*694MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter is before the Court on Defendant United States’ Motion for Summary Judgment.1 Plaintiff, Earl C. Mills (Mills), has filed a response to the motion. The United States, acting through the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), did not file a reply, and the time for doing so has now expired. The Court has reviewed the briefs submitted by the parties and is now prepared to rule. This matter constitutes a core proceeding,2 and the Court has jurisdiction to decide it. The Court denies the motion for summary judgment, and the matter is now set for trial.
I. FINDINGS OF FACT
Mills initiated this adversary proceeding seeking a determination that his federal income tax obligations for the years 1987 through 1998, now totaling $1,727,813,3 are dischargeable in this Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Code permits a debt- or to discharge income taxes in Chapter 7 for a period that is at least three years before the bankruptcy filing, if the applicable returns were filed at least two years before the bankruptcy case, the returns are not fraudulent, and the debtor has not willfully attempted, in any manner, to evade or defeat the otherwise dischargea-ble taxes. IRS contends that Mills did willfully attempt to evade or defeat his taxes for those years, and, therefore, the taxes are nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(C).4
The basic facts underlying this case are not really in dispute. Mills is a neurosurgeon who obtained his medical degree in 1969 and has been actively employed as a neurosurgeon since at least 1976. During the twelve year period at issue in this case, his adjusted gross income ranged from a low of $84,392 in 1997 to a high of $434,003 in 1990, with an average annual income of $255,243.5 His AGI over this period of time totaled $3,062,914, with a tax due on returns in the same period totaling $557,762.13, or only 18.2% of his AGI. In 1998, Mills closed his private practice and took a salaried position at Howard University, where he worked until the end of 1999 for an annual salary of $300,000.
During this same period, Mills was married to another physician who had annual income also available to support their family of four (consisting of Drs. Mills and their two children, who were born in approximately 1983 and 1986) in amounts in the $120,000 to $150,000 range. Mills also was in the Amway business, and records reflect his receipt, during some period, of another $3,000 per month attributable to that business venture. This translated into monthly gross income to support their family of anywhere from $44,000 to $54,000 *695per month during at least portions of the time period in question.6
In August 2000, Mills took a position at the Wichita Clinic in Wichita, Kansas for an annual salary of $350,000-$393,000. At the time of the filing of this bankruptcy in 2003, Mills’ Schedule I reflected monthly gross income of $37,171.60, which would equal approximately $446,000 per annum. Mills also earns substantial additional income by doing medical consulting, in addition to the Wichita Clinic salary; he projected $45,000 in consulting income for 2003. Accordingly, at the time he filed this bankruptcy petition, it appears his 2003 income may have been in the one-half million dollar range. It is also relevant to note this is Dr. Mills’ second bankruptcy, the other one having been filed in Maryland in approximately 1990.7
Mills ultimately filed a tax return for each year in question, although eight of the twelve returns were filed late.8 During most of that time period, Mills was apparently self employed, and thus required to pay estimated tax payments on a quarterly basis. Mills did not pay those estimated taxes9 as they became due throughout the tax year, nor did he pay the balance due on the returns when the returns were ultimately filed.
For the years 1987 to 1998, Mills incurred income tax liabilities in the sum of $557,762.13, excluding interest and penalties. IRS contends that Mills had more than adequate income available to him to pay these taxes as they became due, and before interest and penalties accrued, but that he made the choice, instead, to live an extravagant lifestyle. IRS relies, in part, on Mills’ decision to purchase, and then continue to own, certain pieces of expensive real estate (including owning three separate houses simultaneously during a significant part of the relevant time frame — at least 1989 to 1995) to support its position. Specifically, IRS contends that the following transactions are evidence of Mills’ decision to continue a lavish lifestyle, instead of choosing to have a very comfortable lifestyle while also paying his tax obligations:
1. In 1978, Mills purchased a house in Rockville, Maryland for approximately $216,000. Mills lived there for approximately four years and required a mortgage payment of approximately $1,800 per month. Mills then rented the property to his *696wife’s parents for monthly rent of approximately $300 (and he thus paid the remaining $1,500 monthly mortgage payment) until the property was foreclosed in 1995. The estimated fair market value of the property in 1993 was $700,000. There is no evidence in the record why these individuals required support, or if support was necessary, why they required such a high-dollar residence, or why they could not have resided with the Mills.
