T. E. Brennan, J.,
(dissenting).
The Facts
Plaintiffs are the parents of Thomas L. Miller, a mentally retarded child formally committed to the Lapeer State Home and Training School on January 24, 1957, as a public-pay patient. The commitment was authorized by the probate court of Wayne County. This action was commenced by plaintiffs after the enactment of PA 1965, No 335, requiring certain relatives to reimburse the State of Michigan in part for the money expended for the maintenance and care of a mentally retarded child. A complaint against the Department of Revenue was filed in the circuit court for the County of Wayne, alleging that PA 1965, No 335, was unconstitutional and requesting relief from its threatened enforcement. In a summary judgment dated December 11, 1967, the circuit court held the act unconstitutional on various grounds; the Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit *309court, but on different grounds. It held PA 1965, No 335, unconstitutional because (1) it found that a formula of reimbursement which is keyed to the net taxable income as shown on a Federal income tax return is in conflict with the equal protection clause of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, since certain actual income of a taxpayer is not required to be included in the computed net taxable income for Federal income tax purposes; and (2) the determination of net taxable income of the responsible relative under the act is controlled by the Congress of the United States and the use of this standard by the Michigan legislature constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the Congress. We granted leave to appeal.
The Statutory Provisions
Public Act 335 was enacted in 1965 and is entitled “Liability of Relatives of Institutionalized Mentally Retarded Persons.” The act imposes an absolute obligation to pay upon the husband, wife, father and mother of an institutionalized mentally retarded person. Once the mentally retarded person is ad*310mitted to an institution under the jurisdiction of the Department of Mental Health, each liable relative is required to provide the Department of Revenue with a signed copy of his most recent income tax return filed with the United States Internal Revenue Service. The Department of Revenue then originally determines the amount of monthly liability of the relative in accordance with a graduated schedule set forth in the act. Failure or refusal to file the necessary forms (including the Federal income tax return) results in an imposition of maximum monthly liability under the act. If a relative believes the monthly liability as determined by the schedule does not reflect his current income status or his ability to pay, he may request a redetermination of his monthly liability by the Department of Revenue. *311The department may then require the relative to furnish all relevant financial information and such additional information as may he provided by rules of the Department of Revenue. If dissatisfied with this determination of liability, the responsible relative may then appeal to the probate court of the county of residence of the patient. If a relative liable under the act fails to pay the assessed monthly liability, and no appeal is pending before the probate court, the Commissioner of Revenue may petition the probate court to issue an execution in the amount due.
I consider seriatim three arguments advanced by plaintiffs attacking the constitutionality of the instant legislation.
*312I
Does the Michigan Reimbursement Statute Delegate Legislative Power to the Federal Congress?
Plaintiffs contend that the act embodies an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, since it involves an attempt by the Michigan legislature to incorporate future Federal legislation. The act provides that any relative liable for the care and maintenance of an institutionalized retarded child must file an informational form with the department of revenue. This form must contain, among other things, “the net taxable income of the relative last reported to the United States internal revenue service for Federal income tax purposes.” Section 8 of PA 1965, No 335, provides that the amount of the monthly liability of a responsible relative for the care and maintenance of a mentally retarded person in a state hospital is to be originally determined by the use of a schedule which associates a monthly liability with the relative’s net taxable income appearing on the submitted Federal income tax return. The Court of Appeals held that these provisions amounted to a delegation to the United States Congress of the ultimate determination of the amount of reimbursement in violation of the requirements of constitutional due process.
I disagree. It is well settled that incorporation by reference of an existing Federal law in a state statute does not render that statute constitutionally infirm; beyond a doubt,
“ * * * a state legislature does not invalidly delegate its legislative authority by adopting a law *313or rule of Congress, if such law is already in existence or operative.” 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law § 245, p 496.
In Dearborn Independent, Inc., v. City of Dearborn (1951), 331 Mich 447, 455, we noted that a state statute which adopts existing statutes, rules or regulations of Congress by reference does not involve an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Yet plaintiffs contend that the language in PA 1965, No 335, discloses a clear legislative intent to incorporate future Federal legislation and thus unconstitutionally delegates legislative power to Congress, in violation of art 4, § 1 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, vesting legislative power in “ * * * a senate and house of representatives.”
