This is an appeal by the defendant below from an adverse declaratory decree. The plaintiff-appellee Courtney entered into a contract of employment with the appellant *41Storz Broadcasting Co., hereinafter referred to as the company, “to act as a commentator, moderator and master of ceremonies for a three-hour radio and/or television discussion program, six nights a week.” The term of the contract was three years, commencing October 1, 1958, with options to the company to extend the contract three additional years. The contract was so extended, and the employment period ended September 30, 1964.
The contract contained a covenant that during the period of employment Courtney would work exclusively for the company and would not engage in another business or perform such services for another person or firm,1 and a covenant against competing for eighteen months in event his employment with the company was terminated for any reason other than discharge without cause.2
Some five months prior to the end of the term of employment under the contract as extended, Courtney filed this suit against the company seeking declaratory decree as to whether the latter covenant would restrict him after the contract period. The matter to be determined, as submitted to the trial court by stipulation of the parties, was as follows:
“ * * * [T]he sole question or issue which the court, in and by its final declaratory decree, shall determine and decide in this suit is whether or not, when the mentioned agreement shall have terminated by its own terms and the plaintiff shall have left the employ of Storz Broadcasting Co., the quoted covenant shall be enforceable against the plaintiff for a period of 18 months from the date of termination of the mentioned agreement and the cessation of such employment. * * * ”
In a final decree entered August 18, 1964, the trial court answered that question by holding the restriction would not be enforceable after the end of the term of the contract because taking similar employment with another radio station (as intended) would not be “engaging in a similar business,” and therefore not within the exceptions stated in § 542.12(2), Fla. Stat., F.S.A.; and holding further that, if enforceable, the trial court would exercise a discretion not to enforce the contract in this instance.3
*42Appellant contends, and with, merit, that the trial court was in error in so holding. It is now established that accepting employment in a similar business falls within the term “engaging in a similar business” as used in the statute, and therefore is within the exceptions stated in § 542.12(2), Fla.Stat., F.S.A. Fogle v. Orkin Exterminating Co. of So. Fla., Inc., Fla. App.1964, 168 So.2d 153; Orkin Exterminating Co. of So. Fla., Inc. v. Lefkowitz, Fla.App.1964, 169 So.2d 336. In justice to the trial judge it should be noted his decree preceded those decisions. Nor was the trial court free to elect not to enforce the contract, if thus breached. The limit on the discretion referred to in the statute was disclosed in an opinion prepared by Chief Judge Sturgis in the first district court of appeal in Atlas Travel Service v. Morelly, Fla.App.1957, 98 So.2d 816, 818. The validity of the statute involved (subsections (1) and (2) of § 542.12, Fla.Stat., F.S.A.) was established by the Supreme Court in Standard Newspapers, Inc. v. Woods, Fla.1959, 110 So.2d 397.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the decree should be affirmed because the covenant not to compete related to termination of employment during the term and was not applicable after the employment contract was fully performed. When in the opinion of an appellate court a ground exists for upholding a decree which is challenged on appeal t the decree will be affirmed although the reasons relied on by the trial' court are rejected. Chase v. Cowart, Fla.1958, 102 So.2d 147, 150; TriCounty Produce Distr. v. Northeast Prod. Cr. Ass’n, Fla.App.1963, 160 So.2d 46, 49.
Examination of the contract involved in this case, with particular reference to the paragraphs quoted in the margin, leads to the- conclusion that the covenant relating to restriction against competing was applicable only to termination of employment during the term. The Supreme Court of Indiana so construed a similar contract, in the case of Jenkins v. King, 224 Ind. 164, 65 N.E.2d 121, 163 A.L.R. 397.
Applicable canons of construction support this ruling. Thus, in ' construing contracts in restraint of trade, ambiguous or doubtful language is to be construed against the restraint. Ream v. Callahan, 2 Cir.1943, 136 F.2d 194, 197; Richardson v. Paxton Co., 203 Va. 790, 127 S.E.2d 113, 117. When a contract provision is inserted for the benefit of a party, any ambiguity therein must be construed more strongly against that party. McGhee Interests v. Alexander Nat. Bank, 102 Fla. 140, 135 So. 545, 548; Capitol City Bank v. Hilson, 59 Fla. 215, 51 So. 853, 855. Contracts of an employee not to engage in a competing business, being in the nature of contracts in restraint of trade and personal liberty, will not be construed to extend beyond their proper import, or further than the language of the contract absolutely requires. Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co., 3 Cir.1958, 255 F.2d 641, 647; Combined Insurance Co. of America v. Bode, 247 Minn. 458, 77 N.W.2d 533, 536; Adams v. Adams, 156 Neb. 778, 58 N.W.2d 172, 179.
Accordingly, for the reason stated, the decree appealed from is affirmed.
Affirmed.