This appeal by the state challenges dismissal of criminal misdemeanor charges against Boone for leading *417approximately 25 people in a demonstration on state property known as the Georgia World Congress Center. The state’s indictment was brought under Code Ann. §§ 91-134 and 91-9908 (Ga. L. 1976, pp. 471-473, as amended), which prohibits interference with and disruption of activities and operations on all state property and in all state buildings.1 It accused Boone of leading the group in singing, talking in loud voices, standing and kneeling in close proximity so as to block the *418flow of pedestrian traffic in that part of the main lobby adjacent to the administrative offices, and of refusing to vacate the property and building where ordered to do so.2
Boone rebutted these allegations contending he led the group in prayer over diminishing welfare benefits and employment discrimination in the Center; that State Highway patrolmen and Georgia Building Authority security personnel, removed their hats and respected the prayer period, then ordered the group to leave. Boone argued he had asked to see the manager of the Center and was told to wait while he was summoned. At this point, the officers refused to let the group wait and arrested them. At the preliminary hearing, all charges were dismissed except those against Boone. The order to leave was given only to him. A motion attacking the constitutionality of the statute was filed and argument heard prior to joining issue on the merits. The trial court determined the statute was "facially unconstitutional” as being vague, overbroad and imposed prior restraint on free speech, observing the statute arms security personnel with authority to determine the subjective intent of a party prior to any act being committed; arms them with authority to exclude persons if the guard thinks they pose a threat to security or if they are "merely” displaying banners or placards. These provisions "invite discriminatory application” and restrict free speech and assembly in violation of the Georgia and United States Constitutions.
The state contends it was error to hold the statute unconstitutional. We agree and reverse.
1. The statute is not facially overbroad nor so vague *419as to violate First Amendment freedoms of assembly or speech. Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XV, Ga. Const., 1976 (Code Ann.. § 2-115); Art. I, U. S. Const. (Code §§ 1-801,1-815). Its language clearly seeks to proscribe conduct, not free speech, and "... that conduct — even if expressive — falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct...” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 615 (93 SC 2908) (1973). See United States v. Douglass, 579 F2d 545, 550 (1978). Cf. Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation, - U. S. - (98 SC 3026, 3037) (1978). Further, no constitutional infirmity is created by language in the statute authorizing exclusion of those persons whom a guard, by the exercise of subjective evaluation, determines has the potential of violating the security of personnel or whose activities are intended to disrupt or interfere with the normal activities and functions carried on in the building. Language regarding "intent” is commonly used in statutes regulating conduct.3 Law enforcement officers must exercise subjective evaluations as part of their duty to protect the public safety, peace, *420comfort and convenience from unauthorized conduct. "The state, no less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated. . .” Adderley v. Florida, 385 U. S. 39, 47 (87 SC 242) (1966). The statute, sub judice, proscribes specific conduct. These restrictions are limited and "... punish only conduct which disrupts or is about to disrupt normal. . . activities . . .” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 116 (92 SC 2294) (1972). See Tinker v. Des Moines &c. School Districts, 393 U. S. 503, 514 (89 SC 733) (1969).
2. We do not so narrowly construe the language of the statute authorizing denial of entrance into or upon state property to "any person displaying any sign, banner, placard, poster or similar device . ..” as prohibiting entry merely because such signs or placards are present. This prohibition must be construed together with those sentences authorizing denial of entry as construed in Division 1.
3. The statute is also not violative of due process or equal protection guarantees. It comports with fair notice to those to whom the statute is directed, and as we construe the language used here, actual or imminent threat of harm or of disruption of on-going operations on state property or in buildings housing state agencies is required. Grayned v. City of Rockford, supra; Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U. S. 611 (88 SC 1335) (1968). We also do not agree that the statute is overbroad as "sweeping within its prohibitions” what may not be punished under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. "[T]he government may adopt reasonable time, place and manner regulations, which do not discriminate among speakers or ideas, in order to further an important governmental interest unrelated to the restriction of communication.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 18 (96 SC 612) (1975). See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205, 209 (95 SC 2268) (1975); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536 (85 SC 453) (1965); Adderley v. Florida, supra; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (69 SC 448) (1949).
Judgment reversed.
All the Justices concur, except Hill, J., who concurs in Divisions 1 and 3, and in the judgment.
*421Argued March 13, 1979
Decided April 4, 1979.
Hinson McAuliffe, Solicitor, Charles Hadaway, Assistant Solicitor, for appellant.
Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, Daniel M. Formby, Assistant Attorney General, amicus curiae.
Brooks Franklin, Margie Pitts Hames, Al Horn, Reber Boult, for appellee.