Although neither the Federal Constitution nor any state constitution explicitly provides that the legislative power cannot be delegated, the non-delegation doctrine has been written into our constitutions by judicial interpretation. The basis for this judge-made rule rests on two independent grounds. First, the doctrine has been developed and applied by the courts as a corollary to the principle of separation of powers. But it has been pointed out that the doctrine of separation of powers of government does not stand in the way of all attempted delegations by the legislature of the legislative power. *314The origin of the non-delegation doctrine has been traced also to a maxim of agency, delegata potestas non potest delegari, i.e., that each department of government being itself a delegate could not therefore delegate. The soundness of that maxim as a principle of constitutional law has been questioned. One writer, discussing that agency principle in the context of the delegation question, has concluded: “ * * * it is entitled to some respect as a broad assertion of principle if rightly limited and understood. As an exact and universal statement, it is false.” And one eminent authority has stated that the origins of the principle “ * * * can hardly aid the solution of twentieth-century problems of delegation.” (Emphasis added.) Davis, Administrative Law Treatise (1958), § 2.02, p 79.
Yet, whatever the theory behind the non-delegation doctrine, it has been noted that the divergence between theory and holding in decisions dealing with the issue of delegation of legislative powers is immense. Both in Federal and state courts, *315dicta on the non-delegation doctrine are frequent. Thus, although the United States Supreme Court has stated “That the legislative power of Congress cannot he delegated is, of course, clear,” United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co. (1932), 287 US 77, 85 (53 S Ct 42, 77 L Ed 175), Davis has stated that “ * * * the Supreme Court has specifically upheld scores of delegations of legislative power.” (Emphasis added.) Davis, supra, § 2.02, p 77. On the state level, the dictum of an Ohio court has often been repeated: “The true distinction, therefore, is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.” Cincinnati W. & Z. B. Co. v. Commissioners of Clinton County (1852), 1 Ohio St 77, 88.
In sharp contrast, one court has noted:
“[T]here is an overpowering necessity for a modification of the doctrine of separation and non-delegation of powers of government * * * . The public interest would be greatly advanced and our law clarified, if the situation as it now exists were frankly recognized * * * . State ex. rel. Wisconsin Inspection Bureau v. Whitman (1928), 196 Wis 472, 498, 506 (220 NW 929)."
*316But the undeniable fact is that state courts have upheld such delegations frequently, and Professor Davis has concluded, after an analysis of numerous decisions, both state and Federal: “ * * * the assertion that authority as to what the law shall be is not delegable is clearly false.” (Emphasis added.) Davis, supra, § 2.02, p 78. He cites with approval a distinction once made by an eminent jurist but all too often disregarded in later decisions :
“ ‘It will not be contended that Congress can delegate to the courts, or to any other tribunal, powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative. But Congress may certainly delegate to others, powers which the legislature may rightfully exercise itself * * * . The line has not been exactly drawn which separates those important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from those of less interest, in which a general provision may be made, and power given to those who are to act under such general provisions to fill up the details.’ If the Supreme Court had consistently followed this lead, the law of the subject might be much more satisfactory.” (Emphasis added.) Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman v. Southard (1825), 23 US (10 Wheat) 1 (6 L Ed 253), quoted in Davis, supra, § 2.02, p 80.
Judicial invalidation of legislative delegations must ultimately be attentive to Justice Marshall’s important distinctions as to that power which is “exclusively legislative” and thus non-delegable, and should be assessed in terms of the “practical needs of effective government.”
Those practicalities were summed up, over three decades ago, in an incisive article dealing with the *317“still unsettled constitutional issue” of delegated legislative power:
“In short, it is futile for the legislature any longer to attempt to work out the details of large legislative changes. Statutes cannot be altered or repealed as rapidly as justice may demand in a complex world in which the state must constantly assume a greater part. If statutes are made under such conditions to embrace the whole of a legislative policy, they will be hopelessly cumbersome and prolix.” (Emphasis added.) Weeks, Legislative Power Versus Delegated Legislative Power, 25 Geo L J 314, 316 (1935).
