Appellant issued its policy of insurance to cover compensation of employees of the respondent, Ben C. Gauthier, Jr., specifically in his hotel opefations and other operations incident thereto. The insured later engaged in logging operations, and it was while employed in such logging operations that respondent Charles Doud, an employee of the insured, was injured and became entitled thereby to compensation from the insured.
The áppellant raised the objection before the commission and the court below that the policy did not cover logging operations, and that on the issue thus presented the Industrial Commission did not have jurisdiction to hear and determine the same.
The Industrial Commission is given jurisdiction by sec. 102.17, Stats., to hear all disputes or controversies affecting compensation, and by sec. 102.18 to make its finding and award. But appellant claims that the commission had no jurisdiction to construe the policy and determine that the company had in law insured the risk. Its position is erroneous. Every board, commission, or body having a right to hear' and determine a controversy must in the first instance determine its jurisdiction — its right'to proceed. This rule is elementary. If it errs in assuming jurisdiction, the aggrieved party may have a review by certiorari in the absence of a statute giving some other due process. Borgnis v. Falk Co. 147 Wis. 327, 359, 133 N. W. 209. The commission decided it had jurisdiction to determine compensation and, necessarily, had to determine proper parties to the award in the first instance. The appellant Sought review pursuant to *239the compensation act, and is bound by the forum it selected, assuming it had a remedy by certiorari.
Jurisdiction is determined as a matter of law. The statute furnishes the same remedy in this respect as certiorari.-The circuit court reviewed the question of jurisdiction of the commission, and sustained it. From that decision the appellant has a right of appeal to this court and to be here heard in review of the judgment of the circuit court. This is due process as to the appellant, which brought itself under the act by issuing its policy.
The statutes applicable are printed in the margin.1 It will *240be seen: 1. The employer was required to carry insurance under the compensation act. Sec. 102.28 (2). This compulsory' insurance is required as a part of the state’s public policy to protect the injured workmen against insolvency of their employers. 2. The insurance company consents to be bound by the compensation act when it writes insurance pursuant thereto. Sec. 102.31. 3. As a further public policy to protect the injured workmen, the statute requires every policy so issued to cover all liability of the assured under compensation. Sec. 102.31. 4. In any dispute or controversy before the commission as to compensation, the insurance carrier is made a party. Sec. 102.17 (1). S. The employee entitled to compensation has the right to recover in his own name in the manner provided in the act the liability of any insurance company which may have insured the *241liability for such compensation. The statutes plainly fix the liability of the insurance carrier beyond a doubt. They were enacted as an amendment to the original act obviously pursuant to a sound public policy. It was essential to prevent just such limitations and uncertainties as here attempted to be written into the policy. ' The insurance carriers are amply protected by their audit of the pay-rolls, the premiums being based thereon, and rates fixed based on the various occupations according to hazard.
By the Court. — The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.