2. In 1980, Mills purchased a house in Potomac, Maryland for $545,000.10
3. In 1983, Mills purchased a townhouse in Bethesda, Maryland requiring a monthly mortgage payment of approximately $2,325. Mills allowed his wife’s sister to live in this property for $500 a month in rent (while he paid the remaining $1,825 of the required payment) until the property was foreclosed in 1995. The estimated fair market value of the property in 1993 was $350,000. Again, there is no evidence why Mills was obligated to support this person, or if necessary to provide her support, why she required such a high-dollar residence, or why she could not have resided with the Mills.
4. Also in 1983, Mills purchased a second home, in Potomac Falls, Maryland, for approximately $600,000, which is where Mills and his immediate family lived. In 1987, Mills sold this house for $1.4 million.
5. In February 1989, Mills purchased another home in Potomac, Maryland for $2.8 million.11 He used the $800,000 “profit” from the sale of the Potomac Falls home as a down payment on this 8,000 square foot, eight bedroom, ten bathroom house.12 The mortgage on the home required a monthly payment of approximately $25,000.13 The estimated fair market value of the home in 1993, six years after he had acquired it, was $3.1 million. The loan on the house was also foreclosed in 1995 when he stopped making the required payments.
6. From 1995 until 2000, Mills rented property in Potomac, Maryland for $5,500 to $6,000 per month.14 This home had the approximate same square footage as the $3.1 million home (8,000 sq. ft.).15
7. Upon moving to Wichita, Kansas in 2000, Mills first rented a 4,000 *697square-foot house for $5,000 per month.
8. In May 2003, Mills purchased a 6,000 square-foot, five-bedroom house in Wichita, Kansas for $370,000, which required a monthly mortgage payment of $5,627.14, not including real estate taxes and insurance.16 This home has an elevator and a swimming pool, although there is nothing in the record indicating that anyone living in this home has any disabilities.
IRS also cites several other purchases, transactions and living expenses to support its position that Mills chose to enhance, or at least maintain, his lifestyle instead of paying his income taxes, including:
1. Mills throughout the years in question paid living expenses of his wife’s parents (and at least the housing expenses of a sister-in-law for some portion of time).
2. In 1988, Mill purchased approximately $17,075 worth of antiques for his home.17
3. Mills purchased a new Mercedes Benz automobile in 1982 and another in 1984, as well as a 1987 model year van and a 1987 model year Jeep in December 1986.
4. Mills purchased artwork in the 1980s for approximately $50,000, and apparently has never liquidated that art in an attempt to pay ongoing, or past due, taxes.18
5. Mills’ children attended private schools for a time when the family lived on the East Coast.
6. Mills belonged to a country club in Wichita, Kansas and he paid for his wife’s personal trainer at a cost of $480/month for some period of time in 2003.
7. Mills and his wife took a trip to Hawaii in 2004 at a cost of over $4,000.
8. Mills hired an interior decorator for approximately $350.
9. In 2001, when his tax liability well exceeded a million dollars, Mills donated over $23,000 to his church.
Mills has responded to many of these allegations, claiming IRS has “scant facts” to support its assertions. He argues that many of the identified purchases and ex*698penses took place prior to 1987, when these tax obligations arose, and thus could not be evidence of a willful failure to pay during the years in question. Mills also states that he tried, to dispose of at least one of the properties in the Washington, D.C. area, but that a downturn in the real estate market made disposing of the properties impractical. Further, Mills points out that his children stopped attending private schools when his family moved to Kansas, that his donations to his church are motivated by religious beliefs and not an attempt to evade his taxes, and that his membership in the country club no longer exists.19 He contends he joined the country club merely to build business contacts upon moving to Kansas. Finally, Mills claims that many of the expenses, such as a payment of $850 to an interior decorator, are so de minimus that they do not support IRS’s position.
Additional facts will be discussed below, when necessary.
II. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party demonstrates that there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact” and that it is “entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”20 In applying this standard, the Court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.21 An issue is “genuine” if “there is sufficient evidence on each side so that a rational trier of fact could resolve the issue either way.”22 A fact is “material” if, under the applicable substantive law, it is “essential to the proper disposition of the claim.”23
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating an absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.24 In attempting to meet that standard, a mov-ant who does not bear the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial need not negate the other party’s claim; rather, the movant need simply point out to the court a lack of evidence for the other party on an essential element of that party’s claim.25
If the movant carries this initial burden, the nonmovant who would bear the burden of persuasion at trial may not simply rest upon his pleadings; the burden shifts to the nonmovant to go beyond the pleadings and “set forth specific facts” that would be admissible in evidence in the event of trial from which a rational trier of fact could find for the nonmovant.26 To accomplish this, sufficient evidence pertinent to the material issue “must be identified by refer*699ence to an affidavit, a deposition transcript, or a specific exhibit incorporated therein.”27 Finally, the Court notes that summary judgment is not a “disfavored procedural shortcut;” rather, it is an important procedure “designed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.”28
III. ANALYSIS
A debtor under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code is generally granted a discharge from all debts that arose before the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Exceptions to discharge are to be strictly construed in favor of debtors.29 The objecting creditor, here the IRS, bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the debtor’s taxes are nondischargeable.30
Certain debts are excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523, including any debt “for a tax or custom ... with respect to which the debtor ... willfully attempted in any manner to evade or defeat such tax ....”31 Evidence of nonpayment alone does not, however, support a finding that a tax debt is nondischargeable.32 To defeat the discharge of the tax debt, the creditor must prove that the debtor willfully attempted to evade or defeat the tax, and that proof must contain both a “conduct” element, that the debtor has attempted in any manner to evade or defeat tax, and a “mental state” element, that he has acted willfully.33 The conduct required is that the debtor attempted in any manner to evade or defeat a tax, which can include either affirmative conduct or acts of culpable omission. The willfulness required under §' 523(a)(1)(C) is met if the actions are done voluntarily, consciously, or knowingly and intentionally.34
Interwoven into the Court’s analysis is the underlying policy that § 523(a)(1)(C) should be applied in such a fashion as to best promote its purpose of limiting discharge to the honest but unfortunate debtor.35 Thus, the late filing of returns, or the failure to pay taxes as they became due, due to mistake, inadvertence or an honest misunderstanding would not, without more, constitute a willful attempt to evade or defeat a tax. Conversely, conduct found to be sufficient for a finding of willful tax evasion under § 523(a)(1)(C) could include the combination of unexcused late-filed returns and significant understatement of income.36 As the Court understands the evidence, there is no dispute that Mills had a duty to file returns and pay taxes, and that he knew he had such a duty.
*700It is important to note that in order for a debt to be non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(1)(C), the debtor does not have to have acted with a bad purpose or an evil motive.37 A tax can be found non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(1)(C) if the debtor has elected to pay creditors other than his tax creditors and to purchase discretionary items rather than address his tax obligation. When a debtor has made the conscious choice to pay other debts and purchase luxury items or an expensive home, instead of paying an admitted tax liability, he can be said to have acted willfully under § 523(a)(1)(C).38 As stated in United States v. Angel,39 the Court must distinguish
“... between the debtor with the present ability to pay who so refuses and the unfortunate debtor without a present ability to repay. Debtors with an inability to pay their taxes with no more culpability will have their tax debts discharged. However, debtors who have cash in hand and, instead of responding to their tax obligations, choose to pay other creditors or purchase luxury items and expensive homes will have their tax debts excepted from discharge.”40
The Court finds that the following four, admittedly overlapping, factors should be considered when deciding whether Mills is an unfortunate debtor who simply was unable to pay his taxes, as they became due, or a debtor who had adequate funds, but instead chose to pay others. The Court will analyze these under a “totality of the circumstances” standard, which is required because direct proof of an intention to evade or defeat taxes may be difficult to establish.
First, the Court should consider under what circumstances the tax obligations arose. For example, over what period of time did the taxes arise? Was it a onetime occurrence, or a pattern of accumulation of tax obligations? Was there some unexpected, and unavoidable, reduction in income or increase in expenses that caused a debtor to suddenly become unable to meet all his financial obligations, such as job loss or illness, or an employee’s embezzlement of funds?