Turning from the origins and theory of the non-delegation doctrine to the case law in this area, there is some early authority supporting the constitutionality of tax statutes ascertaining charges to be made on the basis of variable foreign legislation. In People, ex rel. Pratt v. Goldfogle (1926), 242 NY 277 (151 NE 452), the court rejected the contention that a tax statute was unconstitutional because the property subject to tax was in part dependent on future congressional acts:
“The first claim rests upon the reasoning that the Legislature has abdicated its powers and violated the Constitution by providing that the capital to be taxed must be in competition with the business of National banks and which business may be enlarged or diminished by act of Congress, thus giving to that body the indirect power to determine what shall be the subject of this taxation. We are unable to accept this view which seems extreme and untenable. If we are right, as we have no doubt we are, that the Legislature had the power to classify the particular kind of property to be taxed by this statute in part by reference to the uses in which it was employed, the exercise of that right would not *318be invalidated because the use thus described might thereafter be changed or enlarged by custom, usage or Federal statutory provision. The Legislature does not surrender any of its essential and constitutional powers. It declares the taxation, fixes the rate and describes the property to be taxed and in doing this we believe it had the right to make its classification and description of the property flexible so that they would be adjustable to conditions thereafter arising rather than that it was compelled to adopt a new statute every time that some change in the business to be transacted by National banks was made. The classification and description are complete; the extent of the property to be included within the classification may be changed but that is a minor incident.” (Emphasis added.) Pp 291, 292.
Thus, the court held that the delegation was a constitutional one, since the state legislature had not in fact abdicated any of its “essential” powers; the legislation made for convenience to the taxpayer and economy to the state in avoiding the necessity of setting up a separate standard.
The question of constitutional delegation raised in the context of a tax statute fixing rates dependent on future determinations of other bodies has also been persuasively resolved on the theory that the foreign law is the contingency upon which the domestic law becomes operative. In The People v. Fire Association of Philadelphia (1883), 92 NY 311, the New York legislature levied a tax on foreign insurance companies doing business in New York based on the amount of tax as presently or prospectively determined by the state of the companies’ origin. The court squarely rejected the contention that there was any unconstitutional abdication of legislative authority in the legislatively-dictated scheme:
*319“[T]he legislature [has] the right to pass a law whose operation might depend upon, or he affected hy, a future contingency. * * * ‘The event or change of circumstances on which a law may be made to take effect must be such as, in the judgment of the legislature, affects the expediency of the law; an event on which the expediency of the law in the judgment of the law-makers depends. On this question of expediency the legislature must exercise its own judgment definitively and finally.’ The statute before us fully answers this description. It came from the hands of the legislature a complete and perfect law, having at once a binding force of its own, and dependent upon no additional consent or action for its vitality and existence. The question of expediency involved in it was 'not delegated to any other tribunal, but settled definitively and finally by the legislature itself. It determined, as a conclusion proper and expedient, that foreign insurance companies, as the price of admission to our territory, should pay in taxes, license fees and the like precisely what the States ivhich created them should impose upon our companies in excess of our usual rates as the price of admission to the foreign territory. That was the whole question involved. Nothing else in the proposed law remained to be settled as expedient or otherwise, and that question the legislature determined for itself, upon its own reasons and its sole responsibility. Neither the law nor its expediency depended upon the legislation of another State. It remained the law and its expediency was the same, whether the other States legislated or not. If they did, the contingency arose which the law stood ready to meet; if they did not, it remained none the less the law, although no fact occurred to set it in operation.” (Emphasis added.) Pp 316, 317.
