Bartok v. Boosey & Hawkes, Inc. 523 F.2d 941

OAKES, Circuit Judge:

This appeal presents the question whether a musical composition the rights to which are assigned by the composer and which is performed during his lifetime is nevertheless “posthumous” within the meaning of the copyright renewal provision, § 24 of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 24,1 because it has not been published or, more precisely, printed (and therefore not copyrighted) until after his death. Appellant, Peter Bartók, a son of composer Bela Bartók, is appealing the decision of Judge Richard Owen of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York holding that Bartok’s Concerto for Orchestra, one of the contemporary composer’s most popular compositions, is a posthumous work. According to the renewal provision of the very loosely drawn 17 U.S.C. § 24, a proprietor of inter alia a copyrighted “posthumous work” is entitled to renew the copyright, whereas the author or certain of the author’s surviving kin is entitled to the renewal of most other works. Here both Boosey & Hawkes, Inc. (Boosey), the music publisher and proprietor of the initial copyright of Concerto for Orchestra, and Peter Bartók are claiming the right to renew the copyright. Boosey argues that it is the proprietor of a posthumous work; Peter Bartók argues that the work is not posthumous. The trustee for Bela Bartok’s estate, Benjamin Suchoff, argues as does Boosey that the work is posthumous.2 *943Judge Owen’s holding confers that right on Boosey. We must reverse.

Concerto for Orchestra was composed by Bartók between August 15 and October 8, 1943, after a visit by the conductor Serge Koussevitzky to Bartok’s hospital room. Bartók was suffering from leukemia, which was to take his life in September, 1945. The Concerto for Orchestra was first performed by the Boston Symphony, Koussevitzky conducting, on December 1 and 2, 1944, in Symphony Hall, Boston. The Concerto was again performed in Boston on December 29 and 30, 1944, and at Carnegie Hall in New York on January 10 and 13, 1945, and broadcast over radio,

After completing the Concerto, Bartók assigned his rights in the work to Boosey pursuant to their 1939 publishing contract. Boosey was to prepare the orchestra parts and print the full score within six months. The printing was to be done in England, but wartime conditions delayed completion, as did some rewriting by Bartók after the premiere. Thus Bartók was still receiving and correcting printer’s proofs as late as June, 1945, three months before his death. Printing of the manuscript was not completed and therefore not copyrighted by Boosey until March 20, 1946, six months after Bartok’s death.

The first 28 year copyright term held by Boosey, defined by 17 U.S.C. § 24, expired in March, 1974. Both Boosey and Peter Bartók filed renewal applications. The Register of Copyrights permitted the filing of both renewals, expressly declining to adjudicate between them.

Judge Owen felt “constrained to conclude” that Concerto for Orchestra is a “posthumous work” for purposes of § 24, finding that it was “published” and copyrighted after Bartok’s death. Judge Owen relied on the definition of “posthumous” used by the Register of Copyrights and examples in musical history. He concluded, however, that were he to look solely to congressional intent he would hold the work not posthumous. Bartok v. Boosey & Hawkes, Inc., 382 F.Supp. 880, 883 (S.D.N.Y.1974). We find that we must give controlling weight to the legislative purpose in this case, of first impression,3 and thus reverse.

We agree with Judge Owen that the rationale of the renewal period in § 24 is clear. We are fully aware of the dangers of relying upon isolated bits of legislative history in statutory reconstruction, Jackson, J., concurring in Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395, 71 S.Ct. 745, 95 L.Ed. 1035 (1951), but there are exceptions proving the rule. On March 27, 1908, at the Congressional Committee Hearings before the Joint Committee on Patents, the following colloquy took place between the chairman and William Allen Jenner of New York on the subject whether to extend the author’s term of copyright for an additional fourteen years:

The Chairman: I would like to ask you a question. Would not the publisher, if a third ternji were given, make a contract with the author stipulating that not only was he to have control of the publication for the first twenty-eight years, but that he should control it, and the right to publish it, under the original contract, for the fourteen-year extension period and if we give another extension of fourteen years, then for the second fourteen-year period?

Mr. Jenner: It is never done, and I have some doubt about whether it legally could be done. But I should be glad to see that so provided for that it could not be done under the law. Representative Law: Then put it in the bill itself.

