Facts of Case
This case involves a jurisdictional dispute between the Renton Education Association (REA) and the Washington Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO (WFT). The dispute is over which organization should be certified by the Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC) as the exclusive bargaining representative for vocationally certified educational employees of the Renton Vocational Institute.
Pursuant to its authority under this state's educational employment relations act, PERC ordered that an election be held. Shortly thereafter, REA petitioned the Superior Court under the administrative procedures act seeking review of the election order. PERC's motion to dismiss the *478petition was granted by the Superior Court and REA appeals.
One issue is dispositive.
Issue
Is an order by PERC directing a representative election under the educational employment relations act, RCW 41.59, a final decision subject to judicial review under this state's administrative procedures act, RCW 34.04?
Decision
Conclusion. PERC's direction of election order was not a final decision subject to judicial review; therefore, the Superior Court did not err in dismissing REA's petition.
A provision of the educational employment relations act, RCW 41.59.160, states that decisions made by PERC under that act are subject to the right of judicial review as provided by the administrative procedures act, RCW 34.04.
The administrative procedures act in turn provides that the only administrative decision that is reviewable is a "final decision." RCW 34.04.130(1).1 A "final decision" in this respect is one which imposes an obligation, denies a right or fixes some legal relationship as a consummation of the administrative process. Department of Ecology v. Kirkland, 84 Wn.2d 25, 29-30, 523 P.2d 1181 (1974).
The procedure for certifying exclusive bargaining representatives under the educational employment relations act, RCW 41.59, is detailed in the act itself and in the collective bargaining rules — educational employment, WAC 391-30, *479adopted by PERC pursuant thereto. A summary of the prescribed procedures is set forth in the margin.2
It is apparent from a review of the certification procedure that a direction of election order is no more than a preliminary step in the process, and, since it is an interlocutory administrative order, it is not a final decision subject to judicial review under the administrative procedures act. RCW 34.04.130(1); Department of Ecology v. Kirkland, supra; WAC 391-30-114; WAC 390-30-124(2).
The issue here presented is not whether the election order is reviewable but when. The policy of the administrative procedures act is against piecemeal appeals. Ordinarily, it is the certification of the exclusive bargaining representative following an election that is the final administrative *480decision which is judicially reviewable under the administrative procedures act; and when that order comes up for review it brings with it for review all previous interlocutory orders such as the election order. School Board v. Florida Pub. Employees Relations Comm'n, 333 So. 2d 95 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Klamath County v. Laborers Int'l Local 915, 21 Ore. App. 281, 534 P.2d 1169 (1975); West Allis v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 72 Wis. 2d 268, 240 N.W.2d 416 (1976). See Metropolitan Seattle v. Department of Labor & Indus., 88 Wn.2d 925, 568 P.2d 775 (1977) which involved an appeal from a certification of bargaining representatives by PERC's predecessor, the Department of Labor and Industries.
We do not consider the decisions arising under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1971) et seq., cited by REA as determinative in connection with the issue before us, since that act specifically provides statutory bases for review apart from the provisions of the administrative procedures act. See 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1971). Cf. RCW 41.59.110(2).
Since we have decided that the election order was not a final decision subject to judicial review, we do not address the alternate ground for decision urged by PERC and WFT to the effect that REA's failure to serve a copy of the petition for review on WFT "within 30 days after the service of the final decision of the agency," as required by RCW 34.04.130(2) is fatal to REA's appeal.3
*481Affirmed.
Williams and Ringold, JJ., concur.
Reconsideration denied January 9, 1980.
Review denied by Supreme Court April 24, 1980.