OPINION
Stanley Ozoroski appeals from the District Court’s grant of summary judgment against him on his claims that the Appel-lees denied him access to necessary medical treatment in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights.1
I.
Because we write primarily for the parties, our recitation of the facts and procedural history is brief. Ozoroski, an inmate in the Pennsylvania state correctional system, suffered a small bowel perforation2 during a hernia repair operation in 1993. As a result, Ozoroski underwent multiple corrective surgeries shortly thereafter. Despite ongoing treatment, however, Ozo-roski continued to experience abdominal problems and developed an enterocutaneous fistula.3
Although Ozoroski requested additional surgery to address his abdominal issues, the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) ultimately chose to pursue a nonsurgical course of treatment. In fact, while in DOC custody, Ozoroski was treated and evaluated by more than 20 physicians. While some physicians recommended surgery as a potential way to repair Ozoroski’s abdomen, others believed that the risks of surgery ultimately outweighed any potential benefits.4 The DOC therefore denied Ozoroski’s repeated requests for surgery. Nevertheless, approximately 13 years after his initial hernia operation, Ozoroski was released into the custody of Gaudenzia Drug Rehabilitation Center5 (“Gaudenzia”) and, during his stay, he underwent surgery to repair his abdomen.
Subsequently, Ozoroski filed a complaint in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the prison health services and individual medical personnel deprived him of necessary medical treatment during his incarceration at the state correctional institutions at SCI-Rockview and SCI-Ma-hanoy respectively, and during his subsequent stay at Gaudenzia. After several defendants were dismissed by the District Court, the Court granted summary judgment for the remaining Defendants. Ozo-roski timely appealed.
II.
Ozoroski claims that the District Court erred by finding that Dr. Frederick *97Maue, Chief of Clinical Services of the Bureau of the Department of Corrections; Marva Cerullo, a healthcare administrator at SCI-Mahanoy; and Wexford Health Sources, Inc., a corporation that previously contracted with the DOC to provide healthcare services to inmates, were entitled to summary judgment under the applicable statute of limitations because of the Continuing Violations Doctrine. We disagree.
“The statute of limitations period for a § 1983 claim arising in Pennsylvania is two years.” Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir.2009). That period begins to run “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the section 1983 action.” Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 919 (3d Cir.1991). The Continuing Violations Doctrine, however, is an “equitable exception to the timely filing requirement,” which applies “when a defendant’s conduct is part of a continuing practice” and is “more than the occurrence of isolated or sporadic acts.” Cowell v. Palmer Twp., 263 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir.2001). Under the Doctrine, “an action is timely so long as the last act evidencing the continuing practice falls within the limitations period.” Id.
Here, Ozoroski’s claims against Wex-ford, Dr. Maue and Cerullo do not fall within the Continuing Violations exception. In particular, Wexford contracted with the DOC to provide healthcare services to inmates from September 1996 to August 31, 2003. Ozoroski, however, did not file the underlying action until January 14, 2008— more than four years later. Thus, even under the most expansive interpretation of the Continuing Violations Doctrine, it would not apply to the claims against Wex-ford, since the corporation had no authority to provide Ozoroski with medical care during the two-year limitations period.
Further, the Doctrine does not extend to Ozoroski’s claims against Dr. Maue or Cerullo because their alleged conduct was not connected to any “continuing practice” but instead amounted to isolated incidents. In fact, Dr. Maue’s involvement in Ozoroski’s treatment was limited to two letters dated November 10, 2003 and October 20, 2004, which stated that it was his medical opinion and that of other physicians that surgery was not in Ozoroski’s best interests. As the District Court appropriately reasoned, “[t]he two letters amount to little more than discrete, isolated events not appropriately linked to some larger scheme to deny Ozoroski’s medical care.” App. at 10. Ozoroski’s claims against Cerullo rest on an equally isolated event — her refusal to permit an application for pre-release to be filed on Ozoroski’s behalf. Furthermore, since Ozoroski filed a grievance in connection with Cerullo’s refusal to file his pre-release application on November 9, 2004, we find that her conduct was sufficiently permanent to “trigger [Ozoroski’s] awareness of and duty to assert his ... rights” during the limitations period. Cowell, 263 F.3d at 292. Nevertheless, he did not bring suit until more than three years after Cerullo and Dr. Maue’s alleged conduct. Therefore, his claims against Cerullo and Dr. Maue are also barred as untimely.
Ozoroski also argues that the District Court erred by granting summary judgment on his Eighth Amendment claims in favor of Prison Health Services, Inc. (“PHS”), another healthcare provider contracted to provide healthcare services to DOC inmates; Dr. Adam Edelman, director of PHS; Cecilia Velasquez, director of Gaudenzia; and Cheryl Cantey, head medical supervisor of Gaudenzia.
To establish Eighth Amendment liability against a private employer, such as PHS, the prisoner must “provide evidence that *98there was a relevant PHS policy or custom ... that ... caused the constitutional violation [he] allege[s].” Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 584 (3d Cir.2003). The District Court did not err in finding that Ozoroski presented insufficient evidence to establish an Eighth Amendment violation. As the District Court noted, his treating and consulting physicians had varying views on whether surgery was appropriate to treat his condition. The record demonstrates that Dr. Edelman exercised his professional judgment and we can find no evidence that he consciously disregarded Ozoroski’s medical needs. Moreover, Ozoroski failed to show that Velasquez or Cantey demonstrated deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs once he reached Gaudenzia, where he continued to attend various medical appointments and ultimately obtained surgery to repair his abdomen.
Ozoroski contends that PHS maintained a policy and practice “of focusing on medical costs instead of the patient’s best interest.” Appellant’s Br. at 28. In support of his claims, he offers a peer review article, an online newspaper article noting that Wexford terminated its contract due to soaring costs, and a 2008 PHS white paper discussing the rising costs of providing healthcare services.6 These documents contain only general information regarding the delivery of cost-effective healthcare and therefore fail to create a material question as to whether PHS maintained a policy or custom that caused the deprivation of Ozoroski’s constitutional rights.7
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s entry of summary judgment in all respects.