Nor was the attempted delegation rendered unconstitutional by leaving the amount of the tax to the legislative discretion of another state:
*320“But the whole argument rests on the single point that the amount of the tax or fine imposed is not definitely fixed by the terms of the statute, but depends above a certain rate upon foreign legislation. Is it true that a fine or tax, cannot be imposed unless its amount be stated in the law? And that, if left to be determined by some other tribunal, thereby the legislative power has been delegated? Laws define a multitude of forbidden acts and impose fines and penalties not exceeding certain amounts, but below those amounts left wholly uncertain and committed to the discretion and judgment of judicial officers or tribunals. It is quite certain, therefore, that the legislature does not abdicate its functions and delegate its authority when it imposes a fine or penalty without itself fixing the amount, or when it leaves it to be fixed by some other tribunal. But in the statute before us nothing is left to anybody’s discretion. ' That is certain which can be rendered certain, and the act fixes the tax by reference to an extrinsic fact which determines its amount in excess of a fixed and established rate. Because that extrinsic fact is the legislation of another State, it does not follow that the legislative discretion of such other State is in any manner substituted for our own.” The People v. Fire Association of Philadelphia, supra, p 318. (Emphasis added.)
Even more persuasive was the court’s analysis of the delegation question — an issue of constitutional dimension — as turning on the mere form which the legislature adopts to follow mutations in foreign laws:
“But if, when our statute was passed, there had been in existence a law of Pennsylvania, imposing upon New York companies a license fee of three per cent, and because of that fact our legislature had enacted that all Pennsylvania companies should pay *321a license fee of three per cent, would that law have been a delegation of legislative authority to the State of Pennsylvania? Most clearly not, although the fact of the foreign law lay at the foundation of our legislative judgment and discretion. And if, within a month, the foreign law changed the impost to four per cent, and our own legislature, again ascertaining the fact, and because of it should change our tax to four per cent, would that be Pennsylvania legislation and not our own? And what would be certainly constitutional if done seriatim, by several and separate acts, does it become unconstitutional when the same precise and identical result, founded upon exactly the same legislative discretion, is accomplished by one? If so, a grave constitutional question is made to turn upon the bare form instead of the substance of legislative action(Emphasis added.) The People v. Fire Association of Philadelphia, supra, pp 318, 319.
Thus, the fact of existing as well as prospective foreign law may occasion legislative action and prompt the exercise of legislative judgment and discretion. To forbid the legislature to follow mutations in foreign law by a single enactment is tantamount to restricting the exercise of that proper legislative discretion which is exclusively vested in that body. Of course, legislative recognition of the shifting character of foreign legislation does not in itself validate a delegation which is unwarranted and in substance amounts to a prohibited abdication of power. But, neither is such legislation per se invalid. To hold otherwise is to base fundamental constitutional questions on matters of form. So viewed, it is clear that the resolvent of the delegation question is not the form of the legislative action or the nature of the contingency in question, but rather the substance of the legislation as embodying a complete expression of the legislative will.
*322Notice should also be taken of the comparatively recent trend in decisions on the state level to uphold the constitutionality of legislative attempts to incorporate prospective changes in Federal statutes or administrative regulations. In the leading case of Alaska Steamship Co. v. Mullaney (CA9, 1950), 180 F2d 805, that state’s income tax act was challenged as invalidly delegating legislative powers to Congress. The general scheme of the Alaska act was to incorporate by reference the internal revenue code “as now in effect or hereafter amended.” After noting that the right to incorporate by reference provisions of the Federal law “now in effect” could not be questioned, the court continued:
“We do not overlook the fact that if the words ‘or hereafter amended’ were dropped from the Act, what remains would, in the long run, be unworkable under the legislative scheme here devised, for if the federal income tax requirements were changed substantially by future amendments, it would be impossible, administratively, to calculate the Alaska income tax merely by dividing the tax shown on the federal return by 10. * * *
“We think it is far from clear that any invalid delegation is attempted. There are of course many cases which have held attempts by a legislative body to incorporate provisions into its enactments by reference to future acts or amendments by other legislatures, to be invalid. But where it can be said that the attempt to make the local law conform to future changes elsewhere it [sic] not a mere laborsaving device for the legislators, but is undertaken in order to attain a uniformity which is in itself an important object of the proposed legislative scheme, there are a number of precedents for an approval of this sort of thing.” P 816.
Two points emphatically made by that Court deserve similar emphasis here. First, since the broad *323policy of conformity had properly been made by the state legislature — an exclusively legislative function —the clearly expressed intent of that body to incorporate future Federal legislation constituted a permissible delegation of legislative power. Second, the non-delegation doctrine was applied in recognition of the practical necessity for referring to future Federal laws, since it made for “convenience to the taxpayer and simplicity of administration”. The delegation was a means of effectuating a legislative plan, a controlling judgment made by that body. Such considerations narrowly circumscribe the range of permissible legislative delegation, but clearly validate the attempted delegation in the instant case.
