delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the extent of an interstate carrier’s liability for a passenger’s baggage loss. On October 5, 1949, Mrs. Nothnagle, respondent here, purchased a railway ticket from petitioner in Meriden, Connecticut, for a journey to Fall River, Massachusetts, via New Haven, Connecticut. She boarded a train in Meriden at 11:19 a. m. and arrived shortly after 11:30 a. m. in New Haven where she alighted for transfer to another train. On the station platform her suitcase was solicited by a redcap employee of petitioner, and she handed it to him with orders to return it at the Fall River train departing at 12:40 p. m. No baggage check was given; no money was paid. The suitcase vanished, and respondent sued. At trial in the Meriden City Court the parties stipulated that the baggage and contents actually worth $615 were lost due to petitioner’s negligence. Petitioner insisted, however, that its liability as an interstate carrier was governed by a tariff schedule filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission which limited a recovery for baggage loss to $25 unless the passenger had in writing declared a higher valuation.
The state courts granted full recovery to respondent. The trial court found that although respondent had not declared a greater value, she had neither actual knowledge *130of petitioner’s asserted restriction nor was notified of its existence by a legend on a baggage receipt or posted signs. In any event, the court concluded, petitioner had accepted the baggage only “for safe-keeping and not for transportation,” so that the parties’ rights were determinable by Connecticut principles of bailments rather than any rule of federal law.1 The Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors affirmed, viewing respondent’s journey from Meriden to Fall River as not “continuous,” and “suspended for a substantial time in New Haven” to be resumed only when she boarded the Fall River train.2 Accordingly, that court deemed the case governed by Connecticut law under which petitioner was held liable for $615.3 Petitioner claims that this decision impairs federal rights secured by the Interstate Commerce Act, and we granted certiorari to examine the scope of that statutory protection. 345 U. S. 903.
We have little doubt that the transaction was incident to an interstate journey within the ambit of the Interstate Commerce Act. Neither continuity of interstate movement nor isolated segments of the trip can be decisive. “The actual facts govern. For this purpose, the destination intended by the passenger when he begins his journey and known to the carrier, determines the character of the commerce.” Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U. S. 163, 168 (1928). And see Baltimore & Ohio S. W. R. Co. v. Settle, 260 U. S. 166, 171 (1922); Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Woodbury, 254 U. S. 357 (1920). In this case respondent undertook a journey from Connecticut to Massachusetts, with a temporary stopover for transfer along the way. And it goes unchallenged here that the redcap to whom she entrusted her baggage was a railroad *131employee performing functions, whether viewed as services in connection with an interrupted through trip from Meriden to Fall River or with the second unquestionably interstate leg of respondent’s journey, incident to interstate travel and reached by the terms of the Interstate Commerce Act. Cf. Williams v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 315 U. S. 386, 394, 397 (1942); Stopher v. Cincinnati Union Terminal Co., 246 I. C. C. 41 (1941).4 The Interstate Commerce Act, therefore, must control to whatever extent its provisions apply.
