Opinion
Although these appeals have reached us from different procedural sequences, we consider them together because of the questions *97common to' both: whether, and upon what evidence, a public school teacher may be subjected to administrative penalties after he has been arrested and convicted upon a charge of possession of marijuana.
The Comings Appeal (1 Civil 29298): Facts
For several years prior to 1969, appellant Arthur Tilleard Comings held certain certification documents issued by respondent State Board of Education (hereinafter the board) pursuant to the Education Code and to title V of the California Administrative Code. The documents included a general elementary teaching credential which authorized Comings to serve as a teacher in any public elementary school, or in grades 7 or 8 of any junior high school, in California. An accusation was filed with the board on August 21, 1968, alleging that Comings had been in possession of marijuana in San Diego on February 23, 1967; that he had consequently been arrested and convicted on a charge of violating Health and Safety Code section 11530; and that his cerification documents should be revoked because he had thereby committed “acts involving immoral and unprofessional conduct,” “acts demonstrating his unfitness for service,” and “an act or acts involving moral turpitude.”
Comings demanded and received an administrative hearing, which was conducted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act. (Ed. Code, § 13203; Gov. Code, § 11500 et seq.) He appeared at the hearing through counsel only. No testimony was presented at the hearing, but opposing counsel (1) stipulated to the introduction of the evidence received at Comings’ preliminary examination on the marijuana charge,1 and of the minute-order record of his plea of guilty thereto in the Superior Court of San Diego County; and (2) stipulated that he was subsequently convicted on the charge in that court, and was granted probation.2 None of the foregoing evidence was disputed, nor is it disputed on Comings’ appeal: no other evidence was received at the hearing.
The hearing officer proposed, and the board adopted, a decision revoking Comings’ certification documents pursuant to Education Code sections *9813202 and 13129,3 which were cited in the decision: Comings thereupon sought a writ of mandate, in the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco, to compel the board to set aside its decision and to reinstate his certification documents. The cause was apparently submitted on the pleadings and the administrative record, without the introduction of any evidence. The superior court denied Comings’ petition by minute order,4 from which he appeals.
The Jones Appeal (1 Civil 29573): Facts
In and prior to 1969, appellant Selwyn Jones was a permanent, certificated employee of respondent Jefferson Union High School District, and taught in the art department of Westmoor High School in Daly City, San Mateo County. On August 22, 1969, while visiting Hawaii, Jones was arrested and charged with possession of marijuana in violation of the laws of that state. Pursuant to his plea of nolo contendere, he was thereafter convicted as charged, and granted probation and fined, in the Circuit Court of the Fifth District of Hawaii.
After Jones’ return to- Westmoor High School in the fall of 1969, respondent school district’s superintendent filed, with respondent district’s *99governing board and pursuant to Education Code section 13404, a written statement of charges against him.5
The board commenced administrative proceedings directed to Jones’ immediate suspension and dismissal. (Ed. Code, § 13408 et seq.) When he demanded a hearing, the board by resolution authorized the San Mateo County District Attorney to file an action for Jones’ dismissal. {Id., § 13412, subd. (b).) The district attorney commenced such action in the Superior Court of San Mateo County on November 10, 1969, alleging the above-recited sequence in the “Complaint for Dismissal.” Jones having answered the complaint, the cause was tried before the court sitting without a jury. As plaintiff at the trial, respondent school district introduced testimony by Dennis Higashi and Margaret Riggs. Higashi, an officer in the police department of the County of Kauai, Hawaii, testified to the circumstances surrounding Jones’ arrest, in which he (Higashi) had participated.6
Miss Margaret Riggs, vice-principal at Westmoor High School, testified as follows:7 Jones’ return to the school as a teacher would adversely *100affect its art department, its faculty at large, its student body generally, and the students’ parents, because many of the persons involved had expressed “disapproval” or “concern” at the prospect of having a teacher on the campus who had been convicted of using marijuana or who had admitted its use. The effect of his return would “not be good,” as to the students, because “the behavior of a faculty member who would have used marijuana would be . . . [an] . . . example in opposition to the instructions which we are giving ... [to the students] . . .” in “a campaign, instructional campaign, going on within our own school district ... on drug use and abuse.” Directly asked for her “overall opinion” concerning Jones’ “fitness to teach after his conviction of marijuana possession and his admission to marijuana use,” Miss Riggs testified that it “would not be a positive one,” and “would, in fact, work against the total goals of our school,” because it would not indicate to- the students “the kind of behavior which they are told to develop.”
Miss Riggs also- testified that her knowledge of Jones’ arrest and conviction in Hawaii, and of his admissions to the use of marijuana (see fn. 7, ante), was based exclusively upon information she had received after Jones had been suspended in the course of the administrative proceedings' commenced against him in October 1969. Jones, however, called at the trial in his own behalf, testified in effect that his 1969 arrest and conviction had been reported in the San Francisco Chronicle.8 (He also denied having made the oral admissions attributed to him by Officer Higashi, and testified to the general effect that he could have successfully defended the Hawaii prosecution, but pleaded nolo contendere therein as a matter of convenience.)
