The state appeals from an order that dismissed a charge of misdemeanor driving while suspended (DWS). ORS 487.560 (1),(5). The trial court held that, under State v. Tooley, 297 Or 602, 687 P2d 1068 (1984), due process requires that there be an opportunity for a hearing before a license suspension, and, because defendant did not have such an opportunity, dismissed the charge. On appeal, the state argues that it was error to dismiss, because State v. Tooley, supra, is based on statutory grounds inapplicable here, and because MVD’s order of suspension otherwise complies with due process. We agree and reverse.
On April 24, 1984, the Motor Vehicles Division (MVD) issued an “Order of Suspension” notifying defendant that his operator’s license “is suspended effective” May 15, 1984. The order provided that the license was suspended, pursuant to ORS 482.440 and ORS 484.415(1),(2) for “Failure to Comply.”1 It also provided that the suspension would go *160into effect in 20 days unless defendant obtained, and MVD received, within that time a “Notice of Clearance” from the District Court of Josephine County. The order included the court docket numbers which were apparently relevant to the failure to comply charge. The suspension order took effect, and on May 29 defendant was cited for DWS.2 Thereafter, the court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss.
There is disagreement about whether Tooley is based on statutory or constitutional grounds. The defendant there was convicted of a misdemeanor involving the use of a motor vehicle. MVD erroneously recorded the conviction as a felony. On the basis of the erroneous felony notation, MVD sent a notice of license revocation,3 citing ORS 482.430(1)(c) and 486.211(3)(c). The notice stated that revocation would become effective five days from the date of the mailing of the notice, that defendant had 20 days from the date of mailing to request a hearing to challenge the revocation and that, once the revocation became effective, a fee was required for reinstatement. Finally, the notice warned: “Do not drive until you have been advised by the Division that you have been reinstated.” The defendant did not request a hearing. He later was convicted of driving while revoked.
The Supreme Court reversed, because MVD’s notice of revocation contained insufficient information about the defendant’s “right to a pre-revocation hearing on the matter” and “incorrectly communicated that the revocation went into effect regardless of defendant’s request for a hearing and remained in effect unless and until defendant prevailed.” 297 Or at 609. The court stated: “[Licensees are entitled by *161statute to notice and an opportunity for hearing. ORS 486.221.[4] The notice requirement is designed to apprise the licensee of the Division’s action and of the means to contest the action before the revocation goes into effect.” 297 Or at 606.
Tooley reviewed the history of ORS 486.221. As originally enacted in 1971, the first sentence stated, in pertinent part, “ [WJhenever the division suspends or revokes the license * * * for any reason set forth in ORS 486.211, the division shall immediately notify the licensee * * * and afford him an opportunity of a hearing * * In 1977, “whenever” was changed to “before” as it now appears:
“(1) Before the division suspends or revokes the license of any person * * * for any reason set forth in ORS 486.211 or 486.251, the division shall notify the licensee * * * and afford the person an opportunity of a hearing * * (Emphasis added.)
MVD “is required to provide notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior to revoking or suspending a license for the reasons set forth in ORS 486.211.” 297 Or at 608. (Emphasis in original.)
Tooley observed that the 1977 amendment was intended to make the statute consistent with Bell v. Burson, 402 US 535, 91 S Ct 1586, 29 L Ed 2d 90 (1971), and Floyd v. Motor Vehicles Division, 27 Or App 41, 554 P2d 1024, rev den (1976). Those cases hold that due process requires notice of an opportunity for a hearing before revocation of a driver’s license. The original opinion in Tooley concluded the discussion of ORS 486.221(1) by stating that “ORS 486.221 codifies this constitutional requirement.” 297 Or at 608. That sentence permitted the inference, not only that the statute’s *162notice provision was initially enacted to comply with the federal constitution, but that it also continues to embody a due process requirement. The court later changed that sentence to read: “ORS 486.221 codified this constitutional requirement as the legislature perceived the due process requirement to be at the time.”
