This is a case of first impression in Ohio concerning the constitutional validity of Disciplinary Rules which restrict the content of legal service advertisements. Specifically, the question presented herein is whether the content restrictions of DR 2-101(B)2 violate the First *47Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 11, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.
As to the Daikon Shield advertisement we agree with the findings of the panel and board that respondent violated DR 2-101(B), prohibiting illustrations in an advertisement; DR 2-104(A), in accepting employment resulting from unsolicited advice given by him to a non-lawyer; DR 2-101(A), in publishing communications which were misleading; DR 2-101(B)(15), by failing fully to disclose the terms of the contingent fee arrangement which was intended to be entered into at the time of publishing the advertisement; and DR 2-103(A), in recommending employment of himself as a private practitioner to a non-lawyer who had not sought his advice regarding employment of a lawyer.
These sections which the panel and board found had been violated by the respondent are constitutional provisions of the Ohio Disciplinary Rules as contained within the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The holdings of the United States Supreme Court in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona (1977), 433 U.S. 350, and In re R.M.J. (1982), 455 U.S. 191, do not totally prohibit the states from restricting lawyer advertising. The court in Bates, at 383-384, stated that there could well be a number of areas where restrictions are allowed. Certainly one such area is where the advertising is misleading per se, or may be misleading in its reach and interpretation. A *48potential client peering at a lawyer advertisement may be misled or confused by the expressed words, by an illustration or drawing, or by a combination of both.
In the subsequent case of In re the court at page 203 recognized that the state retains some authority to regulate a communication which is not misleading in nature. The state must, however, assert a substantial interest in the regulation and the restriction on the advertisement must be in proportion to the interest served.
Although the restrictions must be narrowly drawn, this state’s Disciplinary Rule concerning lawyer advertising passes constitutional muster. Each restriction is closely related to a substantial state interest. It is our view that an allowable restriction for lawyer advertising is that of asserted expertise of the advertising lawyer. A lawyer should not be permitted to hold himself out as an expert in certain designated areas unless there are in existence certain standards or criteria that have been promulgated by the court and set forth in the Disciplinary Rules.
Also, requirements relative to the content of the advertising concerning legal fees would be permissible under the United States Supreme Court rulings cited. Certainly for purposes of clarity to those reading a lawyer advertisement which refers to contingent fees, the requirement should be that such fees be specifically expressed, as well as any additional costs that might be assessed the client.
Also, it is reasonable for a state to impose restrictions upon lawyer advertising, prohibiting the lawyer from giving legal advice in a specific area, and then recommending employment of himself to those who have not sought his advice. Further, in this regard, the states may restrict the lawyer from accepting employment resulting from unsolicited advice given by him.
The specific subsections of DR 2-101(B) which were involved here and which were the basis of the sanctions recommended for the respondent are not unconstitutional. Although some other portions of DR 2-101(B) may be found to be constitutionally overbroad it is not necessary that we scrap the totality of this Disciplinary Rule.
With respect to the drunk driving advertisement, the board found that respondent violated DR 2-101(A). The board reasoned that the phrase “Full legal fee refunded if convicted of Drunk Driving,” as contained in the ad, encouraged the reader to believe that he could obtain representation in a criminal case at no cost. However, in view of the common practice of entering a plea of guilty or no contest to a lesser included offense when a person is charged with operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, this interpretation would be erroneous. If such a plea were entered, the defendant would not be “convicted of drunk driving” and therefore the legal fee would not be refundable.
While we agree with the board’s conclusion that the drunk driving advertisement was “misleading and deceptive” in violation of DR 2-101(A), we also note that respondent voluntarily withdrew the advertisement from cir*49culation after only one publication and did not accept any clients as a result thereof.
Accordingly, we accept the hearing panel’s recommendation and hereby determine that respondent’s conduct warrants a public reprimand.
Judgment accordingly.
Celebrezze, C.J., W. Brown, Sweeney, Locher, Holmes and J. P. Celebrezze, JJ., concur.