With the enactment in 1906 of the Carmack Amendment, Congress superseded diverse state laws with a nationally uniform policy governing interstate carriers’ liability for property loss. E. g., Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491, 504-505 (1913); Kansas City S. R. Co. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639, 648-649 (1913). Insofar as now pertinent that enactment provided that any interstate railroad “receiving property for transportation . . . shall issue a receipt or bill of lading therefor and shall be liable to the lawful holder thereof for any loss, damage, or injury to such property caused by it ... , and no contract, receipt, rule, or regulation shall exempt such . . . railroad . . . from the liability hereby imposed.” 5 In 1915 Congress fortified the Carmack Amendment by adding, in part, that “any such limitation, without respect to the manner or form in which it is sought to be made is hereby declared to be unlawful and void.” 6 One year *132later, however, a proviso qualified that prohibition by rendering it inapplicable “first, to baggage carried on passenger trains ... , or trains . . . carrying passengers; second, to property . . . received for transportation concerning which the carrier shall have been or shall hereafter be expressly authorized or required by order of the Interstate Commerce Commission to establish and maintain rates dependent upon the value declared in writing by the shipper or agreed upon in writing as the released value of the property, in which case such declaration or agreement shall have no other effect than to limit liability and recovery to an amount not exceeding the value so declared or released . . . .”7
*133We assume that petitioner’s tariff was properly filed pursuant to a lawful authorization by the Interstate Commerce Commission. In Stopher v. Cincinnati Union Terminal Co., 246 I. C. C. 41, 44-47 (1941), the Commission determined that an interstate railroad’s redcap services constituted railroad transportation as defined by the Act, and directed that a tariff covering service charges be filed.8 See also Dayton Union R. Co. Tariff for Redcap Service, 256 I. C. C. 289 (1943); Redcap Service, Cincinnati, Columbus, Indianapolis, 277 I. C. C. 427 (1950). Petitioner railroad participated in filing New England Joint Tariff RC No. 3-N with the Commission. Cf. American Railway Express Co. v. Lindenburg, 260 U. S. 584, 588-589 (1923). In addition to listing a schedule of charges per piece and truckload of baggage, that tariff de-*134dares that “Carriers will not accept a greater liability than Twenty-five (25) Dollars per bag or parcel . . . handled by Red Caps under the provisions of this tariff, unless a greater value is declared in writing by the passenger. If a greater value is so declared in writing by the passenger, an additional charge of Ten (10) Cents per bag or parcel will be made for each One Hundred (100) Dollars or fraction thereof above Twenty-five (25) Dollars so declared. Any bag or parcel which is declared by the passenger to have a value in excess of Five Hundred (500) Dollars will not be accepted for handling by Red Caps under the provisions of this tariff.”
Clearly that limitation of liability is voided by the Act unless saved by the statutory proviso. Adams Express Co. v. Darden, 265 U. S. 265 (1924); Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. McCaull-Dinsmore Co., 253 U. S. 97 (1920). The excepted “baggage carried on passenger trains” refers solely to free baggage checked through on a passenger fare. See, e. g., Boston & Maine R. Co. v. Hooker, 233 U. S. 97, 117 (1914).9 It cannot apply to redcap service for which the carrier exacts a separate charge because the cost of providing that facility is not an element in the determination of passenger rates. Redcap Service, Cincinnati, Columbus, Indianapolis, 277 I. C. C. 427, 436 (1950).10 The limitation must therefore qualify under *135the proviso as part of an authorized schedule of rates graduated according to property valuations in writing. Petitioner’s tariff on its face does not deviate from the statutory standard, and it may be read as complying with the law. Cf. American Railway Express Co. v. Lindenburg, supra; Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. v. Rankin, 241 U. S. 319, 327 (1916).
But the facts here do not bring the case within the statutory conditions. There was no “value declared in writing by the shipper or agreed upon in writing”; in fact, not even a baggage check reciting a limitation provision changed hands.11 Moreover, the actual value of respondent’s baggage exceeded $500; the tariff itself deems such highly valued property unacceptable for handling by redcaps. But only by granting its customers a fair opportunity to choose between higher or lower liability by paying a correspondingly greater or lesser charge can a carrier lawfully limit recovery to an amount less than the actual loss sustained. Boston & Maine R. Co. v. Piper, 246 U. S. 439, 444-445 (1918); Union Pacific R. Co. v. Burke, 255 U. S. 317, 321-323 (1921); cf. The Ansaldo San Giorgio I v. Rheinstrom Bros. Co., 294 U. S. 494, 497-498 (1935). Binding respondent by a limitation which she had no reasonable opportunity to discover *136would effectively deprive her of the requisite choice;12 such an arrangement would amount to a forbidden attempt to exonerate a carrier from the consequences of its own negligent acts. Ibid.; cf. Watson Bros. Transp. Co. v. Feinberg Co., 193 F. 2d 283, 286 (1951). “The great object of the law governing common carriers was to secure the utmost care in the rendering of a service of the highest importance to the community. A carrier who stipulates not to be bound to the exercise of care and diligence ‘seeks to put off the essential duties of his employment.’ It is recognized that the carrier and the individual customer are not on an equal footing. ‘The latter cannot afford to higgle or stand out and seek redress in the courts.’ ” Sante Fe, P. & P. R. Co. v. Grant Bros. Construction Co., 228 U. S. 177, 184-185 (1913). In sum, respondent cannot be held bound by petitioner’s limitation, and the judgment of the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors must be
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.