for the Court:
The matter before the court involves a judgment in the amount of $15,140.82, representing treble damages under the Odometer Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1989 (1988), for alleged fraudulent representations by the defendant, appellant herein, Regency Nissan, Inc. (Regency), the retail used car dealer who sold a truck to Jenkins. We reject Regency’s contention that it was entitled to a directed verdict and the other claimed trial errors in evidentiary and instruction rulings and affirm.
I.
On April 11, 1989, William Jenkins traveled from his home in Philadelphia, Mississippi to Jackson, Mississippi in his 1979 Chevrolet pick-up truck and visited Regency, a retail car dealership, where he became interested in a 1987 Dodge Dakota truck with an odometer reading of 51,236 miles. Jenkins noticed that the vehicle had a broken windshield, broken radio, a missing headlight and no inspection sticker. Regency promised to fix those problems if Jenkins bought the truck. With that assurance, Jenkins paid $8,546.94 for the Dakota, with the assurance that the odometer reading was accurate. Although Jenkins objected to taking the truck without the repairs completed and without an inspection sticker attached, he agreed to purchase the Dodge truck on the representation of the Regency salesperson that he already had a buyer for Jenkins’s own Chevrolet truck.
After buying the truck, Jenkins observed that the oil change sticker in the frame of the passenger door which indicated an oil change on March 7, 1989 and mileage of 90,171 miles. Additional problems allegedly arose with the truck, which indicated to Jenkins that the odometer reading was inaccurate and that major defects existed with the vehicle, including such items as the oil pump, pistons, rod bearing, and the camshaft. The motor required an overhaul and the emergency brakes and speedometer cable, which was dragging on the ground, were repaired. There was evidence that the original passenger door had been cut off, a new door welded onto the frame, and the replacement door painted the same color as the truck. The truck had three different brands of tires, all requiring replacement; it also required a front-end realignment and two transmission repairs.
On June 12, 1989, Jenkins filed suit in the First Judicial District of Hinds County against Regency, alleging that he had purchased the Dodge pick-up truck with a fraudulent odometer reading. He requested relief under a federal act, the civil enforcement provision of the Odometer Disclosure Sub-chapter of the Motor Vehicle Information and Costs Saving Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1989 (1988).1
In response to this action, Regency filed an answer, counterclaim, and third-party claim. In its counterclaim, Regency alleged that Jenkins’s action was frivolous and that the complaint violated the Mississippi Litigation Accountability Act of 1988, Miss.Code Ann. § 11-55-1 (Supp.1988). The third-party Complaint named as the third-party defendant Embers Wholesale Automobiles, Inc., (Embers), the wholesaler from whom Regency had purchased the truck. In turn, Embers filed another third-party complaint against others from whom they had purchased the truck. These additional third-party defendants were Paul Baugh d/b/a Star Motors (Star), and Frank G. Weaver and Harry Schermer d/b/a Hwy 49 Motors (Hwy 49). Regency, in turn, also filed a third-party complaint against Star and Hwy 49. The initial owner of the truck was Frank G. Weaver, another third-party defendant. Embers also sought indemnity from these additional defendants on the basis of their prior ownership of the truck.
After all claims and responsive pleadings were filed in trial court, the following parties appeared in the action. The parties are listed in descending order of their ownership of the 1987 Dodge Dakota pick up truck:
*98(1) Plaintiff/Appellee — William H. Jenkins;
(2) Defendant/Appellant — -Regency Nissan, Inc., who answered, filed a third-party complaint, and appeared at trial;
(3) Third-party defendant/Appellee — Embers Wholesale Automobiles, Inc., who answered, filed a third-party complaint, and appeared at trial;
(4) Third-part defendant — Harry Schermer, d/b/a Highway 49 Motors, who answered, appeared at trial pro se, but did not present evidence, question witnesses or argue or appeal;
(5) Third-party defendant — Paul Baugh d/b/a Star Motors, who did not answer or appear at trial or appeal; and
(6) Third-party defendant — Frank G. Weaver, the truck’s original owner, who did not answer or appear at trial or appeal.
Before trial, Regency filed a motion in limine to suppress admission of an oil change sticker that indicated that the Dakota’s mileage was substantially higher than shown on the odometer. Regency’s position was that this document was neither admissible authentic nor as a hearsay exception. Jenkins argued that he offered this sticker to show notice that the mileage was inaccurate rather than to prove the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., that the car had more than 90,000 miles on it. Overruling Regency’s hearsay objection, the trial court found the sticker was admissible and reserved its ruling on the authentication objection until trial.