Mr. Jenner: Put it in the bill itself, and say that it cannot be done, so that the author is certain to have that extension as a provision for his age or a *944provision for his widow and his children.

Thereafter, the House Committee reporting out the 1909 Act called for one 28 year renewal, and in connection therewith had the following to say:

Your Committee, after full consideration, decided that it was distinctly to the advantage of the author to preserve the renewal period. It not infrequently happens that the author sells his copyright outright to a publisher for a comparatively small sum. If the work proves to be a great success and lives beyond the term of twenty-eight years, your committee felt that it should be the exclusive right of the author to take the renewal term, and the law should be framed as is the existing law, so that he could not be deprived of that right.

H.R.Rep.No.2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1909). See 2 M. Nimmer, The Law of Copyright § 113, at 461, and § 117.21, at 493-94 (1974 ed.). This congressional purpose — to give the author or his family the renewal right — has been recognized by the courts, although not in any recent case. See Harris v. Coca-Cola Co., 73 F.2d 370, 371 (5th Cir. 1934):

The second period is intended, not as an incident of the first for the benefit of the then owner of the expiring copyright, but as a second recognition extended by the law to the author of work that has proven permanently meritorious by giving directly to him, if alive, or if not, to his widow, children, next of kin or executor . a supplementary copyright upon the terms stated in the statute.

See also White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Goff, 187 F. 247, 251 (1st Cir. 1911). As the Supreme Court said in Fred Fisher Music Co. v. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 653-54, 63 S.Ct. 773, 87 L.Ed. 1055 (1943), the “basic consideration of policy underlying the renewal provision” was the right of “the author to sell his ‘copyright’ without losing his renewal interest.”

A “posthumous work” is one of the three exceptions to the renewal statute. The only definition of “posthumous” which fulfills the legislative purpose of protecting authors and their1 families is that in the narrow situation — not present here — where a contract for copyright was never executed by the author during his life. See 2 M. Nimmer, supra, § 114.1, at 464; Kupferman, Renewal of Copyright, 44 Colum.L.Rev. 712 (1944). In that case the estate can make its own contract and thereby protect itself. For example, had the work here been found among Bartok’s effects, his widow and children could and presumably would have made their own arrangements to have it published. In that case the logical basis for excepting the widow and children from statutory protection is that, as original proprietors, they would have no need of it. See Kupferman, supra, 44 Colum.L.Rev. at 715.

In this case, however, where the copyright contract was executed before the author’s death, the family has no means of protection other than the statutory renewal right;4 this is equally true whether the work is available in print or not. Yet the district court’s definition of “posthumous” would create a legislative discrimination between families in these two equally unprotected situations. Where, as here, death occurs after copyright sale, but before publication, one commentator agrees that “no one has suggested any possible reason why the rights of the statutory beneficiaries should be defeated in such an instance.” Bricker, Renewal and Extension of Copyright, 29 S.Cal.L.Rev. 23, 38-39 (1955). See Kupferman, supra, 44 Colum.L.Rev. at 715.

As Nimmer points out, the legislative purpose of protecting authors and their families derives not so much from a paternalistic view toward authors as a class as from the economic reality that

the form of property designated copyright, unlike real property and other forms of personal property, is by its *945very nature incapable of accurate monetary evaluation prior to its exploitation.

2 M. Nimmer, supra § 113, at 462. This purpose is equally salient for all families' where the copyright sale is during the author’s lifetime. In short, where the legislative purpose of the statute is to extend protection to an author and his family, it makes better sense to read the “posthumous work” exception as a withholding of unnecessary protection where the family can protect itself, rather than as an illogical discrimination between families who are in equal need of protection. 1

