This is an appeal from an order of the circuit court, granting summary judgment for summary possession to plaintiff-appellee City and County of Honolulu (hereinafter appellee) against defendant-tenant-appellants Kamakichi Toyama, dba K. T. Poolroom, Fusako Chinen, dba New Kukui Cafe, Bacilio Balalong, Margaret Balalong, Hilario Gungab, Magdalena Gungab, Victorino Nabora, Marina Nabora, Rufino Ramos, Sotera Ramos, Mariano Tarampi, Rita Tarampi, Arnold Ramos, Luis Mendoza, Ricarte Vidad, and Estanislao Balais (hereinafter appellants).
In the court below appellee brought an action for summary possession against appellant Estanislao Balais and a separate action for summary possession against all the other appellants. These actions were consolidated.
After a hearing, the trial court granted appellee’s motion for summary judgment. The writ of possession issued by the trial court was stayed pending appeal to this court. We reverse.
ISSUES
I. Whether appellants received timely notice under HRS § 521-71(a)(1976).
II. Whether adequate relocation assistance was offered to appellants.
III. Whether appellees’ failure to give appellants notice *158and a hearing regarding demolition of the buildings was in violation of due process.
Under H.R.C.P., Rule 56(c), a summary judgment will be sustained only if the record1 shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hunt v. Chang, 60 Haw. 608, 618, 594 P.2d 118, 124 (1979); Gealon v. Keala, 60 Haw. 513, 518, 591 P.2d 621, 625 (1979). Inferences to be drawn from the record must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Hunt v. Chang, supra, 60 Haw. at 618, 594 P.2d at 124; Hokama v. Relinc Corp., 57 Haw. 470, 472, 559 P.2d 279, 281 (1977).
For purposes of ruling on a summary judgment a fact is material if proof of that fact would have the effect of establishing or refuting one of the essential elements of a’ cause of action or defense asserted by the parties. Hunt v. Chang, *159supra, 60 Haw. at 618, 594 P.2d at 124. See Richards v. Midkiff, 48 Haw. 32, 39, 396 P.2d 49, 54 (1964).
I. WHETHER APPELLANTS RECEIVED TIMELY NOTICE UNDER HRS § 521-71(a) (1976).
Appellants contend that appellee failed to comply with the notice requirements of HRS § 521-71(a) (1976) and of the regulations2 promulgated under the federal Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970.3
Initially, we conclude that the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act is not within our purview, as it was not introduced in evidence. HRS § 662-13(a) (1976).4
HRS § 521-71(a) (1976)5 provides:
(a) When the tenancy is month to month, the landlord or the tenant may terminate the rental agreement upon his notifying the other at least twenty-eight days in ad*160vanee of the anticipated termination or in cases of voluntary demolition of the dwelling units, ninety days in advance of the anticipated demolition. If notice is revoked or amended and re-issued, the ninety day period shall begin from the date it was re-issued or amended.
Appellants contend that appellee was required to give notice “ninety days in advance of the anticipated demolition” because this is a case of “voluntary demolition” under HRS § 521-71(a) (1976).
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (unabridged, 1967) defines “voluntary”, in part, as follows:
1. a: proceeding from the will; produced in or by an act of choice . . .; b: performed ... of one’s own free will . . .; e: acting of oneself: not constrained, impelled, or influenced by another . . .; g: acting or done without any present legal obligation to do the thing done or any such obligation that can accrue from the existing state of affairs.
It is undisputed that on September 26, 1975, the City Building Department sent notices to correct to the City Department of Housing and Community Development (DHCD) regarding the buildings at 139-143 North Beretania Street, 155 North Beretania Street, and 1189 River Street, stating that inspectors from the City Building Department had inspected the buildings and
found substandard condition(s). . . which endangers life, limb, health, property, safety or welfare of the public or the occupants of the building.
The notice to correct regarding the building at 139-143 North Beretania Street stated:
Please take the necessary step(s) within 48 hours to correct the deficient conditions) and to complete such repairs within 90 days. (Emphasis added.)
However, the DHCD decided to demolish the structure instead of making the necessary repairs to the building. The notices to correct regarding the buildings at 155 North Beretania Street and 1189 River Street stated:
Please take the necessary steps within 48 hours to demolish and remove the structure and complete all such *161demolition work within 90 days from receipt of this notice. (Emphasis added.)
In regard to the buildings at 139-143 North Beretania Street, this is a case of “voluntary demolition. ” Although the City Building Department’s notice to correct directed only that the DHCD make repairs “to correct the deficient condition^), ” the DHCD chose to demolish the building.
Notwithstanding the fact that the City Building Department’s respective notices to correct directed the DHCD to demolish the buildings at 155 North Beretania Street and 1189 River Street, the decision to demolish these buddings was also voluntary. Appellee’s Building Department and appellee’s Department of Housing and Community Development are both departments of the executive branch of appellee and are both supervised by appellee’s managing director. Charter of the City and County of Honolulu, art. VI, §§ 4-102, 6-102 (1973). The different departments do not constitute legal entities which are separate and apart from appellee.
