Plaintiffs appeal from a trial court order granting defendants’-appellees’ motion for an accelerated judgment. That motion was based upon the alleged failure of plaintiffs to commence their dramshop action1 against these defendants within the two-year statute of limitations.2
Injury was sustained by plaintiffs from a collision with an automobile driven by defendant Young, occurring on August 2, 1974. During a July 2, 1975, pretrial deposition, plaintiffs learned that Young had been drinking at the establishments of the defendants involved in this appeal.
On March 10, 1976, plaintiffs filed a motion to amend their complaint to add those defendants under the dramshop act. After several adjournments, the motion was heard without opposition and granted on March 31, 1976. Attached to the motion was a copy of the proposed amended complaint, but, according to the record, it was not filed with the court for service until August 6, 1976. Apparently, the intervening time period was consumed by plaintiffs’ motion for entry of an order allowing the complaint to be amended and several adjournments of the hearing on that motion. This *148latter motion was granted on July 7, 1976, and a nunc pro tunc order was filed on August 24, 1976.
Plaintiffs contend that the filing of the motion to amend, together with a copy of the proposed amended complaint, constituted a commencement of the action against the added defendants within the meaning of GCR 1963, 101.3 Consequently, plaintiffs maintain that the action was commenced on March 10, 1976, well within the limitations period, which ended on August 2, 1976.
In the alternative, plaintiffs argue that the statute of limitations was tolled during the interim between the filing and granting of the motion to amend. Adding this 21-day period to the time limitation on dramshop actions, plaintiffs maintain that the amended complaint was filed within the statute of limitations, which did not bar commencement of proceedings until August 23, 1976.
Appellees contend that rule 101 be strictly construed. Accordingly, they argue that only when the amended complaint is actually filed should the action be deemed to have commenced against the added defendants.
The opposing sides of this controversy bring into juxtaposition the purposes and policy underlying our court rules permitting pretrial amendment of pleadings and those upon which are founded statutes limiting the time in which a cause of action may be prosecuted. As applicable to the instant case, the former permit a diligent plaintiff to seek recovery from those whose potential liability and existence are not discovered until after the initiation of a cause of action against another involved in the same transaction or occurrence.4 The latter *149promote security from litigation arising out of transactions or occurrences remote in time.
Noting that GCR 1963, 101 is derived from FR Civ P 3,5 plaintiffs cite a number of Federal court decisions holding that the filing of a motion to amend to add parties is commencement of the action against those parties.6 To support their tolling theory, plaintiffs cite the decision of this Court in Forest v Parmalee (On Rehearing), 60 Mich App 401; 231 NW2d 378 (1975).
While the Federal decisions are enlightening, we decline to formulate any inflexible rule based upon their suggested interpretation of the Federal counterpart to GCR 1963, 101. Similarly, a more appealing fixed rule of procedure is not yielded from our review of Parmalee. Our conclusion is that any rule made to apply without regard to the peculiar circumstances of each case would undermine the purposes of both our court rules and the statutes of limitation and invite a risk of injustice of an unacceptably high degree.
We, therefore, conclude that whether a party seeking to add parties to the litigation has complied with the court rules so as to entitle him to suspend the running of an applicable statute of limitations in favor of an added party, is for determination in the first instance by the trial court. An added party may obtain the trial court’s review of the circumstances leading up to the *150filing of the amended complaint by filing a motion for accelerated judgment based upon the statute of limitations. The trial court may then review de novo the procedural steps taken by the amending party to assure that dilatory tactics have not unjustly deprived the added party of his legitimate statute of limitations defense. It is then within the discretion of the trial court to grant or deny the motion based upon his evaluation of the circumstances in each case.
In every case cited by the plaintiffs under FR Civ P 3, the particular circumstances were of dominant influence on the court. Their common factual characteristics included the filing of a motion to amend at or near the end of the limitations period, a ruling on the motion near or after the expiration of that period, and a contemporaneous filing and service of the amended complaint.7
In the case under review, the plaintiffs obtained knowledge of the added defendants’ potential liability more than a year before expiration of the statute of limitations. Their motion to amend was filed eight months later and granted more than four months prior to the end of the limitations period. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs permitted the remaining four months to lapse before filing the amended complaint with the court for service upon the added defendants.
As stated by Justice Swayne of the United States Supreme Court:
*151"Statutes of limitation are vital to the welfare of society and are favored in the law. They are found and approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence. They promote repose by giving security and stability to human affairs. An important public policy lies at their foundation. They stimulate to activity and punish negligence. While time is constantly destroying the evidence of rights, they supply its place by a presumption which renders proof unnecessary. Mere delay, extending to the limit prescribed, is itself a conclusive bar. The bane and antidote go together.”
Wood v Carpenter, 101 US 135, 139; 25 L Ed 807, 808 (1879), quoted in Ramsey v Child, Hulswit & Co, 198 Mich 658, 671; 165 NW 936 (1917). Our rule 101 is in harmony with these considerations by providing a simple and expeditious means of ascertaining when a civil action has been commenced. Buscaino v Rhodes, 385 Mich 474, 484; 189 NW2d 202 (1971). Only where a plaintiff demonstrates diligence in discovery and compliance with procedural rules should a deviation from the foregoing principles be permitted to avoid a defense based on the statute of limitations.
Under the circumstances of this case, we find that the trial court properly granted the added defendants’ motion for accelerated judgment. That judgment strikes a fair balance between the objectives of our court rules and the valuable purposes served by the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs cannot now complain of a situation created by their own lack of diligence.
Affirmed. Costs to defendants.
Beasley, P. J., concurred.