The State v. A. J. Ward.
An indictment for gaming, which, after describing the public place, alleges that the defendant did, then and there, in tlie house aforesaid, p'ay at a game with cards with one Charles Manor, upon the result of which .«aid game a sum of money was then and there bet, to wit, the sum of five cents, contrary, &e., substantially follows the language of the statute, and is sufficient, without any averment that tho defendant bet the money, or kne\V that any was bet. *
Appeal from Brazoria. This was an indictment for playing cards at a public placo, as follows:
Tub State of Texas, \ In the District Court of Brazoria county, Fall County of Brazoria, j Term, A. D. 1831: In the name and by the authority of the State of Texas, tlie grand jurors, elected, drawii, impaneled *186and sworn to inquire in au(t for the body of the county of Brazoria in the State of Texas, 11~Oi1 their oath preseilt, that on the first day of August, in the year of our Loul one thousand eight hundred and Att'yj. the ease was ea~1ed the defendant moved, ore ~emus, to quash the in-. (lictineut, on the grotuid that there was lie averment hi the inthietnicut. that. the defen(ltut bet any stun of money on the genIe, or knew that at ty was bet which motion was sustained; to which ruling of the court the district attorney excepted, &c. There were three other cases, in which the Attorney General, for appellant. J B. Jones, for nppellee. LIPSCOMB, J. The ~bove-statcd aiid iinmberel cases weic all liulietments uuder the statnte of `20th March, 1848, (Hart. Dhg., art. 1474,) for playing at a game of cards upon which money was bet. The histriet jiulge quashed the imllctn~euts, supposing that the offense was not sufficiently described. We believe that the indictments substantially fol- low the language
of the statute, and we have uniformly held that to be sijifi- dent. The nidictinetits were precisaly similar, and winch were disposed of by the saute opinion.
be- - come matters
of judicial cognizance. The protocol,
Lipscomb, J.
original, would unquestionably be plimary evidence. As between the teatiatonio and land office copy, the former, on general principles, would be the l,~st evi- dence. The latter would be but secondary;
and in order to its admission it would be necessary for the party offering it to coconut for the non-production of the icslimonio. But sinco the statute lies elevated the land-office copy to the same grade as the original, it is no longer seCondaly but is primary evidence, and consequently is admissible
without producing or