ORDER
This matter is before the Court on plaintiff United States of America’s Motion to Strike Claim, or Alternatively Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (doc. 26). The Motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition at this time.1
I. Background.
On April 13, 2004, the United States filed a Complaint for Forfeiture In Rem (doc. 1) pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (forfeiture provision of the Controlled Substance Act) and 31 U.S.C. § 5332(c) (forfeiture provision of the Bulk Cash Smuggling Act).2 According to the well-pleaded alle*1323gations of the Complaint, on November 19, 2003, an Alabama State Trooper stopped claimant Jose Luis Verdin Aguila (“Agui-la”) for following too closely and improper tag display. After noting that Aguila appeared nervous and that he admitted having $1,200 on his person, the trooper requested and received consent to search the 1988 Chevrolet Cheyenne Half-Ton Pickup Truck (the “Truck”) being driven by Agui-la. During the search, the trooper spotted after-market modifications on the Truck in the form of two trapdoors under the bed-liner on each side of the bed, near the wheel wells. Removal of those doors revealed a compartment containing $313,030 in United States currency in vacuum-sealed packages wrapped in foil. Aguila was found to be in possession of an additional $5,900 on his person, not just the $1,200 he had identified. These funds totaling $318,930 (the “Currency”) were seized, as was the Truck. At the time of the seizure, Aguila allegedly gave a statement to law enforcement officers in which he acknowledged that he was being paid $4,000 to transport a duffle bag to Nuevo Laredo, Mexico, and that he believed the bag contained illegal drugs or other contraband.3 The United States initiated this action to effectuate forfeiture of the seized Currency and Truck.4
On June 14, 2004, Aguila, by and through counsel of record, filed a Verified Statement of Interest (doc. 13) in this action, in which he asserted that the Truck and the Currency were “his personal property, acquired through his hard work,” and that they were neither proceeds of illegal activity nor acquired in any manner involving controlled substances. (Id. at 1.)5 No other person or entity has come forward with a statement of claim to either the Truck or the Currency. In the ensuing months, plaintiff and claimant commenced discovery pursuant to the operative Rule 16(b) Scheduling Order. In October 2004, Aguila served interrogatories and requests, for production on the United States; meanwhile, the United States announced its intent to take Aguila’s deposition. Correspondence records reflect that on October 26, 2004, Aguila’s attorney informed plaintiffs counsel that he “had attempted to contact Mr. Aguila [regarding deposition scheduling] but had been told that he would be out of town until October 27th or *132428th.” (United States Brief (doc. 27), at Exh. E-2.) On November 11, 2004, Agui-la’s attorney wrote that “frankly, there is no time that is convenient” for Aguila to appear for a deposition, and that he intended to object to the proposed deposition on the basis of undue hardship and other unspecified grounds. (Id. at Exh. E-3.) The United States ultimately noticed his deposition for November 23, 2004. At no time did claimant ever file objections to the Notice of Deposition or otherwise seek protection from the Court.
Plaintiffs efforts to depose Aguila in November 2004 occurred contemporaneously with other significant events. Specifically, on November 19, 2004, a criminal indictment against Aguila was unsealed in this judicial district, bearing the caption United States of America v. Jose Luis Aguila Verdin, Criminal No. 04-00052. The indictment charged Aguila with two counts of violating the Bulk Cash Smuggling Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5332(a)(1), in connection with the November 19, 2003 seizure of the Currency and the Truck, and one count of providing a false statement to a federal agent, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2), when he allegedly informed Special Agent Lopez that he was unaware that money was hidden in the Truck until such funds were discovered by law enforcement officers. The indictment also included a forfeiture count which tracks generally the forfeiture allegations of the instant civil action, albeit through a criminal law mechanism.6
Upon the unsealing of the criminal case, the United States provided Aguila’s counsel with copies of the indictment and the outstanding warrant for Aguila’s arrest. Having furnished this documentation, plaintiffs counsel inquired as to (a) whether and when Aguila intended to return to the United States to face the criminal charges, and (b) whether Aguila intended to return for his deposition in the civil case as scheduled on November 23. (Plaintiff Brief, at Exh. E-6.) On November 21, 2004, Aguila’s counsel responded with a letter indicating that Aguila would not appear for his November 23 deposition, that counsel had spoken with him about “the most recent developments in this cause of action” (which could only refer to the unsealing of the indictment), and that “all the events have affected him very strongly and that he has been under the doctor’s care.” (Id. at Exh. E-7.) Aguila’s counsel emphasized that while Aguila had not informed him “of a firm decision as to whether he will come back voluntarily to confront the criminal charges,” Aguila wished “to clear all matters” if his health permitted. (Id.) The November 21 letter does not elaborate on the nature of Aguila’s health problems, nor does it identify any doctor-imposed restrictions on his activities. Aguila did not appear for his scheduled deposition, and never sought leave of court to modify or be excused from compliance with the applicable Notice of Deposition.7
*1325II. Analysis.
