MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter comes before this Court upon the complaint of Catheryn Purnell (“plaintiff”) for a determination as to whether her former husband’s obligation in their divorce decree to hold the plaintiff harmless for a $110,769.281 tax penalty is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(B) on the basis that it is in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support. For the reasons stated herein, we find that the debt is dischargeable.
Catheryn Purnell and Lawrence Welborn (“debtor”) were married in October 1975. No children were born of the marriage. While married, the couple operated an engineering consulting business called Energy & Mineral Consultants, Inc. (“EMC”). The debtor was the chief executive officer of the business and the plaintiff served as EMC’s secretary and treasurer. During 1983 and 1984 EMC failed to pay withholding taxes to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). The IRS, in turn, personally assessed a 100% penalty against both the plaintiff and defendant for tax liability to-talling $110,769.28. The couple subsequently obtained a divorce on December 3, 1987. The divorce decree provides that the debtor would assume full responsibility for the unpaid taxes and would hold the plaintiff harmless from any claim for the taxes. The divorce decree further provides that the debtor would reimburse the plaintiff if she were forced to make a payment for these taxes.2 On October 4, 1988, Law*950rence Welborn filed a petition under Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. The plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint to declare the debtor’s obligation under the divorce decree nondischargeable.
This Court previously has set forth the standard applicable to determine whether an obligation is dischargeable under section 523(a)(5)(B) as being in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support. See e.g. In re Mohn, 118 B.R. 51 (Bankr.E. D.Va.1990); In re West, 95 B.R. 395 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1989).3 As we observed in those cases, section 523(a)(5)(B) provides that a debtor is not discharged from any debt
(5) to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such spouse or child, in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of record, determination made in accordance with State or territorial law by a governmental unit, or property settlement agreement, but not to the extent that—
(B) such debt includes a liability designated as alimony, maintenance, or support, unless such liability is actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support[.]
As the legislative history to this section indicates, “[w]hat constitutes alimony, maintenance, or support, will be determined under the bankruptcy laws, not State law.” H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 5787, 6320. The burden of proving that an obligation is “actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support” is on the plaintiff spouse. Tilley v. Jessee, 789 F.2d 1074, 1077 (4th Cir.1986).4
The Fourth Circuit has made clear that “[t]he proper test of whether the payments are alimony lies in proof of whether it was the intention of the parties that the payments be for support rather than as a property settlement.” Melichar v. Ost, 661 F.2d 300, 303 (4th Cir.1981) (citing Shacter v. Shacter, 467 F.Supp. 64 (D.Md.1979), aff'd without published opinion, 610 F.2d 813 (4th Cir.1979); Nichols v. Hensler, 528 F.2d 304 (7th Cir.1976); 3 Collier on Bankruptcy H 523.15, at 523-111 (1981 ed.)), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927, 102 S.Ct. 1974, 72 L.Ed.2d 442 (1982). Intent is the threshold issue that must be crossed before other concerns become relevant. Tilley, 789 F.2d at 1078 n. 4. The Fourth Circuit has stressed that intent must be mutual as opposed to one spouse’s unilateral efforts to obtain additional support. Id. (indicating that mutual intent to create support obligation must be shown).
In the context of a voluntarily executed marital settlement agreement', the intent of the parties to that agreement is determinative of whether the obligation is *951in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support. In re Long, 794 F.2d 928, 931 (4th Cir.1986) (citing Melichar, 661 F.2d at 302). If, however, the parties have “submitted the issues of alimony and property division” to a judge or jury, it is the intent of the trier of fact, rather than the parties’ intent, that is dispositive. Long, 794 F.2d at 931; West, 95 B.R. at 399.
Applying these standards to the case at bar, we must determine whether the plaintiff has proven that it is more probable than not that both she and the debtor intended the obligation at issue to be in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support.5 We begin this inquiry by first summarizing the relevant testimony adduced at trial.
