Appellant, Commercial Life Insurance Company (“Commercial”) sued in district court for judicial review of a final order issued by the Texas State Board of Insurance (“the Board”) in a contested ease. The district court, over Commercial’s objection, held that the proper method of review for the Board’s order was substantial evidence rather than trial de novo and preponderance of the evidence. The district court declined, after its substantial evidence review, to reverse the Board’s order. Commercial appealed to this Court. We will reverse the district court’s judgment and remand the cause to that court.
THE CONTROVERSY
Commercial, a foreign corporation, applied to reserve the name “Commercial Life Insurance Company” in connection with Commercial’s intention to obtain a corporate charter issuable by the Board under Tex.Ins.Code Ann. arts. 3.02 and 3.04 (Supp.1991). The Commissioner of the Board (“Commissioner”) granted Commercial’s name reservation. Commercial’s name reservation was protested by appel-lees Commercial Life & Accident Insurance Company, Bankers Commercial Life Insurance Company, and Commercial National Life Insurance Company, all of which appealed the Commissioner’s ruling to the Board. The Board denied the name reservation desired by Commercial on the statutory ground that the name “Commercial Life Insurance Company” was so similar to that of other insurance companies as to be likely to mislead the public. Tex.Ins.Code Ann. art. 3.02, § 1(2) (Supp.1991). Commercial sued for judicial review of the Board’s order, as authorized by Tex.Ins. Code Ann. art. 1.04(f) (1981), which provides that such causes of action “shall be tried and determined upon a trial de novo” *554and, moreover, “the substantial evidence rule shall not apply.” 1
The opposing insurance companies and the Board first moved in district court for dismissal of the cause on the ground that Commercial had not filed with the Board a timely motion for rehearing.2 Initially, the trial court dismissed the cause on that basis, a judgment we previously affirmed. The supreme court, however, reversed our judgment and remanded the cause to the district court for further proceedings. See Commercial Life Ins. v. Bd. of Ins., 774 S.W.2d 650 (Tex.1989).
Following remand, the district court refused Commercial’s application for a trial de novo and then rendered judgment, based on the record compiled at the Board, sus-taming the Board’s order on the ground that it was supported by substantial evidence. From that judgment, Commercial appeals to this Court on three points of error.
DISCUSSION AND HOLDING
In its first point of error, Commercial contends that the trial court erred in affirming the Board’s order on the basis of a substantial evidence scope of review, arguing that “the law under which review is sought,” article 1.04(f) of the Insurance Code, expressly provides for judicial review by trial de novo. Texas Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act (“AP-TRA”), Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6252-13a, § 19(e) (Supp.1991).3 The Board con*555tends article 1.04(f) is unconstitutional in its mandate for a trial de novo, insofar as the present controversy is concerned. It argues that the issue in controversy— whether the name “Commercial Life Insurance Company” is so similar to that of other insurance companies as to be likely to mislead the public — invokes “legislative” or political considerations and policies which lie outside the judicial power conferred upon the courts of this state. Thus, the Board contends that article 1.04(f) of the Insurance Code violates the separation of powers requirement in Tex. Const. Ann. art. II, § 1 (1984), if it is interpreted to require a trial de novo in the present case, as opposed to a substantial evidence scope of review based on the agency record and limited to the questions of law listed in APTRA § 19(e)(l)-(6).
The supreme court rejected this identical argument, in relation to article 1.04(f) itself, in Key Western Life Ins. Co. v. State Board of Insurance, 163 Tex. 11, 350 S.W.2d 839 (1961). In Key Western, the trial court used the substantial evidence scope of review in reviewing a Board ruling that denied approval of an insurance policy form because it contained provisions which “encouraged misrepresentation” and were “unjust, unfair, inequitable, misleading, deceptive, or contrary to the public policy of this state” in violation of 1957 Tex.Gen. Laws, eh. 501, § 1, at 1464 [Tex.Ins.Code Ann. art. 3.42(f), since amended]. Key Western, 350 S.W.2d at 841. On appeal, the supreme court held that the proper scope of review as mandated by article 1.04(f) of the Insurance Code was by trial de novo. We believe the holding of Key Western controls the disposition of the present case.
In Key Western, the Board made exactly the same argument that it does in the present case. The Board argued that the determination of whether the policy form contained provisions which violated article 3.42(f) was a legislative function, and thus could only be reviewed on appeal under the substantial evidence rule. The Board argued that a review of its decision by trial de novo would violate the separation of powers clause of the Texas Constitution. The supreme court unequivocally rejected this argument and held that the determination made by the Board was a quasi-judicial function which was reviewable on appeal by a trial de novo under the preponderance of the evidence rule. Id. at 849.
In this case, the Board argues that name similarity decisions are constitutionally required to be reviewed under the substantial evidence test because these decisions are an administrative function of the agency and because name similarity among insurers, with its potential to deceive consumers, affects the public as a whole. The Board attempts to undermine Key Western by relying on a number of bank and savings and loan cases involving a completely different statutory scheme and judicial analysis.4 We consider these cases to be inappo-site. Thus, we will employ the same analysis used by the supreme court in Key Western and its progeny.
The supreme court noted in Key Western that it was obliged, if possible, to construe the de novo review mandate in § 1.04(f) “in such a way as to avoid repug-nancy to the Constitution.” 350 S.W.2d at 849. In determining the constitutionality of the review statute the courts must con*556sider whether the reviewing court is required to exercise a function that is deemed nonjudicial. An inquiry by a court is nonjudicial and unconstitutional if it looks to the future and changes existing conditions by making a new rule which is to be applied thereafter. However, a court engages in a judicial inquiry if it investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and under laws already in existence. Thus, the court’s action is adjudicatory in nature if its action is particular and immediate rather than general and future. Id. at 847.
This analysis leads us to conclude that the Board’s action in denying Commercial its name reservation was quasi-judicial and not legislative in nature. Just as the only function of the Board in Key Western was to determine whether the form of the policy submitted for its approval met the standards prescribed by article 3.42(f), likewise the Board’s only function in this case was to determine whether Commercial’s name reservation met the standards prescribed by article 3.02, § 1(2) of the Insurance Code.
Finally, the Board suggests that we should abandon the holding in Key Western as an aberrational precedent which should no longer be followed. It is our opinion that Key Western is sound precedent which continues to be cited and applied not only by this Court but also by the supreme court of this state.5 We hold, therefore, that article 1.04(f) of the Insurance Code is constitutional as applied in the present case, and that the trial court erred in determining this cause based upon a substantial evidence scope of review, thus denying Commercial a trial de novo.
Because we have sustained Commercial’s first point, we will not consider the remaining points of error. See Tex.R.App.P.Ann. 90(a) (Pamph.1990). Consequently, we reverse the judgment below and remand the cause to the district court for further proceedings not inconsistent with our opinion.