Upon the foregoing evidence, the trial court made findings of fact which in effect dismissed some of the original charges against Jones but, sustaining others, found cause for his dismissal.9 Jones appeals from the judgment, next duly entered, authorizing his dismissal.
*101 Challenging the administrative determination and the trial court’s action in each of the cases before us, appellants contend (1) that, as a matter of law, possession of marijuana, or conviction for the crime thereof, cannot amount to “immoral or unprofessional conduct,” or to an act or crime “involving moral turpitude” or demonstrating “evident unfitness for service,” within the meanings of these terms as used in Education Code sections 13202, 13129, subdivision (e) and 13403; and (2) that, as a matter of proof, the contrary conclusion reached by the trial court, in each of the present cases respectively, is not supported by substantial evidence.
The first argument rests upon the propositions assertedly advanced in selected scientific and other authorities, cited in appellants’ briefs, to the effect that the use of marijuana is medically harmless and (although illegal) commonplace among students and adults in California and elsewhere.10 If these propositions were accepted as true (and we are requested *102to take judicial notice of their truth), appellants argue that, as a matter of law, possession of marijuana cannot be “immoral,” or an “act involving moral turpitude” as such terms have been defined by the courts. (Appellants cite, e.g., Board of Education v. Weiland (1960) 179 Cal.App.2d 808, 811 [4 Cal.Rptr. 286], and Palo Verde etc. Sch. Dist. v. Hensey (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 967, 971-972 [88 Cal.Rptr. 570] [“immoral”]; Yakov v. Board of Medical Examiners (1968) 68 Cal.2d 67, 73 [64 Cal. Rptr. 785, 435 P.2d 553] [“moral turpitude”].) We do not accept—because we do not reach—the dubious pTemise that a criminal act cannot be characterized as. “immoral” if it is medically harmless or commonly committed; appellants’ argument to this effect fails for other reasons.
In the first place, we cannot judicially notice the truth of the stated propositions that the use of marijuana is harmless or commonplace. The authorities cited to both effects (see fn. 10, ante [first paragraph]) were mentioned in a brief submitted by Comings in his trial court, but it does not appear that judicial notice of the truth of their asserted conclusions (i.e., that marijuana was harmless and that its use was common) was “requested” in that court (Evid. Code, § 455, subd. (a)) or taken by it with advance notice to the opposite party. (Id., subd. (b).) In all events, the accuracy of the matters asserted, in either proposition, is the subject of intense scientific and popular controversy; actual judicial knowledge of the relevant truths is limited; and there is no evidence, in either record on appeal, supporting a conclusion either way. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the “propositions” stated in the cited authorities are of “generalized knowledge” or “common knowledge,” and are not reasonably subject to “dispute,” so as to permit their being judicially noticed as true. (Evid. Code, § 451, subd. (f); id., § 452, subds. (g), (h). Cf. Rosas v. Montgomery (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 77, 87 [88 CalRptr. 907] and authorities cited; Witkin, Cal. Evidence (2d ed. 1966) §§ 178-179, pp. 164-165.)11
*103More significantly, appellants’ first argument misses the mark because it amounts to semantic preoccupation with the statutory terms “immoral,” and the like, as criteria for analyzing the conduct of public school teachers for disciplinary purposes. This approach is incorrect. As bases for administrative sanctions against persons who hold govemmentally issued credentials which qualify them for employment, the statutory terms “constitute only lingual abstractions until applied to a specific occupation and given content by reference to fitness for the performance of that vocation.” (Morrison v. State Board of Education (1969) 1 Cal.3d 214, 239 [82 Cal.Rptr. 175, 461 P.2d 375].12 Cf. Perrine v. Municipal Court (1971) 5 Cal.3d 656, 665 [97 Cal.Rptr. 320, 488 P.2d 648].) In a disciplinary proceeding against a public school teacher, the administrative agency cannot “abstractly characterize” his conduct in the statutory language (i.e., as “immoral” and so on) unless that conduct indicates his unfitness to teach. (Morrison v. State Board of Education, supra, at p. 229. Cf. Palo Verde etc. Sch. Dist. v. Hensey, supra, 9 Cal.App.3d 967 at p. 972; Board of Trustees v. Stubblefield (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 820, 825-826 [94 Cal. Rptr. 318]; Governing Board v. Brennan (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 396, 402 [95 Cal.Rptr. 712]; Blodgett v. Board of Trustees (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 183, 191 [97 Cal.Rptr. 406], See Louisell and Sinclair, The Supreme Court of California 1969-1970 (1971) 59 Cal.L.Rev. 30, 58 et seq.)
Education Code section 13202 may be construed as constitutional only when so interpreted. (Morrison v. State Board of Education, supra, 1 Cal. 3d 214 at pp. 218, 230, 235; Governing Board v. Brennan, supra, 18 Cal. App.3d 396 at pp. 400-401; Louisell and Sinclair, op cit. supra, 59 Cal.L.Rev. 30 at pp. 58, 63.) The Morrison test, however, applies in administrative proceedings directed to dismissal of a teacher under Education Code sec*104tion 13403, as well as revocation of certification documents under section 13202. (Board of Trustees v. Stubblefield, supra, 16 Cal.App.3d 820 at p. 826.)
