OPINION *
Monica Griffin and her two adult children appeal from the order of the District Court denying their motion for summary judgment and entering summary judgment in favor of the defendants. We will affirm.
*183i.
Griffin and her adult children assert the same claims, so will refer only to Griffin’s claims for ease of reference. Griffin filed an Amended Complaint against the Berks County Housing Authority and four individual defendants raising claims of racial discrimination arising from her participation in the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program. In particular, Griffin claimed that defendants discriminated against her on the basis of her African-American race by not: (1) re-inspecting her apartment after it failed an annual review; (2) accounting for a reduction in child support payments in calculating Griffin’s rent; and (3) providing a proper “utility reimbursement allowance.” She asserted her claims against all defendants under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) and her claims against the Housing Authority under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 Following discovery, all parties filed motions for summary judgment. The District Court denied Griffin’s motion but granted those of the defendants and entered summary judgment in their favor. Griffin appeals.3
We will affirm for the reasons thoroughly explained by the District Court. The District Court properly concluded that Griffin’s claims are governed by the familiar burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Chauhan v. M. Alfieri Co., 897 F.2d 123, 126-27 (3d Cir.1990) (FHA); Hankins v. Temple Univ. (Health Scis. Ctr.), 829 F.2d 437, 440 (3d Cir.1987) (Title VI). The District Court further properly concluded that Griffin did not make out a prima case of discrimination because she did not present any evidence raising a reasonable inference that defendants discriminated against her on the basis of her race.
Griffin argues on appeal in conclusory fashion that she established a prima facie case but that the District Court did not consider the evidence as a whole and denied her due process. Griffin, however, does not acknowledge the substance of the District Court’s reasoning or identify any evidence of record calling it into question. In fact, Griffin does not cite or refer to any evidence in the summary judgment record at all. We nevertheless have reviewed the record and agree with the District Court that Griffin presented no evidence raising a reasonable inference of discrimination.4
*184Griffin raises four other arguments that we will briefly address. First, she asserts that the standard for establishing a prima facie case under the FHA and Title VI “should be more relaxed.” Griffin raises no specific argument in that regard, however, and the District Court properly concluded that she failed to make out a prima facie case under the applicable standard even giving her pro se filings the liberal construction they were due.
Second, Griffin asserts that the District Court should have applied two decisions, which appear to be Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Township of Mount Holly, 658 F.3d 375 (3d Cir.2011), and Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir.2010). She does not argue how these decisions apply to her claims, however, and they do not. Both cases hold that a plaintiff can make out a prima facie case of disparate impact under the FHA by relying on statistical evidence. See Mount Holly Gardens, 658 F.3d at 382-83; Gallagher, 619 F.3d at 836. No such evidence is at issue here, and the District Court’s analysis is not otherwise inconsistent with these decisions.
Third, Griffin argues that counsel for the defendants committed misconduct during discovery. The only specific discovery she claims she did not receive were filter-rogatory responses from defendant Deidre Durham. Griffin, however, did not raise this issue in the District Court in a way that might have permitted its resolution. She mentioned the issue in a footnote in her brief in opposition to summary judgment, but she did not file another motion to compel this discovery after the District Court ordered defendants to provide it. (ECF No. 70.) She also did not file a motion for additional discovery under Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(d) and did not argue how, or even that, the allegedly outstanding discovery rendered summary judgment premature. Nor has she raised any such, argument on appeal. Griffin’s remaining arguments regarding discovery do not state a basis to disturb the District Court’s ruling.5
Finally, Griffin asserts that all defendants “admitted” in their answers and affirmative defenses that they discriminated against her. She does not explain how, and our review of the record reveals no such admissions.
III.
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.