officer; (2) it would be impossible for the driver of a car on a two lane road that is following another vehicle to observe the “passenger side tires” of a pickup in front of the intervening vehicle travel across the fog line; and (3) that it is highly unlikely that the officer could even see what the driver of the pickup was doing, but assuming he could, there was nothing sinister or stealthy about Abeln’s motions toward the passenger side.6
In ruling on a motion to suppress, “[t]he trial court may choose to believe or disbelieve all or any part of the testimony presented by the State, even though it may be uncontradicted, and may find the State failed to meet its burden of proof.” Talbert, 873 S.W.2d at 325 (emphasis added). The fact that the testimony of the State’s witness was submitted *810to the trial court in written form does not strip the trial court of its discretion to disbelieve the submitted testimony and does not result in our review of the trial court’s decision being de novo. “A stipulation as to the testimony an absent witness would give if present ... is not necessarily binding upon the trier of facts, thus leaving it free to consider the weight and credibility of such evidence the same as any other evidence[.j” Howard v. Missouri State Bd. of Educ., 847 S.W.2d 187, 191 (Mo.App. S.D.1993). Thus, a trial court may properly assess the credibility of stipulated testimony and assign whatever weight it chooses to that evidence in reaching its decision.
Similarly, since this court must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s decision and affirm even if this court would have weighed the evidence differently, we cannot wholly disregard the trial court’s credibility determinations and the weight it assigns to the evidence in determining whether the judgment is supported by the evidence. It would be abjectly absurd for a trial court’s decision to be found unsupported by the evidence and “clearly erroneous” based upon an appellate court’s decision to weigh the evidence differently than the trial court where the evidence could support more than one conclusion and the trial court has acted within its authority to assess credibility and weigh the evidence.
For the foregoing reasons, we cannot say that the trial court was clearly erroneous based on its evaluation of the weight and credibility of the State’s evidence. As noted previously, where “the parties have not requested findings of fact or conclusions of law and none are entered, the trial court is presumed to have made findings in accordance with the decree entered,” and “[t]he judgment will be affirmed under any reasonable theory supported by the evidence.” Kam/pschroeder, 985 S.W.2d at 398. Consequently, the trial court could reasonably have found that the State failed to meet its burden of proving that the stop of Respondent’s vehicle was proper, and for that reason alone, the trial court’s judgment must be affirmed.7
*811IV.
Similarly, even if the testimony offered by the trooper was accepted as credible, again something the trial court was not required to do, the State’s secondary contention, that the trial court was clearly erroneous in its determination that Trooper Wilhoit lacked reasonable suspicion that Respondent was involved in a criminal activity, also fails. Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), a law enforcement officer may briefly stop or detain an individual or a moving vehicle to investigate when the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by specific and articulable facts that criminal activity is afoot. State v. Martin, 79 S.W.3d 912, 916 (Mo.App. E.D. 2002); see also State v. Wells, 33 S.W.3d 202, 206-07 (Mo.App. S.D.2000) (“Terry stands for the proposition that an investigative detention, while a seizure, is authorized where specific and articulable facts and rational inferences from those facts give rise to a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or is committing a crime.”). “Reasonable suspicion is determined by looking at the totality of the circumstances to determine if the content of the information possessed by the police and its degree of reliability is sufficient to create a ‘reasonable suspicion’ of criminal activity.” State v. Berry, 54 S.W.3d 668, 673 (Mo.App. E.D.2001).
At the time the stop was initiated, Trooper Wilhoit had been told that an *812individual wearing a tan coat and driving a burgundy pickup truck had been seen picking up a case of starter fluid in an Orseheln store by store employees. The store employees indicated that, after the individual noticed them watching him, he put down the case of starter fluid and took one can of starter fluid to the cashier for purchase. Trooper Wilhoit was also informed that a store employee had indicated that the same individual had purchased funnels and hoses earlier in the week.
After observing Respondent, who was driving a burgundy truck and wearing a coat matching the description provided by the store employees, driving down the highway, Trooper Wilhoit turned his car around to follow Respondent. From a vantage point two cars behind Respondent, the Trooper claims to have seen Respondent moving as if he were putting something into or taking something out of his glove box. While that was going on, the trooper claims to have noticed that the passenger-side wheels of the truck twice traveled over the fog line. After running a check on Respondent’s license plate, Trooper Wilhoit heard Respondent’s name and generally recalled that he had “recently received information that Jonathon [sic] Abeln was involved in local methamphetamine trade and also had information that he was possibly carrying a pistol on his person.”
On this set of facts, even if the trial court were required to accept the trooper’s stipulated testimony as true, the trial court cannot be deemed to have clearly erred in finding that the State failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the trooper had a sufficient reasonable suspicion to warrant stopping Respondent’s vehicle.
The mere fact that someone matching Respondent’s description had picked up a case of starter fluid, put it back down, and decided to purchase one can of starter fluid does not give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the individual is involved in a criminal activity. The additional fact that the individual bought funnels and hoses from the store earlier in the week does not add enough to the scenario to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the individual has committed or is committing a crime. These items all have legitimate uses for which they might have been purchased. Likewise, the fact that Respondent, whose coat and truck matched the description of the individual who bought those products, reached into his glove box while driving and crossed the fog line twice in the process does not add enough to the equation to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
We must therefore determine whether the trooper’s claim to have received information that Respondent was involved in the local methamphetamine trade adds enough to the totality of the circumstances to establish reasonable suspicion. In the case at bar, the State did not present any evidence indicating where Trooper Wilhoit received his “information that Jonathon [sic] Abeln was involved in [the] local methamphetamine trade.” The record does not reflect whether this information came from a known informant or an anonymous tip.