At trial, Jenkins offered the sticker into evidence. Jenkins admitted that the oil sticker could have been on the replacement passenger door that was put on the Dakota to replace the original door. The parties entered into a stipulation concerning the oil change sticker. Jenkins’s interpretation of the stipulation is that the odometer was tampered with before Regency’s ownership; Regency’s interpretation of the stipulation is that Regency did not tamper with the odometer. Over objection, Jenkins told the jury he would have been willing to pay only $3,500 for the vehicle with its mileage and problems, had he known the “truth.” The trial court admitted the sticker into evidence despite hearsay and authentication objections.
As to a $1,000 repair bill on the car paid by Jenkins, offered to show damages and produced by Jenkins the day before trial, the trial court allowed it into evidence for use in refreshing Jenkins’s memory because Jenkins had only received the bill the day before trial. The trial court excluded entirely the other bills offered by Jenkins for lateness of production.
Shortly before Jenkins rested, Regency introduced a title history of the truck showing that the Dakota had 51,236 miles when Jenkins purchased it; 51,186 miles when Regency purchased it; 51,176 miles when Embers purchased it; 51,160 when Harry Schermer of Hwy 49 motors purchased it; and- 51,144 when Star Motors purchased the vehicle from the original owner. Regency moved for a directed verdict. That motion was denied and the matter was presented to the jury resulting in the aforementioned verdict in favor of Jenkins. Regency appeals raising the following issues:
A) WAS THE VERDICT AGAINST THE OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND DID THE COURT ERR IN FAILING TO GRANT A DIRECTED VERDICT?
B) DID THE COURT ERR IN FAILING TO GRANT THE MOTION IN LI-MINE AND IN ALLOWING INTO EVIDENCE PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 4 (THE OIL STICKER)?
C) DID THE COURT ERR IN FAILING TO SUSTAIN REGENCY’S OBJECTION TO APPELLANT’S EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FAIR MARKET VALUE?
D) DID THE COURT ERR IN GRANTING INSTRUCTION P-4 (PLAINTIFF’S DAMAGE INSTRUCTION) AND BY GRANTING A MODIFICATION TO SAME?
E) DID THE COURT ERR IN FAILING TO DIRECT A VERDICT OR IN FAILING TO REFORM THE VERDICT IN FAVOR OF REGENCY AGAINST EMBERS AND SCHERMER ET AL., AS WELL AS FAILING TO DIRECT A VERDICT AGAINST *99SCHERMER, IN LIGHT OF PEREMPTORY INSTRUCTIONS D-21 AND D-24?
F) DID THE COURT ERR IN GRANTING ATTORNEY’S FEES TO THE ATTORNEY FOR THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE AND IN GRANTING THE AMOUNT AWARDED?
II.
a.
To be found liable for a violation of the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1981 to 1991 (1988), the plaintiff must show that the seller had an intent to defraud. 15 U.S.C. § 1989 (1988). The plaintiff may satisfy the requirements of the Act by showing that the dealer did one of two things. The plaintiff may show that the defendant ear dealer represented a car as having a certain mileage when the dealer had actual or constructive knowledge that the odometer reading was less than the actual miles traveled. Nieto v. Pence, 578 F.2d 640, 641 (5th Cir.1978); Moore v. H. Gene Simmons, Inc., 543 So.2d 186, 187 (Miss.1989); 15 U.S.C. § 1989(b). Alternatively, the plaintiff may show that the dealer failed to disclose that the mileage was unknown if, by using reasonable care, the dealer would have had reason to know that the actual mileage exceeded the odometer reading. Nieto, 578 F.2d at 641. A reckless disregard in fading to determine if the odometer reading is incorrect is also sufficient to prove intent to defraud. Haynes v. Manning, 917 F.2d 450, 452-53 (10th Cir.1990).
Constructive knowledge may be proved by a contradictory odometer statement from another source (See Landrum v. Goddard, 921 F.2d 61, 62 (5th Cir.1991)) or by the vehicle’s overall condition as compared to the mileage shown on the odometer. See Nieto, 578 F.2d at 642. Contrary to other types of fraud claims, the plaintiff’s burden of proof is a preponderance of the evidence. Landrum, 921 F.2d at 62-63.
b.
