Appellants, Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company (Fireman’s) and Dale M. Taylor, appeal a decision of the Crittenden County Chancery Court granting appellees’ motions to dismiss.1 They contend that the trial judge erred in finding that appellees were relieved of their obligations under a mortgage indebtedness which appellees previously had assumed as intervening or remote grantees.
*144On August 1,1977, appellees purchased property from Mr. and Mrs. Jerry Briggs. As part of the consideration, appellees assumed the Briggs’s obligations under the mortgage the Briggses had with Commercial National Mortgage Company (Commercial National). Three months later, appellees conveyed the subject property to the Gaymans, who also assumed the mortgage indebtedness. The Gaymans procured from Fireman’s a homeowners insurance contract which, among other things, covered direct loss by fire to the property. On October 10,1983, the primary building on the property was partially destroyed by fire. Fireman’s, giving suspected arson as the reason, denied coverage to the Gaymans.
The Gaymans subsequently sued Fireman’s, and the trial court found Fireman’s had no liability. Thereafter, Fireman’s, in accordance with a standard or union mortgage clause in its policy, fully satisfied the deed of trust held by Commercial National in return for Commercial National’s assignment of that deed of trust and its release of Fireman’s from any further claims. The Gaymans later defaulted in their note payments and Fireman’s commenced this foreclosure action against all parties in the chain of title, including the appellees.
In their motions to dismiss, appellees argued that Commercial National’s unilateral release of Fireman’s also discharged their liability under the trust deed note. In granting their motions, the trial judge found that (1) after the fire, the property and the proceeds from the insurance policy secured the trust deed note; (2) Fireman’s took an assignment of the obligation owed to Commercial National and secured a release from Commercial National of Fireman’s obligations under the policy; (3) the debt owed Commercial National had been paid in full by Fireman’s when they secured an assignment of the obligation; and (4) by Commercial National releasing Fireman’s of its obligations under the insurance policy, the collateral was impaired and appellees were relieved of any further obligation on the mortgage. On appeal, Fireman’s contends that the trial court erred in applying the law of Arkansas. We agree and reverse.
Appellees first argue that Fireman’s was obligated to pay the replacemént cost or actual loss of the building rather than pay the mortgage indebtedness, which was the lesser of these amounts. *145Because Fireman’s did not repair the damage to the building and thereby impaired the collateral securing the mortgage against the property, the trial court, appellees contend, properly estopped Fireman’s from foreclosing against them, as remote grantees and innocent third parties. We believe appellees are wrong for several reasons.
As was stated in Brown v. Summerlin Associates, Inc., 272 Ark. 298, 301, 614 S.W.2d 227, 229 (1981), there is a presumption that parties contract only for the benefit of themselves, and a contract will not be considered as having been made for the use and benefit of a third party unless it clearly appears that such was the intention of the parties. We also note the general rule that insurance policies are personal contracts between the insured and the insurer, and not contracts running with the property. National Bedding & Furniture Industries, Inc. v. Clark, 252 Ark. 780, 481 S.W.2d 690 (1972). In the instant case, the Fireman’s policy, covering the subject property, reflected the Gaymans as the insured and identified Commercial National as the mortgagee. In addition, the policy defined “insured,” in pertinent part, to include the Gaymans, their relatives and any other person under twenty-one years of age in the care of the insured. In sum, the appellees were not mentioned in the policy and, unless we place ourselves in the position of rewriting the terms of that policy, appellees clearly were not named as persons entitled to benefits under the policy’s provisions.
Nor can we agree that the appellees were intended to benefit indirectly — relieved as obligors under the deed of trust — by Fireman’s payment to Commercial National pursuant to the mortgage clause in the Gaymans’ policy.2 That standard mort*146gage clause merely provided that any damage to the subject property by the Gaymans, as the insureds, would not relieve Fireman’s of its obligations to pay Commercial National the unpaid principal plus accrued interest due under the trust deed note if Commercial National, in turn, would assign its beneficial interest in the trust deed and note to Fireman’s.