Given this legislative purpose we do not feel compelled to define the term “posthumous,” as did Judge Owen, by correlating it to one particular definition of the word “publish,” a term which itself has a variety of definitions in the Copyright Act depending upon the context.5 Judge Owen used the definition of “posthumous work” as a work “published after the death of its author,” citing B. Ringer, Renewal of Copyright, Copyright Office Study No. 31 at 128. He also relied on a quotation from 2 M. Nimmer, supra § 114.1, at 463-64 (referring to the dictionary definition of “posthumous”). But Nimmer states that “publication occurs when by consent of the copyright owner, the original or tangible copies of a work are sold, leased, loaned, given away, or otherwise made available to the general public . . .” 1 M. Nimmer, supra § 49, at 194-95.6 In *946this case Bartók had completed the Concerto, had heard it performed, had executed a contract for its copyright, and had corrected published proofs, all before his death. While the tangible copies had not been distributed to the public before Bartok’s death, orchestra parts had been distributed at least to members of the Boston Symphony and the general public had heard the Concerto both in concert and on the radio. The work, as they heard it, was substantially as Bartók intended it to be heard, and the proofs contained his revisions. This is not the case where a composer never released a work for public dissemination, although he may have performed it occasionally,7 so that when the work is distributed after the composer’s death, the public never knows whether he intended substantial revisions.8 We need not pass on the question when publication has occurred; we simply point out that defining a “posthumous work” as one that is not published until after the author’s death carries with it the implicit problem what is publication as well as the implicit danger that an unscrupulous publisher could purposely delay publication in order to obtain renewal rights.

Judge Owen also relied on the form provided by the Register of Copyrights (Circular IB) which defines “posthumous” as a “work first published and copyrighted after the death of the author.” And yet the Copyright Office has no authority to give opinions or define legal terms 9 and its interpretation on an *947issue never before decided10 should not be given controlling weight. See DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 577—78, 76 S.Ct. 974, 100 L.Ed. 1415 (1956).

Appellees rely heavily on the phrase in the statute here italicized, “of any posthumous work or of any periodical, cyclopedic, or other composite work upon which the copyright was originally secured by the proprietor thereof . .” The argument is that this phrase implies that the date for determining what is posthumous is the date of copyright. Even assuming, however, that the italicized phrase modifies both posthumous works and periodicals, it is not useful in defining what is posthumous. Its use is only to define the time from which a renewal term dates since without a fixed point in time for the first copyright there could be no fixed renewal period. No one would argue that the date of copyright and publication is used to define a “periodical, cyclopedic, or other composite” work. Likewise the phrase has no definitional value for a “posthumous work.” Words undefined in a statute must be construed to further, rather than frustrate, the legislative intent or purpose. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 571-72, 85 S.Ct. 1162, 14 L.Ed.2d 75 (1965); Knapp v. McFarland, 462 F.2d 935, 939-40 (2d Cir. 1972); Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District v. FPC, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 117, 391 F.2d 470, 474, cert. denied sub nom. Arkansas Valley G & T, Inc. v. FPC,, 393 U.S. 857, 89 S.Ct. 104, 21 L.Ed.2d 126 (1968). As the master of statutory interpretation once put it,

it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning.

Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand, J.), aff’d, 326 U.S. 404, 66 S.Ct. 193, 90 L.Ed. 165 (1945).

All parties rely on the dictum by Judge Learned Hand in Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Bryan, 123 F.2d 697, 699 (2d Cir. 1941), discussing the proprietor exceptions in what is now § 24 of the Copyright Act by saying,

The first class provides for “posthumous” works, i. e., those on which the original copyright has been taken out by someone to whom the literary property passed before publication.

The dictum has its own ambiguity. We sense Judge Hand to have been thinking of “passed” in the usual sense of transfer by inheritance or intestacy, but not of transfer by contract. But even if we are wrong we cannot place too much emphasis on an ambiguous word in a mention en passant, not vital to the decision, even by the master. Since an initial assignment of a copyright renewal term by the author can vest in the publisher only if the author remains alive at the time of renewal, see 2 M. Nimmer, supra § 117.3, at 503, and cases cited therein, we do not see that an assignment of the renewal term should here vest solely because the war delayed the printing of the score.