This Court’s standard of review is limited when determining the sufficiency of the evidence on a motion for a directed verdict. When contradictory testimony exists, this Court will “defer to the jury, which determines the weight and worth of testimony and credibility of the witness at trial.” Odom v. Roberts, 606 So.2d 114, 118 (Miss.1992). This Court “will not reverse a jury verdict unless it is against the overwhelming weight of evidence and credible testimony.” Gifford v. Four-County Elec. Power Ass’n, 615 So.2d 1166, 1171 (Miss.1992). Regency, who moved for a directed verdict, was required to meet this standard with the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom viewed in a light most favorable to Jenkins. Eaton v. Porter, 645 So.2d 1323, 1325-26 (Miss.1994).
Factual disputes arise when “one party swears to one version of the matter in issue and another says the opposite.” Clark v. Moore Memorial United Methodist Church, 538 So.2d 760, 762 (Miss.1989). A directed verdict is inappropriate when questions of fact exist. Illinois Central R.R. v. White, 610 So.2d 308, 314 (Miss.1992).
The plaintiffs evidence in this case consists of three items. The first is an oil sticker, allegedly located on the passenger side door. This sticker reveals a mileage of more than 90,000. Jenkins allegedly discovered the sticker only after he had purchased the truck from Regency and had taken the vehicle home. Jenkins did not know whether the sticker was applicable to his truck or was from the truck from which the replacement door was obtained.
Second, Jenkins testified as to the worn condition of the truck’s individual parts. Jenkins, who was a military tank mechanic in the Korean conflict, did testify as to the worn condition of various parts. Charles Hobby of Embers testified that wear to the engine would suggest high mileage, but he did not estimate the Dakota’s mileage based on its engine wear.
In Levine v. Parks Chevrolet, Inc., 76 N.C.App. 44, 331 S.E.2d 747, 748 (1985), plaintiffs expert, a mechanic, testified that the ear’s condition clearly showed that the odometer was wrong. Furthermore, the mechanic sufficiently testified that any mechanic *100could have determined that the odometer was wrong based simply on the car’s condition. Levine, 331 S.E.2d at 748.
This Court holds that the evidence regarding wear on the replaced auto parts and the general testimony concerning wear as an indicator of high mileage are sufficient to establish an inference of mileage significantly in excess of the odometer reading on the vehicle. Further, the oil change sticker created a disputed question of fact regarding whether Regency had constructive knowledge that the actual mileage exceeded the odometer reading, whether reasonable care would have put Regency on notice that the actual mileage exceeded the odometer reading, or whether Regency exhibited a reckless disregard in failing to determine the inaccuracy of the odometer reading. The jury concluded Regency should have known the odometer reading was less than the actual mileage of the car. Sufficient evidence exists to support the jury verdict, in that Regency should have examined the motor to see if its age and condition were consistent with the odometer reading. Restated, the evidence is sufficient to establish that Regency had constructive knowledge that the odometer reading was less than the actual miles traveled. Nieto, 578 F.2d at 641; Moore, 543 So.2d at 187; Levine, 331 S.E.2d at 751.
c.
There were two objections to the admission of the oil sticker: hearsay and authentication.
Regency objected to the sticker on grounds of hearsay,2 in that the declarant who wrote the mileage on the sticker did not testify at the trial and the sticker was a written assertion offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted — that the vehicle had 90,000 miles. Jenkins countered, and the trial court agreed, that the sticker was not offered to prove that 90,000 miles was the actual mileage of the car, but to show that Regency had notice that the vehicle’s odometer was wrong.
As Jenkins argues, out of court statements offered to prove notice rather than the truth of the matter asserted are not hearsay. Gayten v. State, 595 So.2d 409, 414 (Miss.1992). The court must closely examine the factual circumstances of each case to ensure that the truth of the matter asserted is not the true issue. Jenkins was required to prove either (1) Regency represented to him the mileage on the Dakota was 51,236 while it had actual or constructive knowledge that the actual mileage was greater than this; or (2) Regency failed to disclose to Jenkins that the actual mileage was unknown and use of reasonable care would have put Regency on notice that the actual mileage exceeded the odometer reading; or (3) Regency exhibited a reckless disregard in failing to determine the inaccuracy of the odometer reading. See Nieto v. Pence, 578 F.2d 640, 641 (5th Cir. 1978); Moore v. H. Gene Simmons, Inc., 543 So.2d 186, 187 (Miss.1989); Haynes v. Manning, 917 F.2d 450, 452-53 (10th Cir.1990).
Here Jenkins finds evidentiary support for the inference that the actual mileage exceeded that shown by the odometer in the general condition of the vehicle. The oil sticker was offered solely to show that Regency had constructive knowledge or notice that the odometer reading was less than the actual mileage or that it acted in reckless disregard, he has no proof that the actual mileage is greater than 51,236. As such, it was not hearsay.
