38 Mich. App. 777

PEOPLE v GREGORY THOMAS

*778Submitted Division 1 January 6, 1972, at Detroit.

(Docket No. 12057.)

Decided February 25, 1972.

Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Gahcdan, Prosecuting Attorney, Dominick R. Carnovale, Chief, Appellate Department, and Gerard A. Poehlman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.

Arthur J. Tarnow, State Appellate Defender, for defendant.

Before: Levin, P. J., and Holbrook and Bronson, JJ.

Levin, P. J.

The defendant, Gregory L. Thomas, was convicted by a jury of the offense of larceny from the person. MCLA 750.357; MSA 28.589. The defense was alibi.

The trial judge charged the jury that there were three possible verdicts: (1) guilty of larceny from *779the person, (2) guilty of the lesser offense of sjbtnple larceny, and (3) not guilty. He refused to charge that the defendant could be convicted of the lesser offenses of attempt to commit larceny from the person or attempt to commit simple larceny.

The defendant’s reliance on People v Lemmons, 384 Mich 1 (1970), is misplaced. Lemmons is an exception to the general rule that it is not error to fail to charge on included offenses in a case where the defendant has not requested such a charge. It has been said that the exception recognized in Lemmons is that where a defendant is entitled to a charge on a lesser offense it is error affirmatively to exclude the lesser offense from the jury’s consideration even if there is no request to charge.1

Here we are not confronted with the question of whether in the particular circumstances presented instructional error should be recognized on appeal even though there was a failure to request a charge ; Thomas’s lawyer requested a charge on lesser offenses and the request was refused. We are, rather, confronted with the antecedent question of whether Thomas was entitled to such a charge at all.

The rule is that entitlement to a charge on a lesser included offense largely turns on whether, on view of the evidence favorable to the defendant, there is evidence which would justify the jury in concluding that the greater offense was not committed and a lesser included offense was committed.2

*780The elements of attempted larceny are the felonious intent to commit a larceny and an overt act going beyond mere preparation towards its commission.3 In this case all the evidence showed that there was a completed larceny. There was no evidence from which the jury could reasonably have concluded that the defendant may not have gone beyond the attempt-stage. The judge did not err in refusing to give the jury the option of convicting the defendant of an attempt to commit a larceny.4

The victim was an invalid who was selling newspapers from a three-wheel bicycle. He testified that he was accosted by the. defendant who reached into the victim’s pocket and took all his money. Although the victim conceded that some of the money may have dropped to the ground that does not negate the evidence showing that there was an asportation.5 The concession that some of the money might not have reached the defendant’s pocket does not tend to show that the completed offense of larceny from the person may not have been committed.

An eyewitness observed the assault and the defendant reaching into the victim’s pocket. The witness conceded that he had no way of knowing what, if anything, the defendant took from the victim’s pocket. Merely because all the witnesses are unable *781to establish all the elements of the crime does not mean that there is uncertainty whether the only evidence establishes a completed offense.6

In this ease there is no inconsistency in the testimony on the factual issue of whether the greater or a lesser offense was committed.7 Nor is this a case where it would have been reasonable to infer from the evidence — disputed or undisputed — that either the greater or the lesser offense was committed.8 In *782this case the evidence is all consistent in establishing that only the greater offense was committed; it would not have been reasonable to infer from the evidence that a lesser attempted offense was committed. See People v Tyrone Williams, 38 Mich App 146 (1972).

Implicit in the long-established rule, recently reiterated by the Michigan Supreme Court,9 that it is not error to refuse to charge on a lesser offense which is not supported by the evidence, is the Court’s rejection of the contention advanced by Thomas that MCLA 768.32; MSA 28.1055 entitles every defendant in every case to a charge on “an attempt to. commit such offense” either because the statute so states or because “every completed offense must include a successful attempt to commit the crime”10 or because a jury may believe such portion of a witness’s testimony as it chooses to believe and discard the balance.11 It is obvious, in the light of the present _!_\__ *783case law concerning entitlement to a charge on lesser offenses,12 that Thomas’s argument has not prevailed in the councils of the Supreme Court. If the law is to be changed the Supreme Court must change it.

Affirmed.

All concurred.

People v. Thomas
38 Mich. App. 777

Case Details

Name
People v. Thomas
Decision Date
Feb 25, 1972
Citations

38 Mich. App. 777

Jurisdiction
Michigan

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