David Lee Brown appeals from his guilty-plea conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Relying on our decision in United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir.2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 907, 122 S.Ct. 2362, 153 L.Ed.2d 184 (2002), that the Second Amendment affords individuals a protected right to bear arms, Brown argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is not narrowly tailored in light of the interplay of the Second Amendment and the regulation of interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause, is overly broad in its reach given the legislative history of its intent, and unevenly burdens a fundamental right in violation of equal protection by relying on inconsistent state law definitions.
Because Brown did not make the above arguments in the district court either at rearraignment or at sentencing, our review is for plain error. See United States v. Munoz, 150 F.3d 401, 419 (5th Cir.1998); United States v. Krout, 66 F.3d 1420, 1434 (5th Cir.1995). We specifically recognized in Emerson that “it is clear that felons, infants, and those of unsound mind may be prohibited from possessing firearms.” Emerson, 270 F.3d at 261 (emphasis added). In light of this recognition, we conclude that Brown has failed to demonstrate plain error. See United States v. Calverley, 37 F.3d 160, 162-64 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
Relying on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 120 S.Ct. 1904, 146 L.Ed.2d 902 (2000), United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 120 S.Ct. 1740, 146 L.Ed.2d 658 (2000), and United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995), Brown also argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power because the regulated activity does not substantially affect interstate commerce. Alternatively, he argues that the factual basis for his plea was insufficient because the evidence established only that the firearm had traveled across state lines at some unspecified point in the past. Brown raises these arguments solely to preserve them for possible Supreme Court review. As he acknowledges, they *676are foreclosed by existing Fifth Circuit precedent. See United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir.2001).
AFFIRMED.