OPINION OF THE COURT
Angel Pinet, a federal prisoner, appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denying his habeas corpus petition. We will summarily affirm because Pinet’s appeal presents no substantial question. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4 and 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
Pinet alleged that he was denied due process during prison disciplinary proceedings. A hearing officer found that Pinet fought with his cellmate, and he was punished by the loss of twenty-seven days of good conduct time and other privileges. He appealed the decision, without success, to the appropriate Regional Director and the General Counsel of the Bureau of Prisons, as required by 28 C.F.R. §§ 541.19 and 542.15. Thereafter, Pinet filed a habe-as petition and traverse under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in which he made twelve claims of error.1 The District Court found that all but two of the claims were procedurally defaulted because Pinet failed to raise some of the claims in his administrative appeals and failed to present other claims at both levels of administrative review. The court gave Pinet an opportunity to try to establish cause and prejudice for the defaulted claims. The court also ordered the government to explain the specific security concerns that made it deny Pinet’s request to view a videotape described in the incident report that the hearing officer *171relied upon in finding Pinet guilty of fighting with his cellmate.
After considering both parties’ responses to the order, the District Court found that Pinet had failed to show cause and prejudice to excuse the default of most of his claims. The District Court also concluded that there was no merit to his remaining claims that his rights were violated when the hearing officer refused to view the videotape and when he was denied an examination by a doctor to determine whether his injuries were from a fight or a cold sore.2 The Government demonstrated that there was a legitimate security reason for the refusal to use the videotape at the hearing (i.e., the tape would show the locations of hidden cameras and allow inmates to figure out where there were blind spots in coverage) and the injury assessment form showed that Pinet was examined by medical staff who would have had the expertise to accurately assess his condition. Accordingly, the District Court denied the petition.
We have jurisdiction over Pinet’s appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. Ruggiano v. Reish, 307 F.3d 121, 126 (3d Cir.2002). As an initial matter, we agree with the conclusion that most of Pinet’s claims are procedurally defaulted and that he failed to establish cause and prejudice to excuse the default. In general, inmates must exhaust administrative remedies before proceeding on a habeas petition brought under § 2241. Moscato v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 760 (3d Cir.1996). If a petitioner fails to exhaust his administrative remedies and the administrative process is no longer available to him, procedural default bars review of his claims unless he can show cause and prejudice. Id. at 761. Pinet raised several claims for the first time in his habeas petition, making no attempt at exhaustion, and failed to present others at every level of the administrative process. His bare assertion that he is innocent of fighting with his cellmate is insufficient to excuse the default of these claims,3 as is his alleged mistaken assumption that the injury assessment form did not document a medical examination, an assumption that is belied by other documents in the record, as explained in the District Court’s opinion.
Turning to the claim regarding the videotape, we agree with the District Court’s analysis. Although due process in this context requires that an inmate have an opportunity to present evidence, that right may trumped by a legitimate security concern, such as the one presented in this *172case. See Young v. Kami, 926 F.2d 1396, 1401-02 (3d Cir.1991). Pinet’s claim that his rights were violated when he was not examined by a physician to determine whether he had a cold sore or a laceration from a fight is essentially a challenge to the injury assessment form relied upon by the hearing officer. Pinet was examined by health services staff after the incident and the District Court did not err when it concluded that such personnel have the expertise to distinguish between cold sores and lacerations. Indeed, the assessment form supports the court’s conclusion, as staff noted both a laceration inside Pinet’s lip and a cold sore outside it.
In conclusion, a prison disciplinary determination comports with due process if it is based on some evidence. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-56, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985). Even setting aside the evidence Pinet has unsuccessfully challenged, which we need not do, other evidence adequately supports the hearing officer’s decision, including the assessment form documenting injuries to Pinet’s cellmate and photographs of the two inmates after the incident.
Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the order of the District Court denying Pinet’s habeas petition.