Opinion
The respondent father, Allen B., who is self-represented in this appeal, appeals from the judgment of the trial court terminating his parental rights in his minor son, N.1 The respondent claims that (1) the court improperly found that he had abandoned N, (2) the court improperly found that the allowance of more time for the establishment of a parent-child relationship between him and N would be detrimental to the best interest of N and (3) he did not receive effective *383assistance of counsel during the termination proceeding. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
In the adjudicatory phase of the termination proceeding, the court found by clear and convincing proof that the respondent abandoned N under General Statutes § 45a-717 (g) (2) (A) and that no ongoing parent-child relationship between the respondent and N existed under § 45a-717 (g) (2) (C). In the dispositional phase of the termination proceeding, the court found by clear and convincing proof that termination of the respondent’s parental rights was in the best interest of N under § 45a-717 (g) (1). After the court rendered judgment terminating the respondent’s parental rights in N, this appeal followed.
I
With regard to the first two claims in this appeal, we observe that “[o]ur standard of review on appeal from a termination of parental rights is whether the challenged findings are clearly erroneous. Our function is to determine whether the court’s conclusion was legally correct and factually supported. We do not examine the record to determine whether a different conclusion might have been reached. Every reasonable presumption is made in favor of the trial court’s ruling.” In re Sarah S., 110 Conn. App. 576, 584, 955 A.2d 657 (2008); see In re Justice V., 111 Conn. App. 500, 512-13, 959 A.2d 1063 (2008), cert. denied, 290 Conn. 911, 964 A.2d 545 (2009).
Our thorough examination of the record and the arguments advanced on appeal leads us to conclude that the respondent has not demonstrated that error undermines the court’s judgment. The issues raised in these claims were analyzed and resolved properly in the court’s complete and well reasoned memorandum of decision. See In re Nicholas B., 52 Conn. Sup. 313, 44 A.3d 230 (2011). We adopt that decision as the proper statement of the relevant facts, issues and applicable law, as it would serve no useful purpose for us to repeat *384the discussion contained therein. See, e.g., In re Mariah P., 109 Conn. App. 53, 55, 949 A.2d 1292, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 946, 959 A.2d 1012 (2008).
II
We are left to address the respondent’s remaining claim, that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance.2 Our review of the respondent’s argument reveals that the respondent has done little more than summarily describe five alleged acts or omissions of his trial counsel. The respondent’s argument is devoid of any legal analysis, let alone citation to any authority. For these reasons, we deem the claim to be abandoned and do not reach its merits. See, e.g., Baker v. Baker, 95 Conn. App. 826, 833-34, 898 A.2d 253 (2006), and cases cited therein.
“While . . . [i]t is the established policy of the Connecticut courts to be solicitous of [self-represented] litigants and when it does not interfere with the rights of other parties to construe the rules of practice liberally in favor of the [self-represented] party ... we are also aware that [although we allow [self-represented] litigants some latitude, the right of self-representation provides no attendant license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Keating v. Ferrandino, 125 Conn. App. 601, 604, 10 A.3d 59 (2010). The major deficiencies in the presentation of this claim, which undeniably interfere with the petitioners’ right to respond adequately to the claim, fall well outside of that degree of latitude afforded self-represented parties.
The judgment is affirmed.