Finally, the rationale for the exception for posthumous works, if defined as works the right to copyright which has passed by will or intestacy, is more analogous to the rationale for the other ex*948ceptions in § 24. Where such a “passing” has occurred, it may be many years before the work is performed, distributed and copyrighted originally; therefore the renewal right may vest beyond the life of the author’s children; there may be many heirs difficult to locate. In a periodical or cyclopedic work, presumably the rationale of the renewal term is to avoid the inconvenience of needing many contributors to join in order to renew the entire work, although contributors can renew individual contributions, raising the question whether the proprietor in the event of such an individual renewal has a right to renew such works, a question in grave doubt. See B. Ringer and P. Gitlin, Copyrights 60-61 (1965); 2 M. Nimmer, supra § 114.2. Commentators agree that the provision for renewal rights for a “corporate body (otherwise than an assignee or licensee of the individual author)” is practically meaningless, see Ringer & Gitlin, supra at 59 n. 42, except as a statement that corporate assignees of a copyright, as in this case, are not entitled to renew the copyright.11 2 M. Nimmer, supra § 114.-3, at 469. As for employers’ renewal rights, if those who have paid employees to create a work were not able to renew the copyright, it would be less profitable, for example, to make films, and it would be difficult in the case where many employees create a work, such as a Disney cartoon, to determine who the author or authors are. The “posthumous work” exclusion appears to us consistent with the other exclusions from § 24 as we have read that section.

Most of the arguments made in the dissent are answered in the course of the foregoing opinion. The dissent’s quarrel with our “philosophy” is evidently a quarrel with the House Committee report on the 1909 Act quoted in our opinion (and in 2 M. Nimmer, supra App. I, at 967-77) and with the underlying rationale of the renewal concept as set forth in 2 M. Nimmer, supra § 113, at 462, also quoted above. The suggestion made that somehow this decision will result in voiding copyright renewals made by assignees at the expense of the author’s family is based on the overly broad and gratuitous assertion in a district court opinion, Von Tilzer v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 53 F.Supp. 191, 196 (S.D.N.Y.1943), aff’d sub nom. Gumm v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 158 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1946); the actual source of the assertion is the inapposite context of Tobani v. Carl Fischer, Inc., 98 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 650, 59 S.Ct. 243, 83 L.Ed. 420 (1938), which denied to those who fail to renew a copyright the right to sue for the conveyance of void copyright renewal registrations of others.

Mindful of the dissent’s warnings, however, we rely on the well-established doctrine that the copyright title procured may be held in trust for the benefit of the persons who are rightfully entitled thereto. Harms v. Stern, 229 F. 42, 46 (2d Cir. 1915), vacated on rehearing on other grounds, 231 F. 645 (2d Cir. 1916). See Silverman v. Sunrise Pictures Corp., 273 F. 909, 914 (2d Cir. 1921), cert. denied, 262 U.S. 758, 43 S.Ct. 705, 67 L.Ed. 1219 (1923) (title held in trust by sisters for class of next of kin); Maurel v. Smith, 271 F. 211, 215 (2d Cir. 1921) (title held in trust for joint author as joint owner); Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 49 F.Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y.1943), aff’d, 140 F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1944). To avoid any possibility of invalidation of renewal copyrights previously made by proprietors in the limited class of those in Boosey’s position here upon reliance on the Copyright Office’s Circular No. 15, the effect of this decision shall be prospective only. That is, our decision will apply only to future and pending renewals, as well as to the parties here, and will not operate to void the legal title to renewal copyrights held by those proprietors in Boosey’s class. Instead, the au*949thor’s “widow, widower, or children, if the author be not living, or if such author, widow, widower, or children be not living, then the author’s executors, or in the absence of a will, his next of kin” shall be deemed to be the equitable owners of the renewal rights and have their remedy against the legal proprietors for the rights to which they are entitled under our decision here.12

For the above reasons the judgment is reversed.

VAN GRAAFEILAND, Circuit Judge

(dissenting):

As one whose musical accomplishments go barely beyond a mastery of “Chopsticks”, I take up the cudgels for appellees with some diffidence. However, since I believe that this case is being wrongly decided, I must respectfully express my dissent.

To place the opinion of my brothers in proper perspective, one should bear in mind that the contest herein is not between the penurious family of a deceased composer and an “unscrupulous” publisher; it is between a son and his mother. Bela Bartók, as a loving and thoughtful husband, executed a will in which he left the royalties from all copyrights and renewal copyrights in trust for his widow with the remainder, upon her death, to his son Peter, the appellant herein. Apparently, appellant is unwilling to wait for his remainder to accrue.