After re-examining Dixon v. Love, 431 US 105, 97 S Ct 1723, 52 L Ed 2d 172 (1977) and Mackey v. Montrym, 433 US 1, 99 S Ct 2612, 61 L Ed 2d 321 (1979),5 we conclude that the United States Supreme Court has substantially limited Bell and that a predeprivation hearing is not required before mandatory revocations or suspensions for public safety reasons. Because Tooley’s revocation was a mandatory revocation for public safety reasons,6 the Due Process Clause did not entitle him to a pre-deprivation hearing. He was only entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing by virtue of ORS 486.221. For this reason, we think that the correction in the Tooley opinion reflected the court’s recognition that, in the case of mandatory suspensions or revocations for public safety reasons, ORS 486.221 grants more protection to a licensee, where it applies, than does the Due Process Clause.7 In sum, we believe that Tooley, as modified, held that if MVD fails to notify a licensee *163accurately of his statutory right to a hearing, suspension based on that notice cannot support a DWS or DWR conviction.
We turn to the issues in this case. The first is whether MVD failed to inform defendant accurately of a statutory right to a hearing. We conclude that it did not. MVD suspended defendant’s license for failure to comply, pursuant to ORS 482.440 and 484.415(1),(2). Defendant concedes in his brief that MVD was not required, by those statutes or any other, to give him a presuspension hearing.8 Thus, State v. Tooley, supra, is inapplicable.
The remaining question is whether defendant was denied due process. Because the Oregon Constitution has no due process clause, defendant’s claim that he is entitled to certain constitutional procedural protections arises under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., State v. Stroup, 290 Or 185, 200, 620 P2d 1359 (1980). It is undisputed that a driver’s license is an interest protected by the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Mackey v. Montrym, supra, 443 US at 10 n 7; Boykin v. Ott, 10 Or App 210, 222, 498 P2d 815, rev den (1972). It is also clear that defendant was entitled to some kind of predeprivation opportunity to be heard. The Mackey and Dixon rule, that a hearing is not required before mandatory suspensions for public safety reasons, does not apply when the legislature gives the court discretion to suspend. Because the suspension here was discretionary, see ORS 484.415(1),(2), defendant was entitled to a predeprivation opportunity to be heard. Bell v. Burson, supra. The issue is whether the opportunity he received is sufficient under the Due Process Clause.
The question of what process is due is determined by balancing the factors set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 US 319, 335, 96 S Ct 893, 47 L Ed 2d 18 (1976): (1) the nature of the private interest affected, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedure used together with the probable value, if any, of other safeguards; and, (3) the governmental interest involved.
The state concedes that the driving privilege is a *164significant private interest. However, the state argues, and we agree, that the procedure used creates little risk of erroneous deprivation because a court’s order of suspension is a reasonably reliable basis for a suspension and because, even if a mistake occurred, the MVD notice provided a procedure for correcting it. Although the trial judge noted that mistakes were “not unheard of or even rare,” we do not think that an occasional mistake makes a court order9 an unreliable basis for an MVD suspension. Moreover, the notice sent to defendant stated that the suspension would not go into effect if he obtained a clearance from the district court within 20 days. The notice identified the court docket numbers relevant to the failure to comply charge. If a mistake had been made, defendant had ample time and information to go to the court, point out the error and obtain a clearance.
The third factor is the value, if any, of other safeguards. Defendant argues that he was entitled to the additional safeguard of a contested case hearing under the Oregon Administrative Procedures Act.10 He argues that a presuspension contested case hearing would have resolved the factual issues regarding what fines were outstanding, would have been a mechanism for detecting any clerical errors and would have allowed defendant to raise any legitimate excuse, such as financial hardship, for non-payment. Even assuming that MVD has the authority to resolve all those issues, we do not believe that such a hearing would have any value. Defendant could just as easily have resolved those issues by applying to the district court for a clearance.
The final factor is the governmental interest involved. “Governmental interest” for due process purposes includes “the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, 424 US at 335. A contested case hearing would impose a significant financial and administrative burden on the state, which cannot be justified given *165that an inexpensive, satisfactory procedure was available to defendant. He was not denied due process.
Reversed and remanded for trial.