The appeal of defendants, Wayne Marvin Gordon and John Joseph McMahon, Jr., was heard on oral argument. They both challenge their conviction for conspiracy to possess marihuana and possession of marihuana with intent to distribute alleging error in the denial of their motion to suppress on the grounds that their stop by border patrol agents and the subsequent search that occurred was without probable cause and, therefore, illegal. The defendant McMahon further challenged his conviction on the basis that he was only a passenger in the vehicle that was carrying marihuana and that there was no proof that he had any connection with it. We decide only the appeal of the defendant McMahon, and we do not reach the question of the legality of the stop and search because we can dispose of his appeal on the basis that as a passenger the government failed to prove that he had any dominion or control over the marihuana found.1 Defendant was riding in the passenger seat of a truck when two border patrol agents stopped the truck and, in the ensuing search, discovered over sixty pounds of marihuana. The truck had triggered a sensor device which was placed on the road in order to alert the border patrol to the movement of illegal aliens. The stop occurred approximately 20 miles from the Texas border with Mexico.
Since McMahon was not driving the vehicle when it was stopped, we must first determine whether there is sufficient evidence to connect McMahon to the contraband found in the truck. In United States v. Ferg, 504 F.2d 914 (5th Cir.1974), this Court discussed the proof which must be supplied in cases of this nature.
Constructive as well as actual possession of contraband will sustain a conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). United States v. Hernandez, 484 F.2d 86, 87 (5th *217Cir.1973). Possession may be joint among various defendants, and such possession may be established by circumstantial evidence. United States v. Stephenson, 474 F.2d 1353, 1355 (5th Cir.1973);. United States v. Mendoza, 433 F.2d 891, 896 (5th Cir.1970); Montoya v. United States, 402 F.2d 847, 850 (5th Cir.1968). In order to establish constructive possession, the government must produce evidence showing ownership, dominion, or control over the contraband itself or the premises or vehicle in which the contraband is concealed. United States v. Martin, 483 F.2d 974 (5th Cir.1974); Garza v. United States, 385 F.2d 899 (5th Cir. 1967); Smith v. United States, 385 F.2d 34 (5th Cir.1967). In other words, there must be some nexus between the accused and the prohibited substance. Proof of physical proximity to controlled drugs is not sufficient to establish either actual or constructive possession. As this court has consistently observed, “mere presence in the area where the narcotic is discovered or mere association with the person who does control the drug or the property where it is located, is insufficient to support a finding of possession.” United States v. Stephenson, 474 F.2d 1353, 1355 (5th Cir.1973).
504 F.2d at 916-17 (emphasis added).
After carefully reading the record, we find that the government presented no evidence to demonstrate McMahon’s connection with the contraband, save the testimony that, upon request, McMahon looked for a screwdriver and then volunteered to assist the agent in taking the screws off the boxes found in a hidden compartment.2 The only other testimony of the agent that related to McMahon concerned the fact that he listened to a football game on the radio while the agents were questioning Gordon. Record on Appeal, vol. 3 at 21-22.
The facts of this case are very similar to those in Ferg, cited above. In that case, there was nothing beyond the fact that the defendant was travelling in the same car with a drug smuggler to indicate guilt. The same is true here.3 In both cases, the driver of the car made no reference to the defendant’s participation in any smuggling activity. We are unable to find any evidence, beyond McMahon’s “mere presence” in the truck, to indicate that he had maintained control over the contraband, had any intention of participating in the distribution of the contraband, or had any knowledge of it whatsoever. To affirm defendant’s conviction would be to countenance a conviction based on guilt by association. We must, therefore, reverse the judgment of conviction and remand the case to the district court with direction to vacate the judgment of conviction and enter a judgment of acquittal.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.