On December 13, 2004, the United States moved to strike Aguila’s claim pursuant to the fugitive disentitlement doctrine or, alternatively, for an order granting summary judgment in plaintiffs favor as to Aguila’s claim. Aguila received a full opportunity to respond and to place supplemental materials in the record. After careful consideration of the arguments and authorities presented by the parties, the Court is of the opinion that the United States’ Motion is due to be granted on principles of fugitive disentitlement.
A. Evolution of the Fugitive Disen-titlement Doctrine.
Federal courts have recognized various permutations of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine for well over a century. In the 1876 case of Smith v. United States, 94 U.S. 97, 4 Otto 97, 24 L.Ed. 32 (1876), the Supreme Court declined to entertain an appeal by a criminal defendant who had escaped and was not in custody when his petition reached the Court. The Smith Court reasoned that, regardless of whether it affirmed his sentence or reversed it and ordered a new trial, the petitioner would not likely respond or appear. Over time, the doctrine has been refined by both trial and appellate courts into an equitable measure to limit access to the courts by fugitives from justice. See, e.g., Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Pharaon, 178 F.3d 1159, 1161 (11th Cir.1999); United States v. Barnette, 129 F.3d 1179, 1183-84 (11th Cir.1997).8 Although a party’s fugitive status does not strip a case of its classification as an adjudicable case or controversy (ie., it does not deprive a court of jurisdiction), it may disentitle that -party from availing himself of the court’s resources to adjudicate his claims. See Pharaon, 178 F.3d at 1161; Barnette, 129 F.3d at 1184. This doctrine has traditionally been employed by appellate courts to dismiss fugitives’ appeals of their criminal convictions, but it has also been utilized by district courts in civil actions to “sanction or enter judgment against parties on the basis of their fugitive status.” Magluta v. Samples, 162 F.3d 662, 664 (11th Cir.1998) (explaining that dismissal of civil action on fugitive disentitlement grounds requires showing that plaintiff is a fugitive, that fugitive status is connected to civil action, and that dismissal promotes equitable considerations underlying the doctrine); see generally Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d 1225, 1240 (11th Cir.2004) (noting that where its authority has been questioned by the defendant’s flight in a criminal case before it, district court is empowered to use fugitive disentitlement doctrine to protect integrity of the judicial system).
Despite this flourishing body of common law, application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine in civil forfeiture cases when the claimant is a fugitive from parallel criminal proceedings encountered a major stumbling block in Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 116 S.Ct. 1777, 135 L.Ed.2d 102 (1996), wherein the unanimous Supreme Court recoiled at the prospect of unilateral judicial action dismissing civil forfeiture claims of claimants who were fugitives from justice. The Degen Court’s holding was predicated on separation of *1326powers concerns with a branch of the government undertaking to define its own authority, without cooperation or input from other branches. Ultimately, that Court ruled as follows:
“[W]e acknowledge disquiet at the spectacle of a criminal defendant reposing in Switzerland, beyond the reach of our criminal courts, while at the same time mailing papers to the court in a related civil action and expecting them to be honored.... A court-made rule striking Degen’s claims and entering summary judgment against him as a sanction, however, would be an arbitrary response to the conduct it is supposed to redress or discourage.”
517 U.S. at 828, 116 S.Ct. 1777. In the immediate wake of Degen, then, use of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to bar defendants from contesting civil forfeitures was no longer permitted. See Pharaon, 178 F.3d at 1162-63 n. 4 (explaining that cases applying fugitive disentitlement in civil forfeiture context were “no longer good law after the Supreme Court’s decision in Degen ”). Following Degen’s lead, the Eleventh Circuit held that the fugitive disentitlement doctrine could not be applied to any civil case in which the purported fugitive was a defendant, including civil forfeiture actions in which the fugitive was a claimant. See id. at 1162-63 (“we think it is very different to bar a fugitive from affirmatively seeking relief than to bar a fugitive from defending civil claims brought against him”).