The plaintiff was the first witness to testify. She explained that in the course of obtaining her divorce, she sought a $9,000 lump sum settlement, attorney’s fees and expenses.6 According to the plaintiff, there was never any division of property, so that she received only what she took into the marriage. Although she testified that she sought indemnification for the tax liability of EMC, she specifically stated that she did not seek alimony, maintenance or support from the debtor. Tr. at 11-12. She explained that if she were not required to pay the tax obligation, she would be able to support herself on her salary. Only if she were forced to pay the tax obligation, did she feel that she would have to look to the debtor for financial support.7 The plaintiff indicated that when she left the marriage, she was basically responsible for herself. She relocated to Denver and did not ask the debtor for moving expenses or *952any other money. As she explained, “I was basically responsible for myself, period, with the knowledge when I got a job, I can support myself with the money I earned.” Tr. at 14.
The plaintiff then testified that her intention in seeking the hold harmless clause in the divorce decree was that it would be in lieu of anything else that she would receive from the marriage. Tr. at 16. Prior to her divorce, she discussed her divorce agreement with Kenneth Butler, an attorney whose advice the plaintiff sought to reduce the tax liability to the IRS. The plaintiff indicated that she told Butler the following:
I know that I discussed with him that this is what he [the debtor] agreed to do in lieu of other things that I thought were basically mine as part of a divorce settlement. This was what I accepted in lieu of money or any other possession, and that I — I mean, I thought it was taken care of. I thought there was an obligation that had been agreed to.
Tr. at 23. In response to her counsel’s question as to why she felt this way, the plaintiff testified:
Because Larry agreed to pay it. He agreed to do it as part of the divorce as his responsibility, as his way of, well, taking the responsibility from me and in lieu of anything else. That was all I had from the divorce. There was nothing else. That was what I wanted_
Id. The plaintiff explained that when she entered into the divorce agreement she was not in any position to have assumed responsibility for the IRS claim. To support this statement, she explained that her present salary is $17,000 and that her present monthly expenses exceed her income by about $500 per month.8 The plaintiff claimed that she was in the same financial condition now as when she sought the divorce. In an attempt to demonstrate the disparate incomes between herself and the debtor, she noted that when she entered into the divorce decree, the debtor was a captain in the Navy earning between $40,-000 to $50,000 per year. Tr. at 29.9 Finally, she testified that she was very ill around the time of the divorce and that her illness made a considerable difference in her earning capability.
*953On cross examination, the plaintiff admitted that she did not seek, through a 'pen-dente lite hearing, temporary support and maintenance from the debtor. She further acknowledged that when the final divorce decree was entered, she did not seek permanent alimony or support from the debt- or. The debtor’s counsel then drew the plaintiffs attention to Plaintiffs Exhibit # 3, which is a letter from the debtor to the plaintiffs counsel, Robert Montague, stating that the debtor agreed to accept the responsibility for the IRS debt in exchange for ownership rights in EMC.10 When asked whether she turned the ownership rights over to the debtor, the plaintiff explained that she “never had an opportunity to” do so. Tr. at 33. In response to her counsel’s inquiry on redirect as to whether she had any ownership rights in EMC to turn over, the plaintiff responded that she had no property of any kind, and any property that belonged to the company, the debtor had. She had nothing tangible in her possession and there were no stock certificates.
Upon the close of the plaintiff’s testimony, the next witness called was Kenneth Butler, the attorney whose advice the plaintiff sought on reducing her tax obligation. In explaining his involvement with the divorce settlement, Butler stated:
I was in fact very much involved with respect to the determination of that settlement. When Mrs. Purnell first contacted me, she was aware of the heavy obligations of her husband, the biggest of which was the tax obligation. From the very beginning she indicated to me that it was important to her that he assume that obligation, that if he would do so, she would not expect to take anything else from him. That is in fact what happened. I counseled with her at the time the offer was made with respect to the lump sum payment, the payment of attorneys’ and accountants’ fees, and the assumption of the debt to the IRS. The very most important thing of those discussions was, of course, the assumption of the IRS debt. I’ve counseled with her about an offer in compromise. I’m aware of her financial situation. I’m aware that it is very important that in order for her to support herself, she needs relief from the IRS debt. That has been the intent of the plaintiff throughout the proceeding as I have counseled her.