Similar legislation was upheld by the Supreme Court of Connecticut in First Federal Savings & Loan Assn v. Connelly (1945), 142 Conn 483 (115 A2d 455). Connecticut’s corporation business tax incorporated the definition of gross income “as defined in the federal corporation net income tax in force on the last day of the income year.” In unanimously upholding the constitutionality of this provision as against plaintiff’s contention that the provision constituted an unlawful delegation of legislative power to the Federal government, the court responded:
“This is not a delegation of legislative power but an incorporation by reference of the federal law into the state law. State law lays a tax on the franchise or privilege of a corporation to do business in this state. * * * The state legislature and not the Congress has selected net earnings as the base for determining the amount of this tax and has fixed the rate to be paid on that tax base. As a matter of convenience to the taxpayer and *324economy to the state, the legislature has adopted some of the standards employed in the federal corporation net income tax law.” 142 Conn 483, 493 (115 A2d 459, 460).
The reasoning and logic of the opinion echo the considerations so prominent in Alaska Steamship Co. v. Mullaney, supra.
Also in point is a unanimous decision of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, State of New Jersey v. Hotel Bar Foods, Inc. (1955), 18 NJ 115 (112 A2d 726). There the delegation question was raised in the context of . a state statute which mandatorily directed a state superintendent to adopt future Federal regulations, and thus the legislation was attacked as an improper delegation of legislative power to Federal officials. Noting the trend toward liberalization of the legislators’ power to delegate, the court said: (p 125)
“The ultimate and controlling policy decision— as to whether there shall be uniformity of federal-state regulation in the field — rests always with the Legislature and it does not in any vicious sense abdicate its legislative judgment or authority.” (Emphasis added.)
The court then continued:
_ “Although the authorities are in substantial conflict, there are reasoned decisions which tend to support the view (so highly desirable for current times) that a state legislature, in dealing with products such as packaged foods (which generally travel in interstate commerce and are properly subject to extensive federal regulation), may constitutionally provide that its administrator’s regulations shall be brought into conformity with pertinent federal regulations as they are duly promulgated and amended from time to time.” (Emphasis added.)
*325Thus, whatever form the particular delegation may assume (i.e., whether the attempt is to incorporate under authority of a state statute, as in Mullaney, or an administrative regulation, as in Hotel Bar Foods) is not decisive. Indeed, a prominent reason for invalidation of authority delegated to an administrative body — to protect against arbitrariness — is largely inapplicable when the legislative intent is to incorporate future Federal statutes. What is decisive on the question of improper delegation is rather a consideration of whether, in the light of the practicalities of the situation, the legislature has in fact abdicated its powers, or has instead exercised its controlling judgment and, in pursuance of its adopted policy, chosen to refer to other acts or regulations.
The logic of Chief Justice Starr in People v. Sell (1945), 310 Mich 305, is supportive of my position here. Sell involved a municipal ordinance permitting municipal prosecutions for violations of Federal price regulations as amended from time to time. In its opinion, the Court stated that the courts “have upheld many State laws which adopted Federal standards and regulations or which were designed to augment the enforcement of Federal laws or regulations” and that “it is clear that Michigan and many other States have recognized the necessity and propriety of a mergence of action and reciprocity of service for the common good between the two sovereign powers, the State and the Federal government.” (Emphasis added.) People v. Sell, supra, 323, 325, 326. The Chief Justice cited with approval and quoted extensively from an article which detailed the numerous areas in which the states have adopted Federal administrative determinations. That article concludes, “In all of these there is an adoption of both existing and prospective federal *326administrative determinations under existing federal legislation.”