He asks this Court to declare that appellee publisher has no right to renew the copyright of his father’s works and to continue to pay all royalties following such renewal to his mother. Instead, he claims the right of renewal with his mother and brother, with the result that Bela Bartok’s widow, to whom the composer left all the royalties during her lifetime, will end up getting only one-third of them, the remaining two-thirds going to appellant and his brother. I believe that the injustice to Mr. Bartok’s widow which results from the majority’s frustration of Mr. Bartok’s wishes is neither required nor justified by the Copyright Law.

The provisions governing copyright renewal are contained in § 24 of the Copyright Law (17 U.S.C. § 24). This provides in pertinent part:

“That in the case of any posthumous work . . upon which the copy*950right was originally secured by the proprietor thereof . . the proprietor of such copyright shall be entitled to a renewal and extension of the copyright of such work for the further term of twenty-eight years . .: That in the case of any other copyrighted work . . . the widow, widower, or children of the author . shall be entitled to a renewal and extension of the copyright in such work for a further term of twenty-eight years . . .

Judge Owen found that the word “posthumous” as used in the field of music for over a century has a specific meaning, i. e., “published after the death of its author”. My colleagues do not hold this finding to be erroneous, as indeed they could not. My limited facilities for research completely substantiate ' it and indicate further that the same finding could be made in the field of literature. The following references are illustrative:

Dunstan, A Cyclopaedic Dictionary of Music (1973):

“Published after the composer’s death.”

Blom, Everyman’s Dictionary of Music (1971):

“A work published after its composer’s death is described as Posthumous. The common abbreviation is Op. posth.”

Riemann, Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Music (1908):

“. . . published after the death of the author.”

The Oxford English Dictionary (1933): “Of a book or writing: Published after the death of the author.”

Johnson, Dictionary of the English Language (1829):

“Done, had, or published after one’s death.”

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1971):

“Published after the death of its author, as posthumous poems.”

Ringer, Renewal of Copyrights 128 (Copyright Office Study No. 31):

“The generally accepted definition of ‘posthumous works’ is ‘one which is published subsequent to the death of its author’.”

Ball, The Law of Copyright and Literary Property § 89, at 195 (1944):

“A posthumous work is one originally published and copyrighted after the author’s death. . . . ”

1 Fisher, Studies on Copyright 524 (1963):

“The generally-accepted definition of ‘posthumous work’ is ‘one which is published subsequent to the death of its author’.”

Ringer and Gitlin, Copyrights 59 (1965):

“The term ‘posthumous work’ is not defined in the statute, but in general it probably refers to works published for the first time after the author’s death.”

Nicholson, A Manual of Copyright Practice 144 (2d ed. 1956):

“. . . works published after the author’s death.”

Kupferman, Renewal of Copyright, 44 Colum.L.Rev. 713, 715 (1944):

“This must mean a work published after the author’s death by someone to whom he passed the right to reproduce it.”

Bricker, Renewal and Extension of Copyright, 29 S.Cal.L.Rev. 23, 38 (1955):

“A posthumous work is one which is published subsequent to the death of its author.”

2 Nimmer, The Law of Copyright § 114.1 (1975):

“The accepted dictionary definition for ‘posthumous’ used in this context is ‘Published after the death of its author, as posthumous poems’.”

Funk & WagnalPs Standard Dictionary (Britannica World Language Ed. 1963):

*951. . published after the author’s death, as a book.”

Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1933):

“. . . of a book or writing: Published after the death of the author 1668.” 1

Berk, Legal Protection for the Creative Musician 190, at § 7.3 (1970):

“. . .a posthumous work is, of course, simply one which is published after the death of the author.

The New Century Dictionary (1927): “. . . published after the death of the author, (as, a posthumous book).”

The Century Dictionary and Encyclopedia (1895):

“. . . appearing or existing after the death or cessation of that to which its origin is due; especially of books published after the death of the author: as to posthumous works.”2

Having established the existence of a commonly accepted and well established meaning for the term “posthumous works”, Judge Owen then applied an equally accepted and established rule of statutory interpretation, viz., “The popular or accepted import of words furnishes the general rule for the interpretation of statutes.’ Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140, 142 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907, 69 S.Ct. 1048, 93 L.Ed. 1719 (1949); Banks v. Chicago Grain Trimmers, 390 U.S. 459, 465, 88 S.Ct. 1140, 20 L.Ed.2d 30 (1967); United States v. Peller, 170 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1948).3

In United States v. Blasius, 397 F.2d 203 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 1008, 89 S.Ct. 615, 21 L.Ed.2d 557 (1968), we said:

“It must be assumed ‘that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning’ of words used in the statute [citations omitted], and where they have a basic and usual sense, they require no resort to legislative history.”