Since, as to all the buildings herein, this is a case of “voluntary demolition,” appellee was required under HRS § 521-71(a)(1976) to notify all of the appellants “ninety days in advance of the anticipated demolition.” There is no dispute that on September 30, 1975, DHCD sent each of the appellants a notice to vacate and that all of the appellants received the notice between October 1 and 7, 1975. It is also undisputed that on October 29 or 30, 1975, DHCD personally served all of the appellants except appellant Balais with notices to vacate. The record does not disclose the date of the “anticipated demolition.”
In our opinion, since the record does not show that the appellants received notice “ninety days in advance of the anticipated demolition,” the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. The action filed by appellee should have been dismissed. Assuming, arguendo, that appellants had received timely and proper notice, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment without first resolving the issues of the adequacy of relocation assistance and appellants’ right to notice and a hearing regarding demolition of the buildings.
*162II. WHETHER APPELLANTS RECEIVED ADEQUATE RELOCATION ASSISTANCE.
Appellants in their arguments rely upon the federal Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 1894, 42 U.S.C. § 4601 et seq., and upon the State Assistance to Displaced Persons Act, HRS § 111-1 et seq. (1976).
As we have stated heretofore, we will not consider the federal act on this appeal since it was not introduced in evidence pursuant to HRS § 622-13(a) (1976).
Appellants contend that appellants are “displaced persons” as defined in HRS § 111-2 and therefore have rights to adequate relocation assistance, that state relocation assistance laws require the City to provide appellants with adequate relocation assistance prior to eviction, and that the DHCD’s relocation housing referrals failed to satisfy the statutory requirements.
The State Assistance to Displaced Persons Act, HRS Ch. Ill (1976) (hereinafter Act), provides that a state agency must offer relocation assistance to persons it displaces. In Lau v. Bautista, (No. 6298), decided today, we construed the Act to require that adequate relocation assistance be offered to displaced persons prior to eviction.
There is no doubt that all of the appellants are “displaced persons” as defined in HRS § 111-2 (1976).6 The appellants are all “persons” as defined in § 111-2 (1976). The City *163Building Department and City Department of Housing and Community Development are “state agencies” as defined in HRS § 111-2 (1976). The City Building Department sent notices to correct to the DHCD, citing “substandard conditions’ ’ and directing the DHCD to demolish two of the subject buildings and to make repairs to the third subject building. In regard to the third structure, the DHCD unilaterally chose to demolish the building. The actions of the City Building Department and the DHCD constitute “a governmental program of. . . code enforcement activities.” The appellants are thus “persons who are required to move from . . . real property after June 25, 1970 ... as a result of ... a governmental program of . . . code enforcement activities.”
Since the appellants are “displaced persons,” the appellee is required to offer relocation assistance to them prior to eviction. The trial court herein erred in granting summary judgment without first determining the adequacy of relocation assistance offered by the appellee to the appellants.7
*164III. WHETHER APPELLEES’ FAILURE TO GIVE APPELLANTS NOTICE AND A HEARING REGARDING DEMOLITION OF THE BUILDINGS WAS IN VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS.
It is undisputed that the City Building Department’s Housing Board of Appeals did not give notice or hold any hearing about building conditions at 139-143 and 155 North Beretania Street and 1189 River Street.
Appellants contend that appellee’s failure to provide them with notice and a hearing regarding demolition of the subject buildings was in violation of their rights to procedural due process under the United States and State Constitutions, as well as under HRS § 53-60 (1976) and the Revised Ordinances of Honolulu (ROH) § 25-9.2 (1975 Cum. Supp.).
HRS § 53-60(a) (1976) provides that a county may cause the “repair, closing or demolition, or removal” of dwellings which are unfit for human habitation. HRS § 53-60(bX2) and (b)(3)8 require that a board of appeals created by the county *165hold a hearing on the dwelling’s fitness for human habitation, that a complaint containing notice of the hearing be served upon “all parties in interest in the dwelling (including persons in possession)”, and that the parties in interest be given a right to file an answer to the complaint and to appear at the hearing.
ROH § 25-9.2(a)(1975 Cum. Supp.)9 provides that when it appears to a building official, upon preliminary investigation, that a building is substandard, the official shall issue a complaint with notice of the charges to “every party in interest, including persons in possession. ”10 ROH § 25-9.2(c) provides *166that after service of the complaint, a hearing shall be held before the Housing Board of Appeals, which may order the building to be “vacated and repaired or rehabilitated” or “demolished and removed.”11
Appellee contends that HRS § 53-60 (1976) and ROH § 25-9.2 (1975 Cum. Supp.) are inapplicable because HRS § 111-10 (1976)12 mandates the supremacy of the federal regulations as contained in the HUD Relocation Handbook. The federal regulations are not within our purview, as they were not introduced in evidence pursuant to HRS § 622-13 (1976).
We conclude that appellants were entitled to notice and a hearing under HRS § 53-60 (1976) and ROH § 25-9.2 (1975 Cum. Supp.). The City Building Department’s notices to correct indicate that it found the buildings to be substan*167dard.13 Appellants, as “persons in possession” are “parties in interest” under both the statute and the ordinance. The appellants’ due process rights were violated herein.
Lowell Chun-Hoon (King, Nakamura, Nakamura and Takahashi of counsel; Wayson Chow and Leanor Tamoria on the briefs) for defendants-appellants.
Edmund L. Lee, Jr., Deputy Corporation Counsel, for plaintiff-appellee.