The general rule is that under a standard mortgage clause the insurer has entered into a separate contract with the mortgagee just as if the latter had applied for the insurance entirely independently of the mortgagor. So far as the mortgagor is concerned, such a policy operates over and above the mortgagee’s interest. 5A J. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 3401, at 287-88 (rev. ed. 1970). It is also settled law that, if the insurer has no liability to the mortgagor, the proceeds of insurance on the mortgaged property, when paid to the mortgagee, need not be applied in reduction of the mortgaged debt. See 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 328, at 453 (1949). We recognize the cases of United Stores of America, Inc. v. Firemans Fund Insurance Co., 420 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1970), and Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Shaw, 269 Ark. 757, 600 S.W.2d 432 (Ark. App. 1980), cited by appellees, but we find them inapposite, since they do not involve an insurer’s payment to a mortgagee under a standard mortgage clause when an insured mortgagor caused the loss to the covered property and, therefore, was not entitled to proceeds under the terms of the policy.3
*147Here, the Gaymans, Fireman’s, and Commercial National were the only persons who had any privity in this matter, and because they caused the loss, the Gaymans were found not entitled to any direct benefits or proceeds under the policy. Nor should they benefit indirectly by having their mortgage indebtedness extinguished merely because the insurer paid the mortgagee pursuant to a separate agreement (standard mortgage clause) under that policy. While we say United Stores is in no way controlling here, we do note the court’s recognition there of the rule that, generally, subrogation may be allowed when the insurer, having a policy defense against the owner or mortgagor, pays the mortgagee pursuant to a loss payable clause in the policy.
Appellees next argue that Fireman’s rights of subrogation are invalid as to any party other than the Gaymans. Again, the law fails to support appellees’ contention. The case of Hill v. Massachusetts Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 195 Ark. 602, 113 S.W.2d 104 (1938), involved an insurance policy which provided that, when the insurer paid the mortgagee for a loss and denied coverage to the mortgagor, the insurer was subrogated to the extent of such payment to all of the rights of the mortgagee under the mortgage. Where the mortgaged property was destroyed by the mortgagor, the supreme court held the assignment of the mortgage from the mortgagee to the insurer was valid, stating:
In consideration of the payment of this insurance the mortgagee transferred and assigned to the insurance companies a proportionate interest in the mortgage and the debt secured by it. We know of no reason why the provision to this effect contained in the insurance policies should not be enforced, especially so after the mortgagee had assigned that interest, a thing which could have been done for a valuable consideration, although there had been no contractual provision requiring it.
Id. at 605-06, 113 S.W.2d at 106.
In the instant case, the appellees remained contractually liable on their prior assumption of the mortgage indebtedness *148on the subject property, Elliott v. Cravens, 182 Ark. 893, 33 S.W.2d 373 (1930), and it is on the basis of this contractual obligation that appellees became personally liable to Fireman’s — assignee of Commercial National — and were made parties to this foreclosure action. Applying the holding in Hill to the facts here, Fireman’s should be allowed to enforce the terms of its newly-acquired deed and note from Commercial National against appellees since the appellees remained contractually liable on that previously assumed debt.
Finally, appellees contend they should not be responsible for the Gaymans’ wrongdoing and Fireman’s should not be allowed to receive a “windfall” by collecting the mortgaged indebtedness from innocent third parties. Of course, the short answer to appellees’ contention here is that Fireman’s foreclosure action is not based upon the Gaymans’ conduct, tortious or otherwise, but is based upon the breach of contractual obligations contained in the trust deed and note which had been assumed by the appellees. In this action, Fireman’s is merely trying to recoup the amount it paid Commercial National which is in accordance with the contractual right Fireman’s was given by the standard mortgage clause in the policy covering the subject property. For appellees to label this a “windfall,” we believe, is a misnomer.
Because we hold the trial court’s decision is contrary to the law, we reverse and remand this cause with directions to reinstate Fireman’s action against appellees.
Reversed and remanded.
Mayfield, J., dissents; Corbin, J., concurs.