The state appeals from the trial court’s granting of the appellee’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. In granting the writ, the trial court found that no record or other competent evidence exists to show that the appellee entered voluntary pleas of guilty in the Prairie County Circuit Court, Northern District, to three counts of kidiiapping. Without a proper and voluntary plea of guilty, the trial court held that there could not be a valid judgment of guilt or a subsequent valid commitment to the penitentiary. On appeal, the state argues that the trial court erred in granting the writ of habeas corpus. We agree and therefore reverse and dismiss.
The appellee was charged with first degree murder in Prairie County, Southern District, robbery in Monroe County, and three counts of kidnapping in Prairie County, Northern District.1 On a change of venue, she was tried for the murder charge in Lonoke County and was convicted of the lesser included offense of second degree murder and sentenced to eleven (11) years imprisonment. The appellee states that her trial in Lonoke County was on April 15,16 and 17,1975, and that she was sentenced on the following Monday, April 21.
According to three Prairie County, Northern District, kidnapping judgments, the appellee appeared in person and with her attorney, James Burnett, on April 16,1975, and entered pleas of guilty to the kidnapping charges. These judgments were signed by Circuit Judge W. M. Lee on June 7, 1975. They reflect appellee was sentenced to serve eight (8) years for each count for a total of twenty-four (24) years to run consecutively to the murder and robbery sentence for a total of forty-five (45) years imprisonment. The judgments are the only evidence in the record to support the existence of the appellee’s guilty pleas to the kidnapping charges. The appellee denied having pled guilty to the kidnapping charges and testified that she was unaware of the existence of these kidnapping judgments until sometime in 1987. *71After serving the time for her murder and robbery convictions, the appellee filed a writ of habeas corpus in Jefferson County, where she is detained, alleging that the kidnapping judgments and commitments were invalid.
The state argues that a writ of habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy under the facts of this case. We must agree. This court has repeatedly held that one is held without lawful authority and thus entitled to writ of habeas corpus when it is shown that the commitment is invalid on its face or the court lacked jurisdiction. See Johnson v. State, 298 Ark. 479, 769 S.W.2d 3 (1989); George v. State, 285 Ark. 84, 685 S.W.2d 141 (1985); Stover v. Hamilton, 270 Ark. 310, 604 S.W.2d 934 (1980); State v. Auten, 211 Ark. 703, 202 S.W.2d 763 (1947).
The appellee argues that a writ of habeas corpus is also available to question the validity of a conviction, not just the facial invalidity of the conviction judgment. In support of her argument, she cites Bakery. Lockhart, 288 Ark. 91, 702 S.W.2d 403 (1986), where we said, “a petition for writ of habeas corpus is restricted to the questions of whether the petitioner is in custody pursuant to a valid conviction and whether the convicting court had proper jurisdiction.” Unfortunately, the Baker court rephrased the long settled rule pertaining to a person’s entitlement to a writ of habeas corpus, and in doing so, misspoke. We correct that error by reaffirming our prior holdings, as cited above, that a writ of habeas corpus petition is only proper when it is shown that a commitment is invalid on its face or the court lacked jurisdiction.
In the present case, the Prairie County Circuit Court clearly had jurisdiction to accept guilty pleas to kidnapping charges in that county. Therefore, our review is limited to whether the appellee’s convictions are invalid on their face. These judgments state that the appellee and her attorney appeared before the court and entered a guilty plea, and are signed by the circuit judge. However, the appellee contends that her convictions are invalid on their face because the judgments state that the sentences will run consecutively to the sentence in the murder trial, which had not yet been completed. In other words, when the appellee allegedly appeared in Prairie County to enter her guilty plea on April 16, the judge sentenced her to eight (8) years for each count *72of kidnapping to run consecutively to her Lonoke County murder sentence, which at the time did not exist.
Appellee’s view of the kidnapping judgments as being facially invalid must fail even if her murder case was still pending at the time she pled guilty to the kidnapping counts. Under A.R.Cr.P. Rule 24.4(c), before accepting a plea of guilty, a trial judge must address the defendant personally and inform him or her and determine that he or she understands, among other things, the maximum possible sentence on the charge, including that possible from consecutive sentences. Here, while the trial judge did not know the appellee’s murder sentence, he could have fulfilled the requirement of Rule 24.4(c) by having told her the possible range of sentences she could receive for murder. See Peterson v. State, 296 Ark. 324, 756 S.W.2d 897 (1988). While in Peterson, the issue was whether the trial court erred in failing to inform the defendant that his sentences could be ordered consecutively before accepting his guilty plea, the court’s discussion of the trial court’s meeting of the Rule 24.4(c) requirements is helpful in the present case. The defendant, in Peterson, pled guilty to one charge while other charges were still pending. Before accepting his guilty plea, the trial judge instructed the defendant regarding the range of sentences he could receive for the pending charges. Here, we find nothing on the face of the kidnapping judgments that reflects the trial judge failed to tell the appellee the range of sentences possible for her murder charge when he informed her that her kidnapping sentences would run consecutively to that sentence.
While we note the appellee’s testimony and evidence supporting her contention that she never appeared in the Prairie County Circuit Court and pled guilty to the kidnapping charges, our review in a habeas corpus case is limited to finding error on the face of those convictions.2 From our review of the appellee’s kidnapping judgments and commitments, we cannot say that they are invalid on their face. Therefore, we must reverse the trial court’s granting of the writ of habeas corpus.
*73Purtle, J., dissents.