Second, once the tax obligation first arose, did the debtor take steps to ensure that his ongoing expenses were reasonable and necessary in light of his available income (after payment of taxes attributable to that income)? For example, did the existing level of the debtor’s lifestyle predate the unpaid tax obligations, or did the lifestyle become more extravagant (or continue to be extravagant) while the tax obligations were accruing? If his lifestyle did not become more extravagant, did debtor take reasonable steps to decrease expenses so as to be able to meet ongoing liabilities? In this case, IRS contends that Mills should have simply sold one or all of the homes he owned in the Washington D.C. area to save on the large monthly mortgage payments (and the taxes, insurance, and upkeep associated therewith). IRS *701also contends that Mills should have sold the properties occupied by his wife’s relatives to save on the large mortgage payments required to retain those additional homes.41
Mills has responded that he attempted to sell at least the $3.1 million home at some point after he acquired it, but that the real estate market had fallen and he was unable to sell it.42 If Mills did in fact take reasonable steps to sell the properties to eliminate the large mortgage payments, but was unable to do sell the property due to no fault of his own, or could only sell the property at a loss (such that it would not net income for payment of tax liabilities or if such sale would result in negative tax consequences not offset by mortgage savings), then that fact would be relevant to the issue of whether he willfully failed to pay the taxes that came due after he was unable to sell the property.
Third, the Court should look at the particular debtor’s awareness of his tax situation and whether he is financially savvy enough to understand the consequences of his spending choices. In other words, was the debtor acting in good faith surrounding the tax obligations? For example, a highly educated debtor, such as Mills, might well be held to a higher standard than a less educated debtor. In addition, a higher income debtor, who could well afford professional tax counseling provided by a lawyer or accountant,43 might be held to a higher standard than a lower income debtor.
On that same subject, whether a debtor is making reasonable efforts to comply with all aspects of the Internal Revenue Code could well be relevant for the Court to determine the willfulness of a debtor’s election not to pay his outstanding tax obligations as they become due. Was the debtor routinely timely filing tax returns, or was he making it difficult for the tax collectors by purposely requiring the collector to chase outstanding returns? Was the debtor, when he filed his tax returns, declaring all income earned, or was he requiring IRS to audit the return because of unexplained income purportedly received?44 Was the debtor electing to pay some kinds of taxes, while choosing not to pay others, such as payment of “trust fund” type taxes that would not be dischargeable45 in a personal bankruptcy *702versus income taxes that, after a certain period of time, might be? Was debtor taking deliberate steps to avoid accumulating assets that could be seized to satisfy his liabilities, such as by renting instead of purchasing assets?46 Finally, what was the debtor’s history with the IRS prior to the time he started not paying taxes? Had he always previously timely filed and paid, or had there been repeated collection problems, which might show that a particular debtor had a unique understanding of the consequences of not paying taxes?
Finally, the Court should consider any other factors that might show intent, including the reasonableness of expenses paid in lieu of taxes. For example, it may not be reasonable for one debtor to send his child to private school while it could be perfectly reasonable for another to do so if he had a child with special needs, or if the public schools demonstrably failed to provide an adequate education.47 Or, it might not be reasonable for a family of two to purchase a large, four wheel drive sport utility vehicle to drive around a large city, while it might be perfectly reasonable for a family of six who lives in a rural community to do so. Furthermore, homes typically cost more in the Washington, D.C. area than they do in Kansas, for example, and thus whether a given mortgage payment is reasonable may depend on the area where a debtor resides, and at what cost safe and comfortable housing is reasonably available. Although the Court well suspects Mills could have found safe, comfortable and affordable housing for considerably less than $25,000 per month, there was no evidence in the record of this fact.
In applying these factors to this case, the Court finds that although it is a close decision, summary judgment is not appropriate because of the required standard of review for summary judgment motions. Mills argues that there is no evidence he purposely sought to expand or increase his standard of living following the start of his tax problems in 1987; instead, he argues that by that time he already had a high lifestyle and that he was unable to extricate himself from the expenses that came with that lifestyle despite his well-intentioned efforts to do so.
Part of the reason the Court finds that granting summary judgment at this stage is inappropriate is because Mills correctly notes that many of the purchases and expenses IRS relies upon to show willfulness occurred prior to, or around the same time as, when Mills’ tax obligations began to accrue. The only expenditures IRS points to, which occurred after his tax problems began in 1987, essentially include those for the purchase of $17,000 in antiques, the *703purchase of the home in Wichita, the temporary use of a storage facility upon moving to Wichita, the country club membership for some time, and the purchase of several used, albeit expensive, automobiles upon the family’s arrival in Wichita.48 Mills has testified, by affidavit, as to each of these expenses, and if all inferences are made in the light most favorable to him, summary judgment is not appropriate. Mills has also presented evidence that he ultimately took steps to reduce his standard of living. Mills notes that the real estate market had fallen -in the Washington, D.C. area, perhaps in part as a result of tax changes surrounding the deduction of mortgage interest, making the sale of multi-million dollar homes more difficult. He contends he in fact tried to sell the most expensive piece of property, but was unable to do so before it was eventually foreclosed. There is no evidence in the record to refute this contention.
