Former husband appeals from a final order awarding attorney’s fees to the former wife in a post-dissolution enforcement action. We affirm.
The trial court properly ratified the general master’s finding that the former husband was vexatiously litigious, as there is competent substantial evidence to support the finding. See Moncrief v. Hall, 63 So.2d 640 (Fla.1953) (“It has long been the law in Florida that a trial judge may not reject a master’s findings of fact unless the court concludes that the findings of fact are clearly erroneous.”).
Furthermore, the trial court properly rejected the master’s recommendation to reduce the fee award by fifty percent. The master cited no legal basis for the reduction, despite having made specific findings that the former wife was entitled to a fee award1 and that her claimed fees were reasonable. See Schafroth v. Schafroth, 610 So .2d 649 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (holding that “the master’s determination—unlike a finding of fact on disputed evidence—did not bind the trial court, which was, to the contrary, required to set it aside.”); see also Mounce v. Mounce, 459 So.2d 437 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).
Finally, the former husband has failed to preserve for review his claim that there was an unreasonable delay between the initial hearing and entry of the final order. See Ascontec Consulting, Inc. v. Young and Young Investments, Inc., 714 So.2d 585, 587 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998); Reis v. Reis, 739 So.2d 704, 705 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). Accordingly, the order is
AFFIRMED.