For reasons of expediency and convenience, the legislature has chosen to determine the monthly liability of a responsible relative under PA 1965, No 335, by referring to the net taxable income figure appearing on the relative’s last reported Federal income tax return. The plan is administratively simple and eminently pragmatic. I find in this legislation no abdication of legislative powers; instead, the ultimate and controlling policy decisions were dictated by the legislature. It determined, upon its own reasons and sole responsibility, the necessity of uniformity across the state in support of mentally retarded persons institutionally committed; the desirability of attaching liability to certain designated responsible relatives; the expediency of determining in the first instance the controlling standard of “ability to pay” to a specified percentage of a relative’s net taxable income figure as disclosed on the last Federal income tax return, subject to redetermination of final liability by the probate court.
The scheme enacted in PA 1965, No 335, embodies the exercise of numerous definitive and final legislative judgments. It is thus wholly unrealistic to contend that the legislature, in choosing to use an income figure which would reflect prospective changes in the complex provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, “abdicated” its legislative power in favor of the Federal Congress; there was, rather, an exercising of legislative power coupled with a permissible delegation to, in a sense, “fill up the details” of that broad policy.
*327Delegation to an administrative agency -with a charge to “fill np details” is true delegation. The agency is the creature of the legislature — its power to “fill up details” is intentionally granted — it is expected to “legislate” within the hounds of the legislative guidelines established. “Delegation” to the Congress is of a different sort. There is no “filling up details” in the sense that the Congress is in any way charged with the responsibility of carrying out Michigan legislative policy.
The legislature would, we can suppose, prefer that the Congress make no changes in the law, thus leaving the Federal definition of net taxable income exactly what it was on the date of the state enactment. The legislature merely recognizes that the Congress may, for reasons of its own, change its definition of net taxable income in the future.
The legislative decision to accept these future changes “sight unseen” is a reasonable decision in light of the existing scheme of the Federal Internal Revenue Code, and the improbability that any substantial change in the theory and substance of the congressional concept of net taxable income will come to pass without ample opportunity for Michigan legislative action to effect a timely dissolution of the partnership of the state and Federal statutes. And viewed with a regard for the practical needs of effective government, the logic of one early decision is strongly persuasive here:
“Possibly we may get nearer the ultimate point of the objection urged. That would seem to be that, *328while the legislature might, by a series of separate acts, each passed because of a then existing foreign law, follow its changes, yet it cannot do so by one act which adopted and enacts such future and contingent mutations. This doctrine requires us to hold that a law, so framed as to follow and recognize the changes of foreign legislation, and thereby incorporate such changes into its own operation, is a delegation of the legislative power and therefore inadmissible. We have found no authority for such a broad and general proposition.” The People v. Fire Association of Philadelphia (1883), 92 NY 311, 320.
I would hold that a statute which prospectively recognizes future amendments to existing foreign legislation incorporated by reference in the statute does not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power where the prospective recognition is only incidental to the administration of the statute and where the prospective recognition constitutes a legislative policy decision that continuing uniformity with the foreign legislation is desirable and not likely to frustrate the purpose of the statute. Judged by these criteria, I conclude that the prospective legislative recognition of future amendments to the Internal Revenue Code as a part of the overall scheme of PA 1965, No 335, is a constitutional delegation of legislative power.
II
Does the Reimbursement Statute Deny Equal Protection of the Laws by Imposing an Arbitrary Classification?
This Court has stated that identical standards regarding equal protection of the laws are applicable to both the Federal and our state Constitutions:
*329“The equality of rights protected by our constitution is the same as that preserved by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.” Naudzius v. Lahr (1931), 253 Mich 216, 222. The controlling standard has been clearly set forth in numerous decisions. In Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Company (1911), 220 US 61 (31 S Ct 337, 55 L Ed 369), the United States Supreme Court stated that a statutory classification is unconstitutional as violative of equal protection of the laws:
“*** 1. *** only when it is without any reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality. 3. When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts * * * must be assumed. 4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary. * * * ” (Emphasis added.)
Decisions of this Court have repeated those criteria. Tracer v. Bushre (1968), 381 Mich 282, Naudzius v. Lahr, supra. More recently, the United States Supreme Court has stated:
“ ‘ * * * The applicable principles are that a state statute may not be struck down as offensive of equal protection in its schemes of classification unless it is obviously arbitrary, and that, except in the case of a statute whose discriminations are so patently without reason that no conceivable situation of fact could be found to justify them, the claimant who challenges the statute bears the burden of affirmative demonstration that in the actual state *330of facts which surround its operation, its classifications lack rationality.’ ” McGowan v. Maryland (1961), 366 US 420, 535 (81 S Ct 1101, 6 L Ed 2d 393).