The Degen-created void sparked a forceful legislative response. In April 2000, the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (“CAFRA”) became law. CAFRA expressly authorized judicial officers to “disallow a person from using the resources of the courts of the United States in furtherance of a claim in any related civil forfeiture action” upon finding each of the following five prerequisites: (1) warrant or process had been issued for the person’s arrest; (2) the person had notice or knowledge of such warrant or process; (3) the criminal case was related to the civil forfeiture action; (4) with such knowledge and with the intent to avoid criminal prosecution, the person purposely left the United States, declined “to enter or reenter the United States to submit to its jurisdiction,” or otherwise evaded jurisdiction of the court where the criminal action was pending; and (5) the person was not being confined or held in custody in any other jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 2466; see also Collazos v. United States, 368 F.3d 190, 198 (2nd Cir.2004) (identifying five statutory conditions to disentitlement under § 2466).9 Significantly, CAFRA does not mandate disentitlement when its requirements are satisfied; rather, the act is couched in permissive terms that a court “may disallow” a fugitive from invoking federal judicial resources under those circumstances. 28 U.S.C. § 2466; see also Collazos, 368 F.3d at 198 (Section 2466 “does not mandate disentitlement; the ultimate decision whether to order disen-titlement in a particular case rests in the sound discretion of the district court”).
Given § 2466’s recent vintage and the relatively rare fact pattern it addresses, there is a dearth of published authorities interpreting and applying it. Nonetheless, courts have not hesitated to exercise discretion in favor of disentitlement upon deeming CAFRA’s requirements satisfied. See United States v. All Right, Title and *1327Interest in Real Property and Appurtenances Located at Trump World Towers, 2004 WL 1933559, *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2004) (declaring that fugitive who had fled to Portugal to evade money-laundering prosecution could not pursue civil forfeiture claim for assets allegedly acquired with fugitive’s ill-gotten gains from money-laundering scheme); United States v. One Hundred Thirty-Eight Thousand, Three Hundred Eighty-One Dollars in U.S. Currency ($138,381.00), 240 F.Supp.2d 220, 226 (E.D.N.Y.2003) (granting judgment to United States as a matter of law on fugitive’s claim to property that was subject of civil forfeiture action, where all CAFRA criteria were satisfied); United States v. $1,281,849.68 In Funds, 227 F.Supp.2d 130, 133 (D.D.C.2002) (striking claim to property in civil forfeiture proceeding, where claimant had fled to Spain without showing intent to face federal prosecution for bribery and fraud); see generally Collazos, 368 F.3d at 201 (district court order of disentitlement was not abuse of discretion where record amply supported conclusion that statutory requirements were satisfied).
B. Application of Fugitive Disen-titlement Doctrine.
Applying the CAFRA criteria to the case at bar, there can be no reasonable dispute that all five statutory elements are satisfied. First, the court file in the unsealed criminal action reflects that a warrant for Aguila’s arrest on charges of bulk cash smuggling, false statements and forfeiture was issued in this District Court on March 30, 2004. Second, correspondence between counsel conclusively establishes that Aguila had actual knowledge of the existence of the arrest warrant and indictment by no later than November 19, 2004, when the United States faxed copies of the warrant and indictment to Aguila’s attorney. (See Plaintiff Brief, at Exh. E-6.)10
Third, there is no question that the civil forfeiture action (seeking forfeiture of a Truck seized on November 19, 2003, as well as over $300,000 in currency hidden in a secret compartment in that Truck) is “related to” the criminal charges against Aguila, which arise directly from his being apprehended on November 19, 2003 while driving said Truck. , “[I]n determining whether a criminal case or investigation is ‘related’ to a civil forfeiture proceeding, the court shall consider the degree of similarity between the parties, witnesses, facts, and circumstances involved in the two proceedings, without requiring an identity with respect to any one or more factors.” United States v. Contents of Account Number 68108021, 228 F.Supp.2d 436, 440 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 981(g)(4)). Here there appears to be virtual identity of facts, witnesses, circumstances, and relevant events for both the outstanding criminal charges and the instant civil forfeiture action, both of which derive from the events of November 19, 2003. Indeed, it is difficult to envision a closer relationship between a criminal case and a civil forfeiture proceeding than that observed here. See also Trump World Towers, 2004 WL 1933559, at *2 (“The relation between the civil and criminal cases at issue here, which involve identical money and property, could not be closer.”).