Authentication, under M.R.E. 901,3 requires sufficient evidence to show that the document is what it is claimed to be. Cox v. State, 586 So.2d 761, 767 (Miss.1991). This Court has held in a prior odometer case that authentication of documents submitted for admission must be proved. Moore v. H. Gene Simmons, Inc., 543 So.2d 186, 187-88 (Miss.1989).
Jenkins testified that the sticker was on the door when it left Regency. While he did not see it, his testimony, in essence was that he did not place a new door or a sticker *101on the track and that a sticker could not have been placed there after he left Regency with the vehicle. Leaving his credibility for jury assessment, as we must, we must assume that the sticker was in fact there. Thus the sticker was authenticated in the only way relevant to its evidentiary purpose, notice to Regency. It was properly admitted.
d.
Regency contends that no fair market value for the track in its condition was established and that instruction P-4 as to damages was erroneously given because it failed to require the jury to find damages with reference to fair market value. The relevance of fair market value is that actual damages are determined by the difference between the sales price of the ear and the fair market value of the car, in addition to other damages “proximately caused by Defendant’s acts.” Gonzales v. Van’s Chevrolet, Inc., 498 F.Supp. 1102, 1103 (D.Del.1980).
Regency objected to Jenkins’s testimony regarding his valuation of the vehicle given the knowledge of the problems that had occurred since his purchase. Jenkins stated he would have paid only $3,500 for the truck at the time he purchased it had he known of the “actual” mileage and the truck’s problems. Regency states that Jenkins should not have been allowed to testify to the value of his own property at the time of purchase. Regency farther argues that Jenkins’s stating what he would have paid is not evidence of fair market value.
Individuals may testify as to the value of their own property. Thomas v. Global Boat Builders & Repairmen, Inc., 482 So.2d 1112, 1116 (Miss.1986); Whitfield v. Whitfield, 40 Miss. 352, 356 (1866). We have not indicated whether this estimate of value must be rationally based. Nor have we required any predicate other than that of ownership. Curiously, in Thomas, we have indicated that an owner is somehow not qualified to express an opinion as to the value of property after it has been damaged, without further qualification. Id. Undoubtedly this latter pronouncement proved confusing at trial because, when Jenkins was asked the fair market value of his track, an objection was interposed based on Jenkins’s qualifications and sustained based on the lack of a proper “predicate.” After several subsequent tries and a bench conference, Jenkins was finally allowed to testify as to what he would pay for it. Later, on cross-examination, Jenkins was asked whether he “put a value on this Dodge track of $3,500,” to which Jenkins responded in the affirmative. The examiner continued by asking Jenkins the basis for his value and Jenkins, in response, over objection which was overruled, related that he had been offered $1,500 to $1,800 for it by a dealer six or seven months after he bought it.
In the colloquy concerning jury instructions, the instruction P-4 was offered. That instruction as submitted directed the jury to assess damages by comparing the purchase price with the fair market value of the vehicle. The initial objection was that it did not specify a particular time as to the value of the truck. A modification was offered inserting “at the time of purchase.” It was then noted that there was no testimony as to “fair market value” and there followed a discussion of the import of the testimony concerning the offer and whether it was admitted for the limited purpose of establishing a basis for Jenkins’s opinion. This discussion included an offer by Jenkins to call another witness, one who was present at the courthouse and could be called without appreciable delay, to further establish fair market value. Finally, the trial court ruled that the testimony concerning the offer was for a limited purpose and that he would give the instruction striking the words “fair market.” There was no objection at that time. Later, after completing the consideration of the plaintiffs instructions, the defendant interposed an objection to the instruction as modified because “there was no testimony as to damages.”
In fact, there was testimony as to damages and the evidence was sufficient to allow a fair-minded jury to assess damages in this case. Jenkins was competent under our precedents to give “fair market” value without further qualification. He was asked what it was worth and to state the actual value. The objection went to competence and then to predicate, rather than to the relevance *102based on the absence of the words “fair market.” Eventually he was allowed to answer the question couched in terms of what he would pay. It was then affirmed with him on cross-examination that his testimony as to what he would pay was the value that he placed on it. With every reason to depress value, his testimony was to the effect that the value he placed was approximately double what a dealer offered him. There was no suggestion that he was talking about anything other than a fair market value. There was no contradictory evidence of fair market value. Thus, we conclude that the elimination of the words “fair market” from the instruction did not, impermissibly mislead the jury.
e.
