MEMORANDUM**
James Ermovick appeals the district court’s judgment in favor of Mitchell, Silberberg and Knupp LLP Long Term Disability Plan (“the Plan”) upholding the denial of long term disability benefits to Ermovick. We reverse and remand.
While Mitchell, Silberberg and Knupp LLP was the designated plan administrator, Prudential Insurance Company of America insured the Plan’s benefits and performed the day-to-day administration of the Plan. It was Prudential that reviewed Ermovick’s claim and ultimately denied long term disability benefits roughly seven months after first granting them.
It is agreed by the parties that the district court was required to conduct de novo review of Prudential’s decision. The district court declared it was doing so, but went on to explain that it would review Prudential’s decision to see if it was clearly erroneous. The court described that standard as “significantly deferential” and indicated that it “must support” Prudential’s decision if reasonable minds could differ. That construction of the standard was plainly wrong, obnebulated the whole process, and failed to constitute “an independent and thorough inspection of [the] administrator’s decision.” Silver v. Executive Car Leasing Long-Term Disability Plan, 466 F.3d 727, 733 (9th Cir.2006). The district court must “[fully] exercise [its] informed and independent judgment.” Mongeluzo v. Baxter Travenol Long Term Disability Benefit Plan, 46 F.3d 938, 943 (9th Cir.1995). Its failure to do so fatally undermines the district court’s findings and conclusions,1 and requires reversal.2
*624Thus, we remand so that the district court can in the first instance properly review the evidence using a proper standard of review. That is a function that is “ordinarily committed ... to trial courts, not appellate courts.” Kearney v. Standard Ins. Co., 175 F.3d 1084, 1095 n. 5 (9th Cir.1999) (en banc).
REVERSED and REMANDED.