Tr. at 36-37. When asked whether he had documentary evidence of the plaintiff’s intent, Butler testified with respect to a copy of a letter that Robert Montague, plaintiff’s divorce counsel, had written to the IRS in March 1988. Butler testified that the letter stated that the debtor’s assumption of the IRS debt was in lieu of alimony and support.11 Butler explained that the letter was consistent with Butler’s understanding that the plaintiff needed relief from the IRS debt to support herself.
Responding to whether he had any other knowledge or information concerning the intent of the parties, Butler explained that he had prepared a letter for the plaintiff to sign suggesting an offer of a $9,000 lump sum payment and relief from both the accountants’ fees and the IRS debt. Butler stated that the letter was evidence of what the plaintiff intended at the time. According to Butler, the plaintiff was very aware of the debtor’s financial obligations and that both Butler and the plaintiff felt that it was not realistic to ask the debtor for anything other than relief from the IRS debt.
The last witness to testify was the debt- or, called as an adverse witness. The plaintiff’s counsel first attempted to have the debtor acknowledge that the debtor did not ask the plaintiff for a waiver of rights to support or alimony. The debtor responded that the debtor never believed that the waiver of rights was an issue. Tr. at 45. According to the debtor “[i]t was never *954discussed, never mentioned [sic] in any way brought forward.” Tr. at 46.
The plaintiffs counsel next asked the debtor to explain the nature of the plaintiff’s interest in EMC. In response to this question the debtor stated that he had thought about taking some of the computer software that was developed when EMC was in existence and perhaps marketing that software. Subsequent events, however, indicated that there was no market for the software, which is now obsolete.
In responding to whether the plaintiff had engaged in any conduct that would prevent her from receiving alimony, the debtor, over the objection of the debtor’s counsel, stated:
A. Has she engaged in any conduct which would prevent her from receiving alimony? Mr. Montague, this may not be the answer you want to hear. My ex-wife voluntarily left the marriage. There had been a lot of stress, lots of duress, as she well knows. Fidelity was not a continuing part of that marriage on her part. There was very definitely a consideration in my mind as to why alimony would have been totally absurd. Mr. Montague: You did not ask her to waive the right to seek it?
A. She did not have the gall to ask for it. I think I know why.
Q. Had you engaged in any conduct which would have entitled her to seek alimony?
A. Absolutely not.
Mr. Bartl: Objection.
Court: Your objection is noted. Overruled.
Witness: Absolutely not.
Tr. at 50-51.
On cross examination, the debtor explained that Montague prepared the divorce decree. The debtor indicated that he did not have any discussions with Montague about the terms of the agreement after receiving it. Further, the debtor did not discuss with Montague the issues of alimony or support for the plaintiff. The debtor did acknowledge that he sent a letter to Montague dated May 13, 1987 (Plaintiff’s Exhibit # 3) reflecting the debtor’s intention with regard to any outstanding property rights. With respect to the debt- or’s intent at the time he signed the divorce decree the debtor testified:
A. Basically, there had been a long, drawn-out issue. I had never denied responsibility for the IRS debt, and knew that when and if I was able to, I would have to deal with it. My feeling in signing this document was that Mr. Montague knew what he was doing and that this would free Cathy of harassment by the IRS. I didn’t feel it was — have any reason to believe it was an [sic] sham document. I thought it probably represented some sort of sound legal advice.
Q. Was it your intention at the time you signed this document and undertook that obligation to provide this as a means of alimony or support to your wife?
A. No.
Tr. at 54-55. Finally, the debtor noted that he filed bankruptcy because of actions taken by the IRS. No action by his wife affected his decision to file bankruptcy.
After careful examination of the testimony adduced at trial, we find that the plaintiff has failed to meet her burden of proving mutual intent. Specifically, the plaintiff has produced no evidence to prove that the debtor intended for the hold harmless clause to be in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support. Because the divorce decree is silent with respect to the parties’ intent regarding the hold harmless provision, we examine first the testimony proffered by the plaintiff.
The plaintiff’s testimony sheds little light on the debtor’s intent with respect to this obligation. Although the plaintiff told Kenneth Butler that “this is what he [the debtor] agreed to do in lieu of other things that I thought were basically mine as part of a divorce settlementf,]” this statement does not make it appear more probable than not that the debtor intended for his assumption of the IRS debt to be alimony rather than a property settlement. Nor does it suggest that the debtor in any way was concerned about the plaintiff’s ability to support herself upon the divorce. The *955plaintiff’s testimony throughout suggests that she felt that the debtor was morally obligated to assume the debt because he was responsible for incurring it. The fact that the debtor may have been responsible for incurring the debt and thus agreed to hold his former wife harmless for it, however, does not necessarily imply that he intended for the obligation to be in the nature of alimony or support.
