Richard Demarshaf Menyweather appeals his jury trial conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. He contends that the district court abused its discretion in admitting police officer testimony as lay opinion testimony rather than expert testimony.
We review the district court’s evidentia-ry rulings for abuse of discretion, subject to harmless error review. United States v. Ebron, 683 F.3d 105, 133 (5th Cir.2012). The officers testified that flight from police is evidence of consciousness of guilt and that they did not believe the firearm needed to be fingerprinted in light of the strength of the evidence indicating that Menyweather had possessed the firearm. Contrary to Menyweather’s argument, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the officers’ testimony as lay opinion testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 701. See Fed.R.Evid. 701; Ebron, 683 F.3d at 136-38. Moreover, any error was harmless because there is not a reasonable possibility that their testimony contributed to the conviction in light of the other strong evidence of Menyweather’s guilt. See United States v. Mendoza-Medina, 346 F.3d 121, 127 (5th Cir.2003).
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.