Where a police officer has relied on information from an anonymous source to justify a stop, the State must demonstrate that the officer sufficiently corroborated the details of the tip before making the stop. State v. Miller, 894 S.W.2d 649, 653 (Mo. banc 1995). Trooper Wilhoit’s testimony about this information is wholly devoid of any corroboration.
The State bore the burden of proving the basis for a reasonable suspicion that the driver of the burgundy truck was in*813volved in a criminal activity. Id. Viewed in accordance with our standard of review, the totality of the circumstances in this case establish that Trooper Wilhoit was, at most, acting upon a hunch when he stopped Respondent’s truck and did not have a reasonable suspicion, supported by articulable facts, that a criminal activity was taking place when he stopped Respondent’s truck. The trial court’s determination that the State failed to meet its burden of proving that Trooper Wilhoit had a reasonable suspicion that Respondent was involved in a criminal activity at the time of the stop was not clearly erroneous.
V.
The dissent attempts to avoid applying the proper standard of review by transforming the stipulation as to what Trooper Wilhoit would say if he were present into a stipulation of the facts of the case. Dis. Op. at 814-15. But the record before us makes it crystal clear that the parties did not stipulate to the facts of the case, and the trial court did not treat it as a stipulation of facts. The stipulation unequivocally recites:
COMES NOW DEFENDANT, JONATHAN B. ABELN, by and through his Court appointed attorney, Frederick P. Tucker, AND COMES ALSO THE STATE OF MISSOURI, by and through special prosecuting attorney Timothy W. Anderson and for purposes of the Motion to Suppress Evidence filed by Defendant agrees that Trooper Steve Wil-hoit would testify as follows:
(emphasis added).8 In addition, all of the numbered statements contained in that document contain the “I” pronoun (i.e. “I was asked,” “I observed,” “I drove,” “I could see,” “I believed”) to reflect the point of view of Trooper Wilhoit.
While the dissent claims that Respondent did not contest the truth of the statements made by the trooper, Respondent’s “Motion to Suppress” talks about the trooper “allegedly” seeing Respondent do various things. Likewise, Respondent’s “Argument to Suppress Evidence” talks about how the trooper “contends” various things. This type of language is indicative that the truth of the trooper’s statements was not conceded by Respondent.
Moreover, and perhaps far more telling, the record clearly reflects that the State understood the trooper’s testimony to be stipulated testimony and not a stipulation of facts. In the State’s notice of appeal, the State notes that “[t]he parties submitted a stipulated record of the arresting trooper’s testimony.” (emphasis added).
Furthermore, the State recognizes that our standard of review on appeal requires us to view the evidence in this case in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and to ascertain whether the trial court’s ruling is clearly erroneous. The State concedes that “[i]f the trial court’s ruling is plausible in light of the record when viewed in its entirety, an appellate court may not reverse that ruling, even if it is convinced that it would have weighed the evidence differently if it had been sitting as the trier of fact.” The State further acknowledges that this court must “defer to the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of the wit*814nesses and the weight of the evidence.” If the stipulated testimony were indeed a stipulation of fact, the State would have no reason to set forth this rule in the standard of review. Indeed, at no point in the State’s brief does the State contend that the veracity of the stipulated testimony was stipulated or that the trial court was required to accept the trooper’s testimony as true.
Accordingly, the dissent has improperly characterized the stipulated testimony as a stipulation of fact. As evident from the record, the parties merely stipulated that Trooper Wilhoit would offer certain testimony if he were called to testify at a hearing on the motion.
“A stipulation as to the testimony an absent witness would give if present does not amount to an admission of truth of such testimony.” Howard, 847 S.W.2d at 191. “A stipulation that a witness, if called, would give testimony of a particular kind or character, or in a particular manner, is not necessarily binding upon the trier of facts, thus leaving it free to consider the weight and credibility of such evidence the same as any other evidence adduced on the trial in the case.” Id. Thus, the stipulation regarding the testimony that would be offered by Trooper Wilhoit is not a stipulation of facts, and the trial court was not bound to accept any of it as true.
The dissent also improperly attempts to rely on the proposition that “[w]here a statement of fact is asserted in one party’s brief and conceded to be true in the adversary’s brief, we may consider it as though it appears in the record.” Woodard v. Director of Revenue, 876 S.W.2d 810, 811 (Mo.App. S.D.1994). While Respondent does paraphrase the trooper’s testimony in the statement of facts contained in his appellate brief without editorial comment, Respondent’s argument on appeal repeatedly talks about how “the trooper contends” various things. Such language does not evidence any intent to concede the truth of the matters asserted by the officer. Read in the context of his brief as a whole, it is readily apparent that Respondent was not conceding the truth of the trooper’s testimony, and “there is no clear and unqualified admission, as is required for a party’s assertion to constitute a judicial admission.” Guyer v. City of Kirkwood, 38 S.W.3d 412, 415 (Mo. banc 2001); see also Chilton v. Garden, 952 S.W.2d 773, 778 (Mo.App. S.D.1997) (“A judicial admission must be clear and unqualified.”).
VI.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s order granting Respondent’s motion to suppress is affirmed.
ULRICH, J. concurs.
LOWENSTEIN, J. dissents in separate opinion filed.