Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Nassau County (Collins, J.), rendered June 1,1983, convicting him of murder in the second degree and burglary in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant was charged with acting in concert with Andre Cartier and Mary Bowen in committing murder in the second degree and burglary in the second degree. The evidence adduced at trial established that on the morning of October 18, 1981, the defendant and Cartier entered the apartment of the elderly victim, for whom Bowen worked as a companion. The police found the victim’s apartment in disarray, and while testimony indicated that she kept large amounts of cash in her home, no money was recovered.
*433Although the defendant initially denied any involvement in the crime upon his arrest, he subsequently confessed that he accompanied Cartier to the victim’s apartment to steal money and electronic equipment. He nevertheless denied any participation in the actual killing, claiming that he remained near the front door of the apartment during the burglary, and never entered the bedroom where the victim was murdered.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (People v Malizia, 62 NY2d 755, cert denied 469 US 932), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt of felony murder since " 'any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt’ ” (People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621; People v Joyner, 26 NY2d 106). As a willing and active participant in the underlying burglary, the defendant was accountable as a principal for the act of his accomplice, which was within the compass of the crime (see, People v Lewis, 111 Misc 2d 682). Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that sufficient proof was presented to the jury to support its factual determination that the homicide occurred in the course of and in furtherance of the burglary, and that the guilty verdict was thus not against the weight of the evidence (CPL 470.15 [5]; see, People v Dering, 140 AD2d 538).
We reject the defendant’s further contention that he established the affirmative defense to felony murder as a matter of law (Penal Law § 125.25 [3] [a]-[d]). In this regard, we note that contrary to the defendant’s contention, his statement to police failed to establish that he "[h]ad no reasonable ground to believe” that his companion "intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious physical injury” (Penal Law § 125.25 [3] [d]). In any event, although the defendant’s statement sought to minimize his participation in the crime, the evidence adduced at trial belies his claim that he acted as a mere "lookout”, and the jury was not required to automatically credit the exculpatory portions of his admissions (see, People v Gonzalez, 143 AD2d 681).
We have examined the defendant’s remaining contentions, including those raised in his supplemental pro se brief, and find that they are without merit. Brown, J. P., Kunzeman, Eiber and Ritter, JJ., concur.