Mills also took steps such as purchasing a much less expensive home when he moved to Wichita (which cost only 13% as much as the $2.8 million house in the D.C. area), sending his children to public school once they moved to Kansas, and buying used vehicles to replace two Mercedes Benz automobiles. On that same subject, he argues that although he admittedly purchased two new Mercedes Benz automobiles in 1982 and 1984, several years before the tax problems at issue arose in 1987, that he and his wife then drove those automobiles until they moved to Wichita in 2000, at which time they could no longer be -repaired.
The Court finds, for purposes of this summary judgment motion, that Mills did make some effort to marginally reduce his monthly expenses. IRS is free at trial to present evidence concerning the reasonableness of Mills’ efforts, in light of his family income, and whether Mills could and should have done more to reduce his living expenses.49 The uncontroverted evidence in this case does show that Mills incurred the tax obligations over a very long period of time, by simply, year after year, failing to pay his taxes as they became due. This is clearly not a case where Mills experienced an unexpected drop in earnings or incurred some unexpected expenses and needed a reasonable period of time to accept that he needed to adjust his standard of living so that he could afford to meet his tax obligations. The taxes in quest on in this motion span a period of twelve years in which Mills completely failed to pay his taxes. Although this factor certainly weighs in favor of the IRS, it is not sufficient, taken by itself, to allow the Court to rule,- as a matter of law, that Mills willfully failed to meet his tax obligations.
Finally, there are numerous other questions that surround the evidence submitted by IRS that preclude summary judgment. *704For example, IRS relies upon the fact that Mills belonged to a country club in Wichita, Kansas as evidence of his lavish lifestyle. The amount spent at the country club is not itemized. Mills has responded that the country club membership was intended to assist his efforts in networking and building his medical practice following his move to Kansas (and not to evade taxes), and that he has since canceled that membership. IRS also notes that he paid for a personal trainer for his wife, to which Mills responds the trainer was only hired for a short period of time and was necessary for certain health reasons, which are undisclosed.50 Again, for purposes of summary judgment, the Court must accepts Mills’s explanation for these expenses and finds that, standing alone, they do partly negate IRS’ contention that Mills willfully failed to pay his taxes.
Without going into each and every argument made by the parties, the Court finds that Mills has raised sufficient questions of fact to preclude summary judgment. The central issue here is whether Mills acted willfully in failing to pay his taxes. Given Mills’ explanation for why he failed to sell the properties in Washington, D.C. when it became patently obvious he could not afford them while simultaneously paying his tax obligation, and his somewhat reduced lifestyle once he moved to Wichita, the Court cannot find that there is sufficient evidence to rule, as a matter of law, that Mills willfully failed to meet his tax obligations. The evidence presented in this motion may well turn out to be sufficient to establish willfulness at trial, but it is not sufficient for summary judgment.51
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court finds that summary judgment cannot be granted with the evidence before it. IRS has outlined numerous purchases, transactions and expenses that do appear to be lavish, and the Court is struck by the amount of income Mills and his wife earned during the time when he was regularly not paying his taxes. That said, however, Mills has provided enough of an explanation for his lifestyle and living expenses that, when all reasonable inferences are viewed in the light most favorable to him, raise a factual question as to whether he willfully failed to pay his income taxes.
“[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge’s function is not ... to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.”52 Accordingly, this issue must be decided as a factual matter following a full opportunity for both sides to present evidence to the Court as a trier of fact. Mills suggests his non-payment over twelve years was as a result of a “downward spiral” and that “despite his best efforts” he was unable to meet all his obligations. It will be this Court’s job, after hearing all the evidence and assessing the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses, to determine why Mills, who appears to have had the wherewithal to pay his taxes, did not do so.
*705IT IS, THEREFORE, BY THIS COURT ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the United States (Doc. 54) is denied. This matter is set for trial on the Court’s stacked eviden-tiary trial docket to commence January 5-6, 2006.