The issue before us is whether, under the original version of Code of Criminal Procedure article 64.05, appeal is to this court or to a court of appeals in the DNA-testing case of a person who was sentenced to imprisonment for capital murder. We hold that such an appeal is to the court of appeals.
The Case
Steven Riley Sisk, who was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to imprisonment for life in 1994, moved for DNA testing on February 28, 2003. The convicting court refused to order testing. Sisk filed notice of appeal to this court, but the district clerk sent the notice of appeal to the court of appeals. That court sent Sisk a letter expressing its concern that his notice of appeal was untimely. Sisk filed a “response to the letter,” in which he said, “This is an appeal of a CAPITAL case.... Thus, as a result, this Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction to hear this appeal.” The court of appeals issued an opinion that said:
*494We agreed, and ... the clerk of this court informed the trial court clerk of the error and requested the notice of appeal be forwarded to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.
Accordingly, because this court has no jurisdiction over an appeal from a denial of a request for forensic DNA testing if the convicted person was convicted in a capital case, see Tex.Code Ceim. Peoc. Ann. art. 64.05 (Vernon Supp.2003), we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.1
We docketed the appeal and ordered the parties to submit briefs on the question of our jurisdiction.
The Statute
The statute on which the court of appeals relied, Article 64.05, is part of Chapter 64 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which authorizes courts, on the motion of a convicted person, to order forensic DNA testing of certain evidence that related to the person’s offense. An act of the 77th Legislature in 2001 created the chapter,2 including Article 64.05:
Art. 64.05. APPEALS. An appeal of a finding under Article 64.03 or 64.04 is to a court of appeals, except that if the convicted person was convicted in a capital case, the appeal of the finding is a direct appeal to the court of criminal appeals.
In 2003, the legislature amended article 64.05 to provide that an appeal is to the Court of Criminal Appeals “if the person was convicted in a capital case and was sentenced to death.”3 The amendment applies only to convicted persons who submit a motion for forensic DNA testing on or after the effective date of the amending act,4 which was September 1, 2003.5 Because Sisk filed his motion before that date, the amendment does not apply to him.
Principles of Statutory Construction
The initial question is whether Sisk, who was convicted of capital murder but not sentenced to capital punishment, was convicted in “a capital case” within the meaning of the 2001 version of Article 64.05.
In construing a statute, “we necessarily focus our attention on the literal text of the statute in question and attempt to discern the fair, objective meaning of that text at the time of its enactment.”6
If the plain language of a statute would lead to absurd results, or if the language is not plain but rather ambiguous, then and only then, out of absolute necessity, is it constitutionally permissible for a court to consider, in arriving at a sensible interpretation, such extratextual factors as executive or administrative interpretations of the statute or legislative history.7
Our “plain language” statutory interpretation also must analyze laws to avoid, when possible, constitutional infirmities.8
*495 The Ambiguity of the Statute
In the 2001 version of Article 64.05, the term “capital case” is ambiguous because (in brief) some cases of “capital offenses” involve “capital punishment” and some do not. Whether “capital cases” refers to all cases of convictions for “capital offenses” or only those cases in which “capital punishment” was imposed cannot be determined by simply examining the plain text of the 2001 version of article 64.05.
When Article 64.05 became effective on April 5, 2001, there were two capital offenses in our law, as there are today: “capital murder”9 and “capital sabotage.” 10 Capital murder was, and is, punishable by death or imprisonment for life.11 Capital sabotage was, and is, punishable by death or imprisonment for life or a term of not less than two years.12 Therefore a conviction of a capital offense might or might not include a sentence to capital punishment.
Usage in the Code of Criminal Procedure
Most articles of the Code of Criminal Procedure that use the term “capital case” or a similar term specifically distinguish cases of capital felony in which there is not (or will not be) a death penalty from those in which the death penalty is being sought or has been imposed.13
Other articles use the term “capital cases” without distinguishing between death-penalty and non-death-penalty prosecutions, but they speak only to procedures before the point at which trial by jury begins or is waived.14 At such pre*496trial stages, every accusation of a capital felony has the potential for a death penalty. These pre-trial statutes are thus different from Article 64.05, which applies only to a post-conviction proceeding in which it is definitely known whether a person has been sentenced to death or to some other punishment.
Only two articles of the Code of Criminal Procedure, other than Article 64.05, use the undifferentiated term “capital case” to refer to a case after the trial is over. One is Article 44.251, the catchline of which is, “Reformation of Sentence in Capital Case.” It speaks to only a case which there was a sentence of death.15 The other is Article 48.01, which says, “The Governor shall have the power to grant one reprieve in any capital case for a period not to exceed 30 days.” This surely refers to cases in which the death penalty was assessed, and not to other cases of capital offenses in which a term of imprisonment was imposed. The language was enacted in 1965 to replace an article that previously had authorized the Governor to “to reprieve and delay the execution of the sentence of death.”16 These post-conviction articles’ usage of “capital case” to refer to a case in which the death penalty was assessed suggests that the term “capital case” should have a similar meaning in former Article 64.05.
Constitutional Considerations
We have held that a DNA-testing appeal is a “criminal case” within the meaning of the grant of jurisdiction to this court in Article V, section 5 of the Constitution, and that we had jurisdiction of such an appeal from a person who had been convicted of capital murdér and sentenced to death.17 There is specific language in the *497Constitution about the jurisdictions of this court and the court of appeals over appeals in a capital case. ,
Between 1876 and 1981, jurisdiction of appeals in criminal cases was exclusively in this court (or its predecessor, the Court of Appeals). The Constitution was amended in 1981 to give the intermediate courts of appeals jurisdiction of appeals in some criminal cases, while retaining this court’s exclusive appellate jurisdiction in others. The jurisdictional distinction is whether a death penalty has been assessed. “The appeal of all cases in which the death penalty has been assessed shall be to the Court of Criminal Appeals. The appeal of all other criminal cases shall be to the Courts of Appeal [sic], as prescribed by law.”18 (Another article of the Constitution, which gives the Court of Criminal Appeals jurisdiction of appeals from denial of bail in certain non-capital cases, makes a constitutional exception to the general constitutional provision.)19
As we have said, the appeal in a DNA-testing case is “a criminal case” as the term is used in the jurisdictional provisions of the Constitution.20 To construe “a capital case” in the original version of Article 64.05 to mean an appeal in a DNA-testing case by a person against whom a death penalty had not been assessed would put the language of the statute in contradiction to the language of the Constitution. It would have the statute prescribe that the appeal in a criminal case in which the death penalty had not been assessed should not be to the court of appeals. It is desirable to avoid a construction of the statute that would raise such a constitutional question.
Conclusion
We hold that the term “a capital case” in former Article 64.05 means a case in which a convicted person was sentenced to death.
We order that this appeal be transferred to the Court of Appeals for the Second Court of Appeals District.