Regency complains that the jury failed to follow the peremptory instruction, D-21, telling the jury that if they found Regency liable they should also find all other defendants jointly and severally liable.4 The trial court also gave another instruction, D-24, directing the jury to return a verdict against Highway 49 Motors (the predecessor-in-title to Embers) if the jury found Embers should pay Regency for Jenkins’s judgment against Regency.5 During deliberation, the jury asked if it could make all defendants equally responsible. The trial judge responded, in writing, negatively; he referred the jury to several instructions, including D-21 and D-24.6 The jury disregarded instructions D-21 and D-24 and found only Regency liable.
Regency argues that the jury’s action constitutes error. Regency states that under implied warranties of merchantability, Embers would have a duty to indemnify Regency for damages under Mississippi’s version of the Uniform Commercial Code because if the odometer reading was altered, the truck would not pass without objection in the trade. Miss.Code Ann. § 75-2-314 (1972).
Cases interpreting 15 U.S.C. § 1989, however, state that this Act imposes separate and individual liability for each person who violates the Act and, therefore, provides no right of recoupment. See, e.g., Ferns v. Haymore, 967 F.2d 946, 956 (4th Cir.1992). The Ferris Court stated:
In reliance upon the plain language and the remedial purpose of the statute, federal courts have held that odometer tampering defendants are separately liable under this statute and not entitled to assert cross-claims against each other for indemnity or contribution. See Chametsky v. Gus Paulos Chevrolet, Inc., 754 F.Supp. 188, 190-91 (D.Utah 1991); Mataya v. Behrn Motors, Inc., 409 F.Supp. 65, 70 (E.D.Wis.1976); Stier v. Park Pontiac, Inc., 391 F.Supp. 397, 401 (S.D.W.Va.1975); cf. Alley v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 767 F.2d 138,141 — 42 (5th Cir.1985).
Id. at 955-56.
The Ferns Court addressed the rationale prohibiting indemnity in this case by stating:
Granting recoupment under the section to a guilty defendant would substantially dilute not only the section’s punitive but also its deterrent force by spreading among several fraudulent parties what are in truth relatively small damages awards ... *103There is affirmative evidence that Congress intended the fall punitive force of the statute to be felt by every person who defrauds the public through deceptive odometer manipulation — joint wrongdoers no less so than others. “[J]udicial notions of fairness and equity must yield to the prophylactic policies of the treble-damage remedy.” Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Mil-liken & Co., 690 F.2d 380, 393 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 914, 103 S.Ct. 1893, 77 L.Ed.2d 283 (1983).
Id. at 957.
Therefore, Regency’s peremptory jury instructions were incorrect statements of the law. It follows that the failure of the jury to follow these incorrect instructions is not error. Walker v. Dickerson, 183 Miss. 642, 647,184 So. 438, 439 (1938).
f.
Regency attacks the award of attorneys’ fees in this case. The statute under which this claim is brought, 15 U.S.C. § 1989, authorizes attorneys’ fees to successful litigants. Under our law, attorneys’ fees are awarded on the basis of the information before the court, and the court’s own opinion derived from “experience and observation.” Miss.Code Ann. § 9-1-41 (1991 rev.). The standard for review of the award of attorneys’ fees is abuse of discretion, and such awards must be supported by credible evidence. Young v. Huron Smith Oil Co., 564 So.2d 36, 40 (Miss.1990).
Jenkins supported his claim with sixteen pages of itemized expenses, consisting of handwritten time sheets, and typed summaries restating the time sheets, for legibility. In total, Jenkins’s attorney billed 82.50 hours at $140 per hour, for a total of $11,550 plus expenses of $164.91 for a grand total of $11,714.91. Regency argued that by the different handwriting on the time sheets, different people, including non-lawyers, did work, but that everyone’s work was billed at $140 hourly. Regency argued individual points on the bills, stated that Jenkins’s attorney had spent too much time on certain things and should have used computerized research capabilities. The trial court awarded Jenkins $7,500.
Regency now argues that under the standards of several Fifth Circuit decisions, Jenkins is not entitled to $7,500.7 However, Regency does not demonstrate how the court specifically erred in its calculations or estimations of the fee. In contrast, Jenkins did support his award request with bills, and the judge adjusted it downward to $7,500. Since Regency cannot demonstrate how the trial court abused its discretion, its assignment of error is without merit.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
HAWKINS, C.J., DAN M. LEE, P.J., and SULLIVAN, PITTMAN and McRAE, JJ., concur.
PRATHER, P.J., dissents with separate written opinion joined by JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr. and SMITH, JJ.