This case is before the court on a petition to review an order of the District of Columbia Rental Accommodations Commission affirming the decision of the Acting Rent Administrator in Tenant Complaint No. 176 filed April 15, 1976. The tenants had claimed that the rent being charged by their landlord, Ginnetti, one of the two petitioners here,1 was excessive and improper under the Rental Accommodations Act. A hearing was requested and scheduled, and notice was sent by the Acting Rent Administrator to the tenants and to petitioner Ginnetti. Ginnetti hired an attorney to represent him, Mr. Alan D. Keiler, who is a member of petitioner Ammerman’s law firm. Notice was not sent to petitioner Ammerman, nor was he named a party to the complaint, and he did not participate in any of the agency proceedings.
The hearing on the tenants’ petition was scheduled for 9:30 a. mi. on Monday, May 24, 1976. On May 19, Mr. Keiler learned that he would be in New York City on a business matter on the day of the hearing. Petitioner Ginnetti advised Mr. Keiler that he too might be unavailable to attend the hearing because of his sister’s illness in Atlantic City. Mr. Keiler requested a continuance of the hearing in a May 19 letter to the Acting Rent Administrator in which he stated only that he would “be in New York on that date.” No explanation for the trip was given in the letter, nor was petitioner Ginnetti’s possible unavailability mentioned. On May 20, the Acting Rent Administrator told Mr. Keiler over the telephone that a continuance would not be granted except upon request of all the parties.
The next day, Friday, May 21, at approximately 3 p. m., Mr. Keiler contacted an *1062attorney at Neighborhood Legal Services whom he believed was representing the tenants in this matter.2 After telling him about the continuance request, Mr. Keiler understood that the attorney would contact the Commission about the continuance. Mr. Keiler then left for New York.
The hearing was held on May 24, 1976, before a Commission hearing examiner; neither petitioner Ginnetti nor Mr. Keiler was present. The Acting Rent Administrator issued a decision and order in the tenants’ favor on June 15 and imposed a $50 fine each on petitioner Ginnetti and petitioner Ammerman for demanding rent in excess of the maximum allowable. On June 28 petitioner Ginnetti filed his administrative appeal to the Commission, and, on July 23, the Commission affirmed the Acting Rent Administrator’s decision. It is this affirmance that petitioners urge as error.
On review, petitioners contend (1) that the Acting Rent Administrator failed to notify petitioner Ammerman about the tenant complaint and that the Administrator failed to make petitioner Ammerman a party to the complaint filed; thus, the Commission could not impose a $50 fine against petitioner Ammerman for demanding rent in excess of the maximum allowable under the Act; and (2) that the Acting Rent Administrator erred in not granting a continuance when requested to do so by petitioner Ginnetti.
An administrative agency’s power to impose sanctions extends only to those parties 3 before the agency who have been afforded the required procedural guarantees with respect to the agency’s proceedings. These procedural guarantees have their roots in constitutional due process and those due process requirements are met only if a party “was given adequate opportunity to prepare and present its position” to the agency involved. Watergate Improvement Associates v. Public Service Commission, D.C.App., 326 A.2d 778, 786 (1974). See also Flotill Products, Inc. v. FTC, 358 F.2d 224, 233 (9th Cir. 1966), rev’d on other grounds, 389 U.S. 179, 88 S.Ct. 401, 19 L.Ed.2d 398 (1967); Freight Consolidators Cooperative, Inc. v. United States, 230 F.Supp. 692, 699 (S.D.N.Y.1964).
Naming a person a party to the complaint on which the agency is acting brings into play the procedural guarantees of the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act which specifically mandates notice to parties, permits participation by parties in hearings, provides an opportunity for parties to file written exceptions to proposed orders, and requires the sending of copies of final orders, decisions, and findings to parties. D.C.Code 1976 Supp., § 1-1509. The Rental Accommodations Commission’s regulations provide further procedural guarantees for parties. For example, Regulation 2.31, 22 D.C.Reg. 3129 (Dec. 17, 1975), specifically mandates that all affected parties shall receive notice of the filing of a tenant petition:
Upon receipt of a rent adjustment petition, the Administrator shall notify the appropriate affected parties by certified mail, or other form of service assuring delivery, of the receipt of such petition and of the right of either party to make a written request for a hearing within fifteen days after receipt of the Administrator’s notice. If a hearing is timely requested by either party, notice of its time, date and place shall be furnished by the Administrator to the parties by certified mail, or other form of service assuring delivery, at least fifteen days before the commencement of such hearing. The notice of hearing shall inform each party *1063of the right to have legal counsel or other representation at the hearing.
