Opinion by
The appellant first complains that the court erred in refusing to withdraw a juror as set forth in the first assignment, the occasion for such application being the remark of the court drawn out in a colloquy with the defendant’s counsel with reference to the significance of the term “criminal abortion,” a fnedical witness having *353used the phrase. Objection was made to the use of the word criminal whereupon that was stricken from the record, and in that connection the court said “I do not think it hurts you because there is not any other kind that could apply to this case.” As the defendant was charged with having produced a criminal abortion, and as the uncontradicted evidence tended strongly to show that such an offense had been committed by some person, the only serious question being whether the defendant was the guilty person, we are unable to see how the defendant was prejudiced by the remark of the court. There is nothing in the testimony to suggest that the cause of the death of the young woman was not that which was stated by the physicians who attended her, and the statement of the court had no bearing on the relation of the defendant to the fact charged in the indictment. To warrant a reversal for the reason assigned it must appear that the remark of the trial judge was prejudicial to the rights of the defendant, or that it is strongly probable that prejudice resulted: Beardslee v. Columbia Township, 188 Pa. 503; Com. v. Longwell, 79 Pa. Superior Ct. 68. The cases cited by the learned counsel for the appellant rest on obviously different grounds.
Objection was made to the admission of the ante-mortem statement made by the young woman who was the subject of the operation. Such declarations are made competent under the Act of June 26, 1895, P. L. 387. The objection covers the form of thé statement and the object for which it was offered. Part of the declaration, in which it is stated that the appellant arranged the operation with the doctor, is said to be incompetent as is also the purpose for which it was offered, there being nothing in the declaration to show that an operation was performed on the young woman by the doctor for the purpose of procuring an abortion. We do not regard either of these objections as substantial. The reference to the defendant in the statement was presumably made on knowledge and it was followed by evidence that the *354defendant took the young woman to the doctor’s office and was there when the act was performed which the Commonwealth alleged was the production of an abortion. What the young woman evidently intended to state was that the defendant arranged to have her see the doctor for whatever purpose was in her mind and that of the defendant. She does not describe what took place as an operation to produce an abortion. What it was, under all of the evidence, was an inquiry for the jury. She states what occurred at the time of the visit to the doctor. She did not give an opinion, as to what had been done but confined her statements to the acts performed by the doctor in the presence of the defendant. There can be no doubt of the admissibility of her statement that an operation was performed. Whether it was of the character and for the purpose charged in the indictment could only be determined from consideration of all of the relevant facts developed by the testimony.
Under the third assignment the appellant contends that the case should not have been submitted to the jury because the guilt of the doctor, who was alleged to have performed the operation, was not first established. The defendant was indicted as a principal under the 44th section of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1860 and, although the evidence may have shown that he was an accessory before the fact to the criminal charge, he was liable to be indicted, tried, convicted and punished in all respects as though he were the principal felon. The learned trial judge instructed the jury that they must find that the crime was committed and that the defendant procured it to be committed. The whole case, therefore, of the commission of the offense and of the defendant’s participation therein, was given to the jury. The law does not require that the person alleged to have actually performed the operation should be tried before this defendant: Com. v. Bradley, 16 Pa. Superior Ct. 561. The defendant was indicted as a principal, and the testimony tended to show that he procured the act to be *355done and wás present at its commission. On the facts disclosed by tbe evidence we find no error in tbe answers to tbe defendant’s second and fourth points. There was evidence supporting tbe Commonwealth’s charge that tbe defendant bad participated in tbe act of procuring an abortion. Tbe declaration of tbe young woman was corroborated by testimony of the defendant’s admissions to tbe extent that be took her to tbe doctor’s office and was present while tbe doctor performed some act or made some examination of her, although be did not see just what was done. Other evidence tended to show bis knowledge and to establish a motive. Tbe evidence was, therefore, sufficient to sustain tbe action of tbe court in submitting tbe case to the jury. No error is disclosed which will sustain a reversal.
The judgment is affirmed, tbe record is remitted to tbe court below, and it is ordered that tbe appellant appear at such time as he may be called and that be be by that court committed until be has complied with tbe sentence or any part of it that bad not been performed at tbe time this appeal became a supersedeas.