Second, the testimony of Kenneth Butler sheds no light on the debtor’s intent with respect to the obligation at issue. Although his testimony does address the plaintiff’s intent to have the debtor assume the IRS obligation, Butler’s testimony suggests virtually nothing with respect to the debtor’s intent. Moreover, Butler’s testimony regarding Montague’s March 1988 letter to the IRS stating that the debtor’s assumption of the IRS debt was in lieu of alimony, has little probative value in reflecting the debtor’s intent when the divorce decree was executed. First, the March 1988 letter was drafted by plaintiff’s counsel and more likely would reflect the plaintiff’s intent. Second, it was written after the parties executed the divorce decree in December 1987. It, therefore, does not necessarily reflect either the debtor’s or the plaintiff’s intent at the time of the divorce.
The most damaging testimony came from the debtor himself, who was called as an adverse witness. First, when the plaintiff’s counsel asked the debtor to admit that the debtor never asked the plaintiff for a waiver of rights to alimony, the debt- or responded that the issue was never discussed or brought forward. Although the absence of a waiver of alimony provision does not necessarily imply that the debtor did, in fact, agree to alimony, here the debtor stated that the issue of waiving alimony was never discussed. Thus, the absence of a waiver of alimony provision in the divorce decree does not have any particular relevance. Furthermore, it was the plaintiff’s counsel who asked the debtor, over the objection of the debtor’s counsel, whether the plaintiff had engaged in any conduct that would prevent her from receiving alimony. The debtor indicated that “alimony would have been totally absurd” because of his former wife’s lack of fidelity during their marriage. We find that the plaintiff’s probing into this area, over the objection of debtor’s counsel, made clear that the debtor did not intend to give the plaintiff alimony. Furthermore, we found the debtor to be a very credible witness.
After examining the evidence proffered by the plaintiff, we can find no evidence that the debtor intended the hold harmless provision to be in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support. The evidence, in fact, establishes the opposite. Most significantly, the debtor’s letter dated May 13, 1987, Plaintiff’s Exhibit # 3, which was written to Montague before the divorce decree was executed, unequivocally demonstrates the debtor’s intent with respect to the debt in question. In that letter the debtor specifically stated that in exchange for a signed commitment from the plaintiff to transfer all of her ownership rights in EMC to the debtor, the debtor would accept responsibility for the IRS claim. See supra note 10 (pertinent provisions of letter dated May 13, 1987). Moreover, we find nothing in that letter indicating that the debtor intended to provide the plaintiff with alimony, maintenance or support. This letter has significant probative value in reflecting the debtor’s intent with respect to the obligation because it was written by the debtor before he signed the divorce decree. Furthermore, we find that the plaintiff’s counsel did not successfully rebut any of the testimony adduced by the debtor’s counsel with respect to this critical piece of evidence. The plaintiff’s counsel’s attempt to show that the plaintiff did not have any interest in EMC to give to the debtor, in no way diminishes the fact that the debtor intended to get something in return for assuming the IRS obligation. In short, the only credible evidence before this Court reflecting the debtor’s intent before the divorce decree was executed is Plaintiff’s Exhibit # 3. The plaintiff has put forth no evidence showing that the debtor’s intent with respect to the obligation at issue changed between the time of the May 13, 1987 letter and the time of the divorce. Accordingly, we find that the plaintiff has *956failed to meet her threshold burden of proving mutual intent.12 Upon a careful examination of all the evidence presented by the plaintiff, we cannot find that the fact asserted by her — that the debt at issue was intended to be alimony — is more probably true than false.
Accordingly, we find that the debtor’s obligation embodied in the December 3, 1987 divorce decree to hold the plaintiff harmless for the IRS tax penalty is a dis-chargeable obligation that is not in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(B).
An appropriate order will be entered in accordance with this opinion.