In the instant case, petitioner Am-merman was never named as a party in the tenants’ petition, nor was he given notice of the hearing on the petition or an opportunity to be heard on his own behalf.4 We hold that the Rental Accommodations Commission is precluded from imposing sanctions on a person who has not been made a party to the complaint being heard by the Commission and who has not been afforded the procedural guarantees of the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act and the Commission’s regulations. The decision to impose a $50 fine on petitioner Ammerman is reversed and the fine is vacated.
The second issue on review concerns the denying of petitioner Ginnetti’s request for a continuance of the hearing because his attorney would be out of town and the holding of the hearing in the absence of both Ginnetti and his attorney.
“No principle of administrative law is more firmly established than that of agency control of its own calendar.” City of San Antonio v. CAB, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 112, 115, 374 F.2d 326, 329 (1967). Accord Nader v. FCC, 172 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 14, 520 F.2d 182, 195 (1975). There is no doubt that continuances can upset an agency’s attempts to control its workload and to dispose of the cases before it expeditiously.5 Agencies must be, and are, given discretion in the procedural decisions made in carrying out their statutory mandate. American Beef Packers, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture, 486 F.2d 1048, 1049 (8th Cir. 1973). Specifically, the denial of a continuance is a discretionary act and reviewable only to determine whether there has been an abuse of discretion. Jennings v. Gilbertson, D.C. Mun.App., 74 A.2d 839, 841 (1950); Freight Consolidators Cooperative, Inc. v. United States, supra at 700. See also Taylor v. Yellow Cab Co., D.C.Mun.App., 31 A.2d 683 (1943).
Section 3.12 of the Commission’s regulations provides:
The Administrator may grant a continuance of a hearing for good cause only. When a continuance has been granted, the Administrator shall inform the parties of the date, time' and place to which such hearing has been continued. [22 D.C.Reg. 3131 (Dec. 17, 1975).]
“ ‘Good cause’ depends upon the circumstances of the individual case, and a finding of its existence [or nonexistence] lies largely in the discretion of the officer or court to which the decision is committed.” Wilson v. Morris, 369 S.W.2d 402, 407 (Mo.1963), quoted with approval in Lambert Brothers, Inc. v. Tri City Construction Co., 514 S.W.2d 838, 842 (Mo.App.1974). By its very nature, “good cause” requires the evaluation of a number of subtle factors, a task properly given to the administrative agency most experienced in dealing with such factors in the first instance. In the absence of an abuse of the agency’s discretion in that evaluation, we are bound by that good cause or lack of good cause determination. Gardner v. Moon, 360 F.2d 556, 559 (8th Cir. 1966), citing Langford v. Flemming, 276 F.2d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 1960).
Concerning a requested continuation in these cases, it must be remembered that the Rental Accommodations Act requires tenant petitions to be approved or denied by the Rent Administrator within 60 days of their filing unless an extension of time is approved, in writing, by both the landlord and tenant or by the Commission. D.C. Code 1976 Supp., § 45-1652(a). See also Commission Regulation § 2.34(a): “[F]or *1064good cause, the Administrator may approve an extension of time not to exceed thirty days.” Petitioner Ginnetti, only two working days before the date of the hearing, requested “a continuance of this matter to a more convenient date (i. e., the second week in June).” Since the sixty-day statutory deadline would expire June 14th, to grant that delay without written consent of the tenant would have unduly risked violating the sixty-day provision of the Act.
We cannot say that petitioner Ginnetti established the requisite “good cause” for a continuance by merely stating that his attorney “will be in New York on that date.” No reason for the trip was given to the Administrator, nor was the Administrator ever informed of the possibility that petitioner Ginnetti might also be unavailable. See Millar v. City of Madison, 242 Wis. 617, 9 N.W.2d 90 (1943). We hold that it was not an abuse of discretion to deny the requested continuance absent the consent of the tenants.6
The $50 fine imposed on petitioner Am-merman is vacated, but in all other respects the order under review is
Affirmed.