My brothers, nonetheless, rely heavily on certain congressional dialogue which they quote at some length. This discussion concerned a debate then taking place before the 1908 Joint Congressional Committee on whether the proposed new law should provide for a long non-renewable copyright term or a shorter renewable one. See Arguments before the Committee on Patents of the Senate and House of Representatives Conjointly on the Pending Bills to Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright (1906-8). The Congress opted for the latter. At the same time, it specified four situations in which the ordinary rules of renewal would not apply — post*952humous works, composite works, works copyrighted by a corporate body and works copyrighted by an employer for whom such works were made for hire.

From the outset of the Joint Committee’s deliberations, it was obvious that these four exceptions were to be given different treatment than ordinary works of copyright insofar as the copyright term was concerned. However, I find nothing in the language which the majority quotes, or anywhere else in the reports of the Joint Committee’s hearings, which indicates that the term “posthumous works” was to be given a meaning different from that which it had had for hundreds of years, viz., works published after the death of the author.

I cannot believe that Judge Hand was unfamiliar with this traditional and commonly accepted definition when he wrote his opinion in Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Bryan, 123 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1941). His description of “posthumous works” as “those on which the original copyright has been taken out by someone to whom the literary property passed before publication” was, therefore, in my opinion, simply a reiteration of the same definition.

Judge Hand discussed posthumous works in the same breath as composite works and works copyrighted by an employer, for whom such works were made for hire, and said that these cover “those cases in which the ‘proprietor’ of the copyright ... is not the author of the work”. It seems rather obvious that he was discussing proprietorships which came into being during the author’s lifetime. This accords with the language of § 9 (17 U.S.C. § 9) which provides in part:

“The author or proprietor of any work made the subject of copyright by this title, or his executors, administrators, or assigns, shall have copyright for such work . . . (Emphasis supplied).4

In short, I agree with the commentator in 29 S.Cal.L.Rev. 23, 39, supra, who said, “. . . there is nothing in the statute, Committee Report or any judicial opinion which would indicate that the term posthumous works was intended to have anything but its ordinary and usual meaning.”

Finally, and most significantly, the United States Copyright Office itself has adopted and used the same definition as the above cited authorities. If we examine the records of that office, we see that in Circular No. 15 (1953) “posthumous works” are defined as “works published and copyrighted after the death of the author”.5 The identical definition is contained in the Copyright Office’s “Certificate of Registration of a Claim to Renewal Copyright”. This is a “contemporaneous and long-continued construction of the statutes by the agency charged to administer them”, Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 213, 74 S.Ct. 460, 468, 98 L.Ed. 630 (1954), and courts should ordinarily “give weight to the interpretation of an ambiguous statute by the agency charged with its administration”. DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 577, 76 S.Ct. 974, 978, 100 L.Ed. 1415 (1956).

Of course, my brothers are correct in stating that the interpretation of the Copyright Office should not be given “controlling weight”. Yet, before the guidelines of the Copyright Office are swept aside, some thought should be given as to what is being swept with them. One wonders, for example, how many widows and children are depending upon royalties from copyright renewals filed in accordance with the existing guidelines. “A renewal of a copyright by a person not entitled thereto is void and cannot be cured by subsequent ratifica*953tion by the person allegedly entitled to renew.” Von Tilzer v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 53 F.Supp. 191, 196 (S.D.N.Y.1943), aff’d sub nom. Gumm v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 158 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1946); Tobani v. Carl Fischer, Inc., 98 F.2d 57 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 650, 59 S.Ct. 243, 83 L.Ed. 420 (1932).