To be valid in either case, the imposition of discipline must be supported by evidence of the person’s unfitness to teach. (Morrison v. State Board of Education, supra, at pp. 218, 236-237; Governing Board v. Brennan, supra, at p. 402.) This may include evidence that his conduct indicates a potential for adverse school relationships in the future, or has achieved such notoriety as to impair those in which he is already involved. (Morrison v. State Board of Education, supra, at pp. 235, 237;13 Board of Trustees v. Stubblefield, supra, at p. 826.) For all these reasons, we are necessarily remitted to the second question raised by appellants: i.e., whether there is substantial evidence, in either record on appeal, of the respective subject’s unfitness, to teach.
The Comings Appeal (1 Civil 29298): Disposition
The Comings record (1 Civil 29298) shows the bare facts of his February 1967, arrest in San Diego for possession of marijuana, the circumstances immediately attending it (see fn. 1, ante), his subsequent prosecution for violating Health and Safety Code section 11530, and his conviction. He was convicted in or about June 1967 (see fn. 2, ante), but the accusation against him was not filed with the State Board of Education until August 1968; a degree of “remoteness in time of the conduct” (see fn. 13, ante) was thus suggested, but not analyzed.
Whether Comings’ conduct “adversely affected students or fellow teachers,” or in what “degree” (see fn. 13, ante), is not even suggested by the record; the latter, in fact, does not show whether or where he taught in a California public school at any time, thus precluding any inference as to the relevant notoriety of his conduct. No inquiry was made into “extenuating or aggravating circumstances, if any, surrounding the conduct,” the likelihood of its recurrence, or Comings’ motives. (Ibid.) The record con*105tains even less evidence of his “unfitness to teach” than appeared in the record held insufficient in Morrison; it thus falls short of the showing required, under the Morrison, test, to support revocation of his certification documents.
While we must therefore reverse the judgment in 1 Civil 29298 (as to Comings), we here paraphrase (as to him and his conduct) some relevant language by the Morrison court: “Our conclusion affords no guarantee that [Comings’ certification documents] cannot be revoked. If the Board of Education believes that [he] is unfit to' teach, it can reopen its inquiry into the circumstances surrounding and the implications of the [1967] incident .... The board also has at its disposal ample means to discipline [him] for future misconduct. [Par.] Finally, we do not, of course, hold that [marijuana offenders] must be permitted to teach in the public schools of California. As we have explained, the relevant statutes, as well as the applicable principles of constitutional law, require only that the board properly find, pursuant to the precepts set forth in this opinion, that an individual is not fit to- teach. Whenever disciplinary action rests upon such grounds and has been confirmed by the judgment of a superior court following an independent review of the evidence, this court will uphold the result.” (Morrison v. State Board of Education, supra, 1 Cal.3d 214 at pp. 239-240 [fns. omitted].)
The Jones Appeal (1 Civil 29573): Disposition
We reach an opposite result upon Jones’ appeal (1 Civil 29573) from the superior court’s judgment authorizing his dismissal as a permanent, certificated employee of respondent Jefferson Union High School District. Margaret Riggs testified at length to her opinions concerning Jones; her qualifications to do so, as vice-principal of the school where he was employed in and prior to 1969, appear in the record and are unchallenged on the appeal. Many of her opinions were directed to the adverse effect of Jones’ “return” to the school, which is not entirely relevant to the question whether he was justifiably dismissed from it. She nevertheless testified directly to Jones’ “fitness to teach,” and her opinion can only be read (1) to¡ the effect that he was unfit and (2) as stating valid reasons for this conclusion.
It is also true that Miss Riggs learned of Jones’ conduct in Hawaii only after respondent school district’s governing board had suspended him in consequence thereof. The conduct itself, however, and the other pertinent events in Hawaii, were reported in the San Francisco Chronicle. (See fn. 8, ante, and accompanying text.) As it may reasonably be inferred that the *106salient facts thus reached the attention of many persons in Daly City, it may also be inferred that Jones’ conduct attained a degree of timely notoriety among persons—students, teachers, parents, and others—interested in Westmoor High School. (See Morrison v. State Board of Education, supra, 1 Cal.3d 214 at p. 237; Board of Trustees v. Stubblefield, supra, 16 Cal. App.3d 820 at p. 826.) Overall, we find substantial evidence of Jones’ “unfitness to teach,” at relevant times and places, as required by the Morrison test. The judgment in 1 Civil 29573 must therefore stand.
The judgment in 1 Civil 29298 is reversed. The judgment in 1 Civil 29573 is affirmed.
Devine, P. J., concurred.
A petition for a rehearing in No. 29573 was denied February 24, 1972, and the petitions of appellant Jones and respondent Board for a hearing by the Supreme Court were denied March 30, 1972.