Moreover, the reasonableness of a given classification is to be examined with reference to the purpose for which the statute was enacted. In Fox v. Employment Security Commission (1967), 379 Mich 579, 588, this Court stated:
“However, the constitutional guarantees of equal protection are interposed against discriminations that are entirely arbitrary. In determining what is within legislative discretion and what is arbitrary, regard must be had for the particular subject of the State legislation. There must be a relation between the classification and the purpose of the act in which it is found.” (Citation of authorities omitted.)
It remains to apply these well-established principles to the statute in question. The purpose of the act is to charge those of sufficient ability to reimburse the state in a reasonable manner. The amount of monthly reimbursement to be paid by a relative for the care of a mentally retarded person who has been institutionalized is originally determined by a graduated scale based on net taxable income as disclosed by the relative’s last Federal income tax return. The Court of Appeals held that the criterion selected — that of net taxable income for Federal tax purposes — -did not accurately reflect a relative’s ability to pay. Reasoning that the legal economic incentive provisions in the Internal Revenue Code would reduce a taxpayer’s net taxable income without affecting his ability to support an institutionalized retarded person, the Court held *331that keying PA 1965, No 335, to the relative’s net taxable income did not reasonably fulfill the purpose of the act, and thus violated the constitutional guaranty of equal protection of the laws.
The finding that a given classification could, in certain limited instances, operate without complete uniformity and not fulfill the purpose for which a statute was enacted is not in itself dispositive of the question of its constitutionality. Reasonableness of a legislative classification is not dependent on complete equality in application of the chosen standard. “It is true that perfection is by no means required under the equal protection test of permissible classification.” Phillips Chemical Co. v. Dumas Independent School District (1959), 361 US 376, 385 (80 S Ct 474, 4 L Ed 2d 384). Those conditions which usually and ordinarily exist measure the reasonableness of the criterion selected. Pasadena City High School District v. Upjohn (1929), 206 Cal 775 (276 P 341, 63 ALR 408). The existence of minor inequalities over a class does not amount to arbitrariness in the classification: “The ‘rough accomodations’ made by government do not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment unless the lines drawn are ‘hostile or invidious.’ ” Norvell v. Illinois (1963), 373 US 420, 424 (83 S Ct 1366, 10 L Ed 2d 456).
It cannot be said that a standard of net taxable income for Federal tax purposes as an approximate determinant of ability to pay is “entirely arbitrary.” *332Food v. Employment Security Commission, supra. Nor is there lacking a reasonable relationship between the purpose of the act and the classification chosen. The mere possibility that a few wealthy citizens could, availing themselves of the economic incentive provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, reduce their net taxable income thus understating their ability to pay for purposes of reimbursement under this statute, does not, under the authorities above-cited render the criterion selected arbitrary and violative of equal protection.
Another factor supports a finding that there is no denial of equal protection of the laws in the provisions of PA 1965, No 335. According to the provisions of § 8 of the Act, monthly liability is only “originally determined” by using net taxable income; § 10 of the act expressly provides that if a relative believes that his ability to pay is not fairly reflected by his net taxable income as shown on his last Federal tax return, he may request a redetermination of his liability by the Department of Revenue, which may “request the relative to supply all relevant financial information and such additional information as may be provided by rules of the department of revenue.” Only after review of this additional information may the amount of monthly liability be then determined. Thus any inequality *333resulting from the original determination of liability could be minimized by the redetermination expressly provided for in § 10 of the act.
When the classification chosen is germane to the object of the legislation and constitutional requirements are complied with, judicial deference to the legislative determination should result in sustaining the legislation.
I would hold that the act as a whole satisfies the minimum constitutional requirements of equal protection since it produces generally fair results and establishes a classification which bears a reasonable relationship to the object of the enacted legislation.