One wonders, also, how many widows like Mrs. Bartók, will be deprived of the full benefit of their husband’s testate bounty because this Court is now changing the long-standing rules of the Copyright Office upon which the will was predicated.6

The affidavits submitted below establish, to my satisfaction at least, that there was no publication of Bela Bartok’s Concerto prior to his death. The intimation in the majority opinion that the playing of the Concerto in concert might have constituted a publication is completely without support in the law. A public performance of a musical composition is not a publication or an abandonment of the composition to the public. Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424, 435, 32 S.Ct. 263, 56 L.Ed. 492 (1912); Nutt v. National Institute, 31 F.2d 236, 238 (2d Cir. 1929); Rosette v. Rainbo Record Manufacturing Corp., 354 F.Supp. 1183 (S.D.N.Y.1973); McCarthy and Fischer, Inc. v. White, 259 F. 364 (S.D.N.Y.1919); 1 Nimmer, The Law of Copyright, § 53.1, at 208 (1975); Gold-stein, Copyrighting the New Music 10 (Ascap Copyright Law Symposium, Number Sixteen, 1966). The original Certificate of Registration gives the date of publication as March 20, 1946, six months after the composer’s death. This is prima facie proof of the facts. Gerlach-Barklow Co. v. Morris & Bendien, 23 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1927); Freudenthal v. Hebrew Publishing Co., 44 F.Supp. 754 (S.D.N.Y.1942). This proof has not been rebutted.

In the final analysis, my objection to what this Court does today can best be summarized by the following admonition of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Addison v. Holly Hill Co., 322 U.S. 607, 618, 64 S.Ct. 1215, 1221, 88 L.Ed. 1488 (1944):

“While the judicial function in construing legislation is not a mechanical process from which judgment is excluded, it is nevertheless very different from the legislative function. Construction is not legislation and must avoid ‘that retrospective expansion of meaning which properly deserves the stigma of judicial legislation.’ Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 522 [62 S.Ct. 1116, 1119, 86 L.Ed. 1638]. To blur the distinctive functions of the legislative and judicial processes is not conducive to responsible legislation.”

My brothers are creating a definition of “posthumous works” which appears nowhere in the legislation or the legislative history; which is completely at odds with long-standing and accepted usage; which is contrary to the definition accepted by the Copyright Office and most authorities in the copyright field; and which is not unanimously recommended by those who seek change.7 This is not the proper role of the judiciary.

I have no quarrel with my brothers’ good intentions but question the philosophy which underlies them. I am not convinced, for example, that the dis*954traught widow of an author or composer is more capable than he to negotiate with a publisher for the sale and assignment of renewal rights. Giving full recognition to the increased worldliness of what was once described as the “weaker sex”, it can hardly be seriously contended that a widow is in as good a position to evaluate the merits of a musical composition as was her husband who composed it. Neither does she have as complete and accurate knowledge of the music publishing field.8

Of course, a widow can wait for twenty-eight years before assigning her right to renew. But will she? She, like her deceased husband, must put groceries on the table today. Insofar as the composer is concerned, the decision of my brothers reduces the value of what he has to sell at the time when he probably is most in need.9

I see no compelling reasons why the resolution of these differences cannot await the considered judgment of the Congress which has been working on a revision of the 1909 Copyright Act for a number of years. Justice would then be accorded to Mrs. Bartók, and her husband’s wishes would be fulfilled. In short, if I may again quote Mr. Justice Frankfurter, this time from his opinion in Fisher Co. v. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 657, 63 S.Ct. 773, 779, 87 L.Ed. 1055 (1943):

“It is not for courts to judge whether the interests of authors clearly lie upon one side of this question rather than the other. If an author cannot make an effective assignment of his renewal, it may be worthless to him when he is most in need. Nobody would pay an author for something he cannot sell. We cannot draw a principle of law from the familiar stories of garret-poverty of some men of literary genius. Even if we could do so, we cannot say that such men would regard with favor a rule of law preventing them from realizing on their assets when they are most in need of funds. Nor can we be unmindful of the fact that authors have themselves devised means of safeguarding their interests. We do not have such assured knowledge about authorship, and particularly about song writing, or the psychology of gifted writers and composers, as to justify us as judges in importing into Congressional legislation a denial to authors of the freedom to dispose of their property possessed by others. While authors may have habits making for intermittent want, they may have no less a spirit of independence which would resent treatment of them as wards under guardianship of the law.”

I believe Judge Owen’s decision was correct, and I would affirm.