Fourth, the Court readily finds from the totality of the evidence that Agui-*1328la has, in order to avoid criminal prosecution, “decline[d] to enter or reenter the United States to submit to its jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 2466(a)(1)(B); see Collazos, 368 F.3d at 199-200 (applying this provision to encompass, inter alia, persons “who may have been in the United States at the time they committed the charged crimes and who refuse to return”).11 As to this requirement, Aguila admits that “no serious argument could be made that the Claimant does not currently meet the definition of a fugitive for purposes of [CAF-RA].” (Claimant’s Brief (doc. 31), at 3.) Fifth, and finally, there is no evidence or information to suggest that Aguila is presently being confined or otherwise held in custody in Mexico or any other jurisdiction, or that he is otherwise involuntarily prevented from travel to the United States.12 See Collazos, 368 F.3d at 201 (“nothing in the record indicates that Ms. Collazos was ever confined, incarcerated, or unable to travel to the United States of her own volition in the months before the district court ordered disentitlement”). Thus, the record plainly shows, and the Court expressly finds, that all five statutory requirements for disentitlement are satisfied in this case.
C. Discretionary Authority to Order Ayuila Disentitled.
Of course, the Court’s determination that the five CAFRA criteria are present does not conclude the inquiry. Aguila correctly points out that § 2466 “does not mandate the court to disallow the claimant,” but rather confers upon the Court discretion to determine whether or not disentitlement is warranted. (Claimant Brief (doc. 31), at 3.) Aguila urges the Court not to disallow his claim, based on the following factors: (1) his “documented nervous condition”; (2) “the relative weakness of the Plaintiffs admissible evidence against him”; and (3) the Court’s ruling on May 17, 2004 that this action could proceed in Aguila’s absence without prejudice to any party’s interests. (Id.) The Court finds none of these arguments persuasive.
1. Claimant’s Medical Condition.
Aguila’s counsel represents to the Court that his client “claims that he has a nervous condition that has prevented his return to the United States.” (Id. at 2.) In support of this contention, claimant’s counsel relies on “Exhibit A,” a five-page typewritten document entitled “Historia Clíni-ca Psicológica,” written in Spanish and purporting to chronicle Aguila’s medical condition.13 This document is undated, un*1329signed, unverified, does not appear on letterhead, and does not identify its author. Moreover, no certified translation accompanies this document, rendering it undecipherable to those not literate in Spanish.
The United States takes issue with this exhibit on several grounds. As a preliminary matter, plaintiff asserts that it is claimant’s own responsibility to furnish an English translation of Exhibit A if he wishes it to be considered. This principle finds substantial support in various case authorities, albeit in other legal contexts. After all, “[i]t is clear, to the point of perfect transparency, that federal court proceedings must be conducted in English.” United States v. Riveras-Rosario, 300 F.3d 1, 5, 7 n. 4 (1st Cir.2002) (noting “well-settled rule that parties are required to translate all foreign language documents into English”); see also Lopez-Carrasquillo v. Rubianes, 230 F.3d 409, 413-14 (1st Cir.2000) (declining to consider as part of summary judgment record a deposition excerpt in Spanish, where party submitting excerpt failed to provide English translation); Krasnopivtsev v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 832, 838 (8th Cir.2004) (copy of passport was properly excluded from evidence where no English translation or certification was offered); United States v. Cruz, 765 F.2d 1020, 1023 (11th Cir.1985) (where defendant engages in “deliberate tactical decision” not to submit English translation of Spanish tape, he cannot complain on appeal that jury’s function was usurped when he failed to present evidence that would have aided jury in fulfilling that function); Heavy Bros. Lightning Protection Co. v. Lightning Protection Institute, 287 F.Supp.2d 1038, 1074 (D.Ariz.2003) (sum sponte striking as inadmissible plaintiffs’ exhibits that were not in English and for which plaintiff had provided no translation); Continental Illinois Corp. v. C.I.R., 1989 WL 99426, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 1464 (U.S. Tax Ct.1989) (declining to make untranslated financial documents part of record where neither respondent nor court is literate in language in which statements were written).14 The Court concurs with the reasoning of these authorities. If Aguila, as a claimant in a civil forfeiture action proceeding with retained counsel, wished for the Court to consider Exhibit A, it was incumbent on him to provide a certified translation. This he has not done,- nor has he offered any explanation for his failure to do so. It is not the responsibility of this Court to remedy Aguila’s failure to transform Exhibit A into a comprehensible exhibit in an English-language court. As such, Exhibit A may properly be excluded from consideration here.
