This appeal requires the review of a Family Court order terminating the parental rights of the natural mother over the daughter, a minor child. The Trial Court found “that the petitioner has proved that the mother is unable to plan adequately for the child’s physical needs or her mental or emotional health and development [13 Del.C. § 1103(5) ]1 and that, therefore, it *831would be in the child’s best interests to terminate the mother’s parental rights (13 Del.C. § 1108).”2
While the Trial Court did not specify, the then existing standard of proof in a termination of parental rights proceeding was “preponderance of the evidence.” Family Court Rule 220(d);3 Matter of Five Minor Children, Del.Supr., 407 A.2d 198 (1979). We presume that, in the absence of contrary indication, that standard was applied here.
Recently, and since the Trial Court’s decision, the U.S. Supreme Court, notwithstanding a strong four-Justice dissent, has ruled that a “clear and convincing” standard of proof must be met when termination of parental rights is sought. A lesser standard, the Court held, would violate the parent’s right to due process. Santosky v. Kramer, - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982).
The Court in Santosky stated:
“When the State initiates a parental rights termination proceeding, it seeks not merely to infringe that fundamental liberty interest, but to end it. ‘If the State prevails, it will have worked a unique kind of deprivation.... A parent’s interest in the accuracy and justice of the decision to terminate his or her parental status is, therefore, a commanding one.’ ” 102 S.Ct. at 1397.
Recognizing the difficult task of the fact-finder in such cases, the Court continued:
“At such a proceeding, numerous factors combine to magnify the risk of erroneous factfinding. Permanent neglect proceedings employ imprecise substantive standards that leave determinations unusually open to the subjective values of the judge. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 835, n. 36, 97 S.Ct. 2094, 2105, n. 36, 53 L.Ed.2d 14. In appraising the nature and quality of a complex series of encounters among the agency, the parents, and the child, the court possesses unusual discretion to underweigh-probative facts that might favor the parent. Because parents subject to termination proceedings are often poor, uneducated, or members of minority groups, id. at 833-835, 97 S.Ct. at 2103-2105, such proceedings are often vulnerable to judgments based on cultural or class bias.” 102 S.Ct. at 1399.
The Court concluded:
“The logical conclusion of this balancing process is that the ‘fair preponderance of the evidence’ standard * * * violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court noted in Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323: ‘The individual should not be asked to share equally with society the risk of error when the *832possible injury to the individual is significantly greater than any possible harm to the state.’ 441 U.S., at 427, 99 S.Ct., at 1810. Thus, at a parental rights termination proceeding, a near-equal allocation of risk between the parents and the State is constitutionally intolerable.
* ;}s *
“A majority of the States have concluded that a ‘clear and convincing evidence’ standard of proof strikes a fair balance between the rights of the natural parents and the State’s legitimate concerns. * * * We hold that such a standard adequately conveys to the factfinder the level of subjective certainty about his factual conclusions necessary to satisfy due process. We further hold that determination of the precise burden equal to or greater than that standard is a matter of state law properly left to state legislatures and state courts.” 102 S.Ct. at 1402-03.
Following the mandate of Santosky, we hold that the standard of a “clear and convincing” burden of proof must be applied to State-initiated termination of parental rights cases. To the extent that it is inconsistent, Matter of Five Minor Children, supra, is hereby overruled and Family Court Rule 220(d) invalidated. We find no justification for a different standard when the case is initiated by a litigant other than the State. In our judgment, the burden of proof should be uniform in all termination cases. We so hold.
Accordingly, this case must be reversed and remanded to the Family Court for further hearing as to the best interest of the child, consistent with the standard adopted herein.
Reversed and remanded.