Ill
Does the Statute Violate Due Process in Failing to Allow for a Hearing Prior to a Determination of Liability?
Plaintiff contends that the act violates procedural due process in not giving a relative liable under the act a formal hearing to determine his liability before that liability is imposed. While any responsible relative dissatisfied with the original determination of his liability may request a redetermination of that *334liability by the Department of Revenue, such a request does not constitute in any sense the hearing generally deemed necessary to comply with due process requirements. But absence of notice and hearing before an administrative agency prior to a determination of liability by that agency does not contravene constitutional due process requirements when property rights are involved.
Many cases have reasoned that provision for de novo judicial review supplies administrative procedural deficiencies.
In Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc. (1950), 339 US 594 (70 S Ct 870, 94 L Ed 1088), the United States Supreme Court held that an ultimate right to a hearing is sufficient to satisfy procedural due process:
“ ‘Discretion of any official may be abused. Yet it is not a requirement of due process that there be judicial inquiry before discretion can be exercised. It is sufficient, where only property rights are concerned, that there is at some stage an opportunity for a hearing and judicial determination. * * * ’ (Emphasis added.)”
In Phillips v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (1931), 283 US 589 (51 S Ct 608, 75 L Ed 1289), the United States Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Brandéis, said:
“Where only property rights are involved, mere postponement of the judicial enquiry is not a denial of due process, if the opportunity given for the ultimate judicial determination of the liability is adequate. * * * Delay in the judicial determination of property rights is not uncommon where it is essential that governmental needs be immediately satisfied.” (Emphasis added.)
Similarly, in Bourjois, Inc. v. Chapman (1937), 301 US 183 (57 S Ct 691, 81 L Ed 1027), the Court *335noted that the provision for an appeal from the determination of a registration board to a trial court cured any lack of notice and hearing before the administrative body. The Supreme Court of Oregon in Mallatt v. Luihn (1956), 206 Or 678, (294 P2d 871), in sustaining the constitutionality of their reimbursement statute -which is very similar to the act in question, stated that de novo review cures any omission of a hearing in fixing the liability of relatives:
“While notice and an opportunity to be heard are of the essence of due process, it is not required that a hearing shall be given at any particular stage of the proceedings. It is sufficient if, before liability becomes final, the person whose rights are affected is given his ‘day in court.’ ”
Thus it is not essential that a hearing be allowed before the making of an administrative determination if thereafter there is adequate opportunity for administrative or judicial review. I note that the act expressly provides for a right to appeal any determination of liability by the Department of Revenue to the probate court. Responsible relatives may further appeal the determination of the probate court as in other cases. Since the probate *336court is not in any sense an appellate court, I construe the word “appeal” as used in the statute to mean a trial de novo in the probate court. Nor does the statute limit the issues which an aggrieved person can present to that court. An appeal of the revenue department’s determination of liability to the probate court with opportunity for de novo judicial review would allow the relative to raise any issue having a direct bearing on the correctness of the administrative determination of liability— thus including the question of the existence of a liability relationship in the first instance.
Trellsite Foundry & Stamping Company v. Enterprise Foundry (1961), 365 Mich 209, does not compel a different result. Trellsite involved an apportionment proceeding under the Workmen’s Compensation Act between former employers. This Court held that the apportionment provision of the statute denied the former employer procedural due process, since only subject to rights of appeal, his liability would be conclusively determined without an opportunity for a hearing. The instant case is clearly distinguishable from Trellsite, supra, in that existing provisions of the statute allow a dissatisfied *337responsible relative, after notification by the Department of Revenue of its determination of Ms liability, to pursue an appeal to the probate court which will then finally determine such liability, at which time any issues germane to such a determination may be raised by the relative, including that of the existence of the requisite liability relationship under the act.
The statute makes ample provision for judicial review of the initial administrative determination of liability, and I would hold that the availability of such review cures the initial denial of an administrative hearing and satisfies procedural due process requirements.
Decision
Finding no merit in the other arguments raised by plaintiffs, I would uphold the constitutionality of this legislation, as against the reasons assigned by these plaintiffs for an opposite holding.
T. G. Kavanagh and Williams, JJ., concurred with T. E. Brennan, J.