Even if Aguila’s failure to provide á certified translation were not fatal to the admissibility of. Exhibit A, that document would fail several basic evidentiary thresholds. No declarant is identified on the document’s face. It is unsigned, unsworn, unverified and unauthenticated. Claimant has failed to identify any basis on which it would be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule found at Rule 802, Fed. R.Evid. Moreover, plaintiff correctly observes that to the extent Aguila seeks to admit Exhibit A pursuant to Rule 902(12), as a certified foreign record of regularly conducted activity, Aguila has ignored baseline equitable requirements, of that rule, namely: (i) that plaintiff be given advance -written notice of his intent to rely *1330on that document, and (ii) that claimant make such document available sufficiently in advance to provide plaintiff with a fair opportunity to challenge it.
In light of these infirmities, it is the opinion of this Court that the United States’ Motion to Strike (doc. 33) this Spanish-language Exhibit A to claimant’s response is due to be, and the same hereby is, granted. The document captioned “Historia Clinica Psicológica” and appended to claimant’s brief as Exhibit A is hereby stricken as an untranslated Spanish text that would not otherwise pass muster under rudimentary evidentiary standards even if it had been presented in translated form.
Because the Court will not consider Exhibit A, it is left with Aguila’s counsel’s unsupported representations that his claim should not be disqualified because “Claimant claims he has a nervous condition that has prevented his return to the United States.” (Aguila Brief, at 2.) This undocumented “nervous condition” does not appear to affect Aguila’s ability to travel, as he drove substantial distances in the United States in November 2003 prior to seizure of the Truck.15 There being no evidence that Aguila has been involuntarily restrained from traveling to this judicial district to defend the criminal charges against him, his purported nervous condition does not persuade this Court to exercise its discretion in favor of allowing his claim in the civil forfeiture action pursuant to § 2466.16
2. Alleged Weakness of Admissible Evidence Against Claimant.
As a secondary basis for requesting that the Court stay its hand and not disallow his claim, Aguila urges the Court to consider “the relative weakness of the Plaintiffs admissible evidence against him.” (Claimant Brief, at 3.) Although claimant does not explain this conclusory remark, he appears to be relying on the following contentions: (1) law enforcement officers apparently failed to record any statement that Aguila might have provided on the date of the seizure; (2) officers apparently failed to secure a written Miranda waiver from Aguila; and (3) there is no evidence that the narcotics dog, Dixie, *1331who alerted to the area of the Truck where the currency was hidden, has been trained to distinguish between ordinary circulated currency (which may contain narcotics residue even in the absence of unlawful activity) and currency used in drug trafficking. (Id. at 3-5.)
The Court would expect Aguila to make all of these arguments in defense of the criminal charges against him. However, that the United States’ case against Aguila may not be ironclad does not necessarily yield a conclusion that the United States’ evidence is “relatively weak.” Let us remember that Aguila was stopped in this judicial district driving a vehicle with a Mexican license plate that held more than $300,000 in U.S. currency secreted in hidden compartments. This vast quantity of currency consisted of more than 12,000 bills (in denominations of between $1 and $20) bound by rubber bands, vacuum-sealed and wrapped in foil. The record includes affidavits from law enforcement officers declaring, based on personal knowledge, that Aguila verbally waived his Miranda rights and stated that he was being paid $4,000 to transport what he believed was narcotics or other contraband to Mexico, but that he did not know there was money in the Truck until the officers discovered it earlier that day. Such affidavits also reflect that Aguila later told an officer (in the context of discussion about a confidential informant program) that he feared for his family’s safety in Mexico because the people whose money he had lost were upset with him.17
Whatever flaws and imperfections it may (or may not) have, this evidence cannot reasonably said to amount to a weak case of civil forfeiture against Aguila under the Controlled Substances Act and the Bulk Cash Smuggling Act. The sheer volume of cash found in the Truck is highly probative circumstantial evidence of a link to illegal drug activity. See United States v. $22,991.00, more or less, in U.S. Currency, 227 F.Supp.2d 1220 (S.D.Ala.2002) (unusually large amount of cash in trunk of automobile is “highly probative, although not dispositive, circumstantial evidence of a link between this exorbitant amount of cash and illegal drug activity”); United States v. $121,100.00 in U.S. Currency, 999 F.2d 1503, 1507 (11th Cir.1993) (characterizing quantity of cash seized as “highly probative of a connection to some illegal activity”). This fact, coupled with affidavit testimony that drug couriers often package and conceal drug proceeds in the manner that the currency in Aguila’s truck was hidden, as well as the drug dog’s positive alert to the presence of narcotics, the officers’ testimony about Aguila’s incriminating statements, and Aguila’s apparently shifting explanations for the Currency, creates a substantial case for civil forfeiture under the Controlled Substances Act.18
*1332Besides, even if Aguila were correct that the case against him is relatively weak, this point would not militate in favor of the Court allowing his claim and declining to apply the fugitive disentitlement provisions of CAFTA. Surely, the prospect of a weak federal case would provide Aguila with all the more incentive to return to the United States to clear his name and vindicate his purported property rights as to the in rem defendants. See, e.g., $1,281,349.68, 227 F.Supp.2d at 133 (“If it truly is his intent to defend himself against the charges in the indictment and to contest the forfeiture action, he has one clear option — return to the United States.”). The Court will not exercise its discretion in favor of allowing Aguila to malign the Government’s case in the civil forfeiture action from afar even as he thumbs his nose at this Court’s jurisdiction over the pending criminal proceedings against him.
8. The Court’s May 2004 Order.
Finally, Aguila urges the Court not to disallow his claim because of the Court’s own findings in its Order (doc. 9) dated May 17, 2004 that there was no reason why this civil forfeiture action could not proceed without Aguila’s presence. (Claimant Brief, at 3.) In that Order, the Court denied Aguila’s request to have this Court order the Departments of State and Homeland Security to allow Aguila to reenter the United States to participate in the forfeiture action. As grounds for this ruling, the Court reasoned, in part, that:
“Aguila’s counsel offers no explanation for why his client’s physical presence in the United States will facilitate preparation of his claim or the conduct of the hearing. There is no obvious inherent reason why a civil claimant cannot provide meaningful assistance in preparing a claim from afar, or why his attorney’s presence at hearings would be inadequate to safeguard his rights.”
(May 17, 2004 Order, at 3.)
However, the landscape has changed considerably since the May 17 Order. In particular, the criminal indictment against Aguila has been unsealed and he has become aware of both the indictment and the outstanding warrant for his arrest. In May 2004, Aguila was not a fugitive from justice. Today, and for the last three months since he learned about the indictment and warrant, he is.19
More fundamentally, Aguila’s argument misses the point. The issue is not whether this civil forfeiture action could ostensibly proceed without his physical presence in the United States. As the Court observed in May, it could. Rather, the issue today is whether Aguila should be permitted to avail himself of the jurisdiction of this Court to reclaim property that he claims belongs to him even as he disrespects the jurisdiction of this Court to institute criminal proceedings against him based on his alleged criminal activities involving that very property. See United States v. All Right, Title and Interest in Real Property *1333and Appurtenances Located at Trump World Towers, 2004 WL 1933559, *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2004) (“But a claimant may not use the resources of a federal court for personal benefit while knowingly evading the jurisdiction of the same court to avoid criminal prosecution, and courts are given express statutory authority to dismiss civil forfeiture claims related to criminal cases when the claimant is a fugitive from justice”). In short, nothing in the May 17, 2004 Order counsels against application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to bar Aguila’s claim.
III. Conclusion.
This case presents a scenario in which Aguila seeks to use the resources of this Court to pursue a civil forfeiture claim while simultaneously evading jurisdiction to avoid sanction in a related, pending criminal case. Aguila is a fugitive from justice who has demonstrated disrespect for the legal process, such that he has no right to call upon this Court to adjudicate his claim. Having found that the five CAFTA prerequisites to application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine in the civil forfeiture context are present, and having determined that disallowing Aguila’s claim is necessary to protect the integrity of the judicial process from abuse, the Court relies in its discretion on 28 U.S.C. § 2466 to dismiss Aguila’s claim to the in rem property that is the subject of this action. In the opinion of the undersigned, “[t]his is precisely the type of situation that Congress intended to address when it enacted the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000.” United States v. $1,231,34.9.68 In Funds, 227 F.Supp.2d 130, 133 (D.D.C. 2002).20
For all of the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ordered that the United States’ Motion to Strike Claim (doc. 26) is due to be, and the same hereby is, granted. Claimant Jose Luis Verdin Aguila’s claim to the in rem property that is the subject of this forfeiture action is hereby stricken and dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2466. No other claimants having come forward with regard to the in rem defendants, judgment will be entered in favor of the United States. Additionally, the United States’ Motion to Strike (doc. 33) Exhibit A to the Claimant’s